Beyond the great story: history as text and discourse
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For Robert F. Berkhofer III
and the next generation
of historians
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THIS BOOK begins in the midst of scholarly conversations and disciplinary dialogues. In this sense at least, it is a product of its times, to use a favorite phrase of historians. First, as some scholars hail the end of theory or even of postmodernism itself, the time seems right for an assessment of the implications of postmodernism and poststructuralism for the practice of history. Second, because multiculturalism and feminist theory impugn the overall viewpoint traditionally used in synthesizing history, it is necessary to reconsider what constitutes an appropriate perspective from which to view and compose a history. Third, it seems important to explore the significant role claimed for historicization in both literary studies and the social sciences today. Poststructuralist and postmodernist theories question the possibility of writing history at the very time that such historicization has become a way of grounding literary studies and the social sciences. That historicization is considered so vital by some scholars just when its whole approach to representing the past is being challenged by others poses the paradox that inspires this book.

This paradox suggests that in view of the postmodernist and multiculturalist challenges both historians and scholars in other disciplines underestimate the difficulties of representing the past as history. Throughout these various disciplinary debates literary scholars and social scientists alike have too unproblematic a view of the nature of history when they theorize about historicization in their fields. Historians, on other hand, have too unproblematic a view of history as discourse and methodology when they defend their discipline against literary and rhetorical theorists.

To address these various concerns this book combines in its arguments insights and interests from several disciplines. It discusses history but is not the kind of work customarily called a history in the discipline, because it
Preface

Preface

This volume exemplifies, like so many books that talk about theory today, the problems of language talking about language. The difficulty in using words stems from the assumption of universal linguistic categories in discourse but the practice of local language customs, especially academic ones. Although this book is addressed to all time rhetorically, it is of course addressed to fellow scholars mainly in the United States at this moment. As a result the terms "history," "historical practice," and "historical discourse" seem to refer to the doing of history everywhere but in context refer to the practices of various historians arranged according to an imaginary set of concentric circles. At the center is American history done in the United States. Outside this circle is another one of English-speaking historians elsewhere and their practices. Larger but less clearly defined circles include historians in other nations and scholars in other fields, all of whom must decide how applicable the book is to their own disciplinary concerns. This volume also distinguishes between formal or professional history and what we might call lay or folk history. This avowal of my own parochial viewpoint parallels the essentially provincial context of every history and highlights the predicaments facing professional historians as they try to make their publications and teaching multicultural, self-reflective, and self-critical.

The subject matter of this book and its organization follow from my perception of the problems facing any historicization today, whether done by historians or by other scholars in the social sciences or the humanities. In the end, I believe that modernist and postmodernist outlooks ought to be in creative tension in historical practice and discourse today. Structuralist and formalist ways still have much to teach historians, as do poststructuralism and postmodernism at this conjunction of scholarly trends. Late modernism and postmodernism hold equally important consequences for changed ways of representation in historical discourse. That is why I have tried to construct a dialogue among changing intellectual influences.

What anglophone historical practice needs at this juncture is the opposite of literary studies. As literary theorists turn to historicization, historians should explore textualism to see what remains useful for historical practice. Given normal professional methodological concerns for deriving facts from evidence, I have stressed the problems and methodology of synthesis. Hence my use of the word "text" to designate usually what historians produce rather than what they use as sources—although the two are never unconnected in practice. "Textualization" and "historicization" refer to the processes of constructing a text or history. Both processes result in publications, films, classroom lessons, lectures, and museum exhibitions, among other forms.

In line with my impression of the challenges facing historians, the first half of the book (Chapters i through 5) treats some of the implications of the linguistic and rhetorical turns as incorporated in modern literary and rhetorical theory for the writing, reading, teaching, and reviewing of history—in short, it examines history and histories as forms of representation. My special concern in these chapters is that, in repudiating some of the implications of textualism, historians not deny those understandings pertinent and useful to their practice. Thus Chapter 1 surveys the challenges now gathered under the rubric of postmodernism and how historians have responded. Chapter 2 covers the diverse roles of narrative in the creation of historical facts and their synthesis into what is termed (a) history and the possibility of multiple stories. Chapter 3 examines the relationships among factual reference, the structure of interpretation, metahistory, and truth in historical texts and in history itself. Chapter 4 explores the distinctions offered by a new rhetoric and poetics of history for
reading historical texts and history as a text, while Chapter 5 focuses on how time is historicized by patterning through emplotment.

The second half of the book examines contextualization of history in general—in histories as texts and of historians as a professional community—in light of a textualist approach. Chapter 6 makes the transition from rhetoric to politics through the roles of voice and viewpoint in history. Chapter 7 tackles the implications of multiculturalism for the selection of viewpoint as well as voices in a historical text by focusing on the problems involved in representing otherness. Chapter 8 moves from the politics of viewpoint, to the politics of historical practice and professional authority, to the self-reflective problems of the sociology and politics of historical knowledge, and ends with the relation between power and knowledge and the politics of competing disciplinary frameworks. In the concluding chapter I discuss some of the implications of the book for writing and teaching, reading and reviewing history today. I explore briefly what I term reflexive (con)textualization as an option open to historians for creating new histories in light of the challenges confronting them.
CHAPTER ONE

The Postmodernist Challenge

As another millennium approaches, even scholarly discourse seems to echo the apocalypticism expressed in popular culture. Certainly, the proliferation of "posts"—industrialism, colonialism, modernism, feminism, Marxism, and even history, theory, and postmodernism itself—betokens a sense of change with regard to the once secure intellectual foundations of modernist scholarship. Among professional historians these fears have focused upon the implications of postmodernism for the discipline. Both those who oppose and those who favor the implications of postmodernism for the writing of history agree upon its chief consequence. Postmodernist theory questions what history can be, both as a real past and as a discourse about it. Historians disagree about how best to meet the challenge.

Interdisciplinary Challenges

If Clio, the muse of history, had followed the intellectual trends of recent decades in the English-speaking world, she might have become quite dizzy as that amalgam of social, moral, and literary studies the French call the "human sciences" took first a "linguistic turn," then "interpretive" and "rhetorical" turns. Although the linguistic, interpretive, and rhetorical turns differed from one another, all questioned the received viewpoint grounding the social sciences: an ideal of scientific positivism and its corollary, the strict separation of objectivity and subjectivity, whether as fact versus value or as empiricism versus political and moral advocacy. Each of the three turns stressed language, meaning, and interpretation as central to human understanding and therefore to understanding humans. All asserted that the methodologies and knowledge embodied in scholarly disciplines were not
universal and timeless but socially and culturally constituted and therefore historically specific like other realms in human affairs. The stimuli for all these turns were the structuralist and poststructuralist movements on the European continent. Their perspectives and premises provided strong new foundations for understanding literature broadly conceived according to general theory and, in the process, impugned the very basis of traditional historical practice. Whether the theorizing emanated from the positivist search for formal systems of the structuralists or from the antipositivist antiformalism of the poststructuralists, it challenged history as traditionally conceived and practiced by raising doubts about the discovery of truth and the foundations of knowledge, the autonomy and unity of the “individual” as agent and subject, the basis of disciplinary boundaries and practices, and the stability of meaning in language.

When French pundits announced the "death of the author" as they dissolved authorship into socially based discursive practices, the "end of man" as they reduced the ego-based autonomous subject to cultural codes, and the death of metaphysics as they deconstructed the "logocentrism" of Western thought, they also proclaimed the "death of history" as a teleological enterprise. Although this dramatic declaration was directed at the grand narratives of progress and emancipation that sustained liberal and Marxist history alike, the implications for traditional historical practice of the collective postmodernist challenges went beyond teleology. In the end, postmodernist theorists questioned the very dichotomies that grounded the paradigm of traditional historical practice. Whether the theorizing emanated from the positivist search for formal systems of the structuralists or from the antipositivist antiformalism of the poststructuralists, it challenged history as traditionally conceived and practiced by raising doubts about the discovery of truth and the foundations of knowledge, the autonomy and unity of the “individual” as agent and subject, the basis of disciplinary boundaries and practices, and the stability of meaning in language.

With the recent announcement of a "historic turn," have the human sciences come full circle to the traditional starting point of historians? After their dizzying dance with the all-encompassing and universal theories of Talcott Parsons and others (now labeled the Structural-Functional school), sociologists and other social scientists repudiated such grand theorization in favor of the historicization of their subject matter. Historical sociology now dominates its discipline, and a historical approach is now also considered fundamental to anthropology and political science. Similarly, as continental grand theory has receded in the literary fields, scholars there too have sought a revival of historicization in their studies, with the "New Historicism" being the most obvious instance.

To many anglophone historians the return of history in the other human science disciplines appears to authorize their traditional practices and focus of study. From their perspective, anglophone empiricism has survived a period of attack and vanished francophone theorizing; the postmodernist challenge to traditional history has at least retreated from its own excesses. But this self-congratulatory verdict seems not only premature but also unfounded, for it fails to consider how the linguistic and other turns have reinterpreted what any historic (re)turn could mean as methodology or practice. If nothing else, late modernist and postmodernist challenges altered the terms and the grounds of the debate and created a new urgency and a more comprehensive challenge.

What is now called the postmodernist challenge to traditional history began as the crisis of representation raised by late modernist and structuralist theorists. To what extent can historians combine the two meanings of history as actual past and modern representation when all we know of language seemingly subverts that very goal? What if a realist theory of the correspondence between history as written and the actual past is abandoned for a constructionist view of history as a form of representation? How can we judge the accuracy of the modern representation of the past against a postulated original when it is, by definition, past? How can we hope to re-present the past as it was when we must do so through present-day (re)creations? Ultimately, since both late modernism and postmodernism question how history is traditionally written, should this last question be answered by new kinds of histories more in keeping with late twentieth-century intellectual fashions, or must they modeled after postmodernist novels or recent reflexive social scientific monographs?

Poststructuralist and multiculturalist theorizing produced the second crisis of representation: Who can speak for whom in histories and history? By denying the universality of viewpoints and knowledge, multiculturalism and poststructuralism repudiated the unified and usually omniscient viewpoint of traditional history-telling in favor of diversity of gender, race, ethnicity, and other social distinctions. The representation of the "Other" through voice and viewpoint also posed problems for the representation of history as textual construction. Were new forms of history-telling needed to incorporate more representative views and voices from the past as they were constructed as a representation of that past? The more diverse the representation of voices and viewpoints, the more fragmented traditional historical representation as discursive construction became.

If the first crisis of representation questioned whether and how historical actuality could ever be re-presented, the second crisis of representation undermined both the authority and the objectivity of traditional history. The first crisis of representation is encapsulated in the slogan "Question Reality," the second in another, "Resist Authority." Thus the explicit general goals of the historical turn become both paradoxical and problematic as a result of the two crises of representation. The advice always to historicize—whether texts, persons, events, or even disciplines—subverts the former in achieving the latter, or vice versa. If texts, subjects, and events can be represented, then the disciplinary practices and written histories are not rendered problematic by and through their representation. If disciplines and written histories are socially and temporally located, then their ability to persuade
others of their representations of texts, events, or subjects is severely constricted or eliminated.

Without tracing—some would say creating—the (a?) history of recent scholarship or disciplinary politics in the human sciences, I would argue that some of the major implications—others might argue achievements—of this scholarship not only undermine older ways of practicing history but also challenge much of the new cultural history said to embody the new theories of representation and social production they supposedly engendered. Likewise, the implications of so much of this once new and grand theory in literature and the human sciences subvert their own perspectives as modes of understanding just as they challenge history as a way of understanding, for the theorizing in the human sciences resulted in no consistent set of intellectual premises, no single paradigm or problematic.

The implications of so-called grand theory in the human sciences centered on and culminated in recent tendencies to denaturalize, demystify, deconstruct, and, one might continue, dehierarchize and dereferentialize. While some of these trends focused on, and resulted from, contemporary concerns with race, ethnicity, class, and gender, the implications spread far beyond these categories to the foundations assumed to be fundamental to all fields of human study, including historical studies. Since these implications challenge our very ways of understanding, they question what we are about as scholars and persons and how we represent our understandings to ourselves and others. In the end, these trends deny any easy separation of texts from contexts and vice versa, any easy division of politics from methodology or vice versa.

**Denaturalization and Demystification**

The clearest, and perhaps most widely accepted, trend is the denaturalizing of race, ethnicity, and sex. Much of what previous generations of scholars ascribed to the effects of biology in the understanding of racial and ethnic differences among peoples and the sexual differences between men and women, recent scholars attribute to social arrangements and cultural constructions. Thus so much of what was once explained by inevitable natural distinctions has come to be seen as socially constructed, hence as culturally persistent and therefore politically arbitrary. In this view, the biology of race, ethnicity, and sex becomes the culture or ideology of racism, ethnocentrism, and gender. Even the conception of human nature as a uniform biological foundation for all human behavior is denied in favor of a highly changeable, very plastic conception of human potential. What distinguishes recent denaturalization from the antiracism and the rise of the concept of culture after the Second World War is how thorough the penetration of culture has been into areas hitherto considered natural. So complete has this penetration been that the priority given nature over culture in that dichotomy has been overturned in the human sciences, and culture has become the preeminent explanation of human behavior. Whether or not racism, ethnocentrism, and patriarchy result from social structures or from cultural systems reveals conflicting foundational assumptions and explanations, but both sides of that issue can agree on the need to reconsider the specific social provenience of canonical texts and artifacts and who and what appear in the historical context.

Accompanying and reinforcing this trend to denaturalization and the study of the Other was one we might call demystification, which traced human behavior, texts, and artifacts to their social production or societal genesis. At its core such an approach postulates societal relationships as systems of structured inequality. Demystification as a methodology explores the connections between the inequalities of social relationships and power in shaping human behavior, ideas, and artifacts. Presumption of such structured inequalities in a society transforms strata or groups into classes, and, along with denaturalization, converts sexes into gender systems and peoples into racial systems. To tie literature, the arts, and ideation in general to social class and political power turns ideas into ideologies and texts into discourses. Scholars replace the search for a single, fixed, and unified meaning of a text with the exploration, in a text, of multiple, contested meanings that reproduce the class, gender, and other conflicts within a society. The revival of class and conflict analysis in literary, historical, and other scholarship has renewed the emphasis upon ideology and the prevalence of such terms as "hegemony" and "domination" in academic discourse. Even the conception of human nature as the universal biological foundation of all human behavior is portrayed as nothing more than a rationale for bourgeois hegemony and a liberal economy. As Roland Barthes argued long ago: "The status of the bourgeoisie is particular, historical: man as represented by it is universal, eternal."

If the terms "post-Marxian" and "neo-Marxian" indicate that orthodox Marxist analysis according to the base/superstructure model of simple economic determinism is out of intellectual favor, the phrase "social construction of ..." demonstrates the continuing popularity of the relativization of ideas and actions to society as a system of structured inequalities, hence a site of conflict. In fact the framework of so much of the cultural studies prominent in so many fields, especially in the form of popular culture, rests on just such a social interpretation of culture. Although culture is not relegated to some simple superstructural level, its seeming autonomy as an independent variable in the explanation of social phenomena appears severely limited by the nature of the social matrix. In the end, all categories of human knowledge, like cultural categories in general, are relativized to their overall societal genesis, be it class, gender, race, or other social origins. As Robert D'Amico concludes in *Historicism and Knowledge*, "Reasoning is
always local and beatable.”17 Thus Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth points out, "A postmodernist would never speak of 'historical reality' not because 'reality' doesn't exist except as defined locally but also because 'history' doesn't exist either, except as defined locally."18

Demystification possesses consequences for the conceptions both of culture and of the individual. Culture, like history, is always a site of social struggle. Culture can never be represented as a unified system for a whole society, because the divisions within a society find one of their expressions in the conflicts within (a) culture. Moreover, because individuals are both created and circumscribed by their location in the social matrix, the seeming autonomy of the individual is a bourgeois Humanistic myth to conceal the social origins of personal experience and the social constitution of the self.

Dehierarchization

Still another clear tendency in recent theory was one I shall label dehierarchization. Such a trend was most evident in the erosion, even dissolution, of the scholarly and aesthetic boundaries dividing elite from popular cultures. Although it may be difficult to pinpoint when the Beatles became as legitimate for academics to study (and appreciate) as Beethoven, or Superman as legitimate as Shakespeare, or everyday commercial objects as legitimate as high art ones, cultural studies as studies of popular culture blossomed first outside the academy, then within it.19 Cultural studies undermined the criteria sustaining the canons in literature, art, and music. Just as Russian formalism made folktales a model for all narrative, so semiotic, structuralist, and poststructuralist methodologies provided models and methods that eliminated the distinction between elite and other forms of literature, art, and music. What popular and cultural studies started was subsequently reinforced by the New Historicism, which studies high cultural literary texts by juxtaposing them with ordinary historic documents to show that all were part of the social and cultural arrangements of a given period. Under the aegis of the New Historicism, a canonical literary work becomes just another document “circulating” within an overall cultural system. This conflation of the literary with the nonliterary undermined the previous scholarly hierarchy that distinguished literary icon from mundane documents and, in the process, fused text and context.

Culture with a C became just another part of culture with a c, but that “reduction”—earlier critics said “degradation”—rested upon certain ways of understanding texts as a context and contexts as texts and had political as well as cognitive and aesthetic implications. Repudiation of the criteria distinguishing elite from popular, folk, and other cultures rested upon a denial of transcendent or universal principles or values in the evaluation of literature, art, and music and the relativization of aesthetic standards in general. Thus "literature,” as Terry Eagleton emphasizes, becomes nothing more than

"a name which people give from time to time for different reasons to certain kinds of writing,” just another one of many signifying practices.20 When judgments of taste, form, and pleasure are demystified, they can be traced to the specific social location of an observer, to a specific interpretive community in a society.18 Once again cultural and social arrangements circumscribe what had been previously presumed transcultural.

Much of the new historicization in the humanities, and particularly as found in the new cultural studies, seems devoted to the demystification of abstract terms, subjects, or categories long considered basic to Western culture, hence projected as universal to Culture (and therefore fundamental to the humanities themselves). As Richard Johnson, former director of the Centre for Contemporary Culture Studies at the University of Birmingham in England, says:

I would describe the evolving agenda [of cultural studies] as a series of critiques of innocent-sounding categories or innocent-sounding practices . . . obviously culture and art and literature, but also communication, and consumption, entertainment, education, leisure, style, the family, femininity and masculinity, and sexuality and pleasure, and, of course, the most objective-sounding categories of all, knowledge and science.22

Even while a study of how the concepts or categories came about reveals how they became reified as concepts and mystified as persistent essentialist and foundational universal categories, such a history can also expose the political uses of the naturalization, the mystification, and the essentializing of them in (a) society.23 In the end, such demystification creates a story of how a presumably shared culture, but eclectic both in its contents and in the social divisions of its audiences, was transformed into categories of culture segregated by the social classes of its sponsors and recipients.24

The new cultural studies seek to fuse cultural and political critique in practice through contextualization.25 The aim of combining cultural and political critique is not new, but its current vitality represents a new phase. If demystifying the class origins and uses of ideas transmutes them into ideologies, however, then do cultural and social arrangements also generate and circumscribe their own theorization? Such is the reflexive dilemma of the sociology of knowledge, as Karl Mannheim noted long ago.26 Should the study of how the concepts or categories arose in the past also reveal the scholar’s own political uses of denaturalization, demystification, and deessentializing in the present? Does—must—the reflexive critique of culture lead to the questioning of its own premises of contextualization as ideology and politics? Must—should—the social construction of cultural reality give way to the cultural or textual construction of social reality?

Under such conditions the very definition of history must take on a more reflexive meaning, one that shows its socially constructed nature, its self-con-
sciousness of its own creation, and the social conditions that allow such a practice. Thus denaturalization, demystification, and dehierarchization when applied to history not only suggest new subject matter, additional actors, and in general a history more inclusive of multicultural viewpoints; they also spotlight the politics of historical methodology, the politics of the traditional viewpoint from which history is seen and told, and the politics of the discipline as a professional community. In short, they highlight the relationships among the nature of historical knowledge, the social bases of its production, and its implication in the power system in a society. They call attention to the very purpose of history as a discipline and the moral and political ends a history serves. Must a history ultimately support or oppose the existing social, economic, and political order?

From this point of view history as method and product is pervaded by values and should expose the wrongs of the past as it espouses the correct political orientation. Cathy Davidson points out the proper role of literary history as a part of the New Historicism:

Offensal or dialogical history challenges conventional ... history by questioning both the relative value of what is examined and the implicit values of the examiner. It sees the very processes and ambitions of historiography as products of much larger forces and it seeks to understand the relationships between those present forces and the hierarchical imperative of the past ... Dialogical history gives us a choice of pasts, too. But that very choice or pluralism is subversive since it implies that ... [history] is not simply inherited but constructed, and constructed according to the ... categories we devise.27

Although denaturalization, demystification, and dehierarchization have broadened who and what are to be included as part of history and the self-consciousness of the social production of a history, they have hardly transformed the basic assumptions about how such history is to be written. Just how much a dialogical or oppositional history challenges the presuppositional paradigm of traditional history is a question to be considered both through possible exemplars in current practice and through the theory of its future creation.

Perhaps the greatest hierarchization of all was the belief among Western scholars that their intellectual categories and their ways of thought were superior to those of other peoples. Part of that ethnocentric and dominating self-privileged and hierarchization entailed the very categorization of persons as Others on the basis of gender, class, age, race, ethnicity, culture, society, nationality, or other classification that presumed the superiority of the classifier over the others. Decolonization and civil rights movements since the Second World War have called this approach into question. By asking whose interests any set of ideas serves, multiculturalism combined with demystification extends canon-busting to all disciplines, all methodologies, all paradig-

matics viewpoints grounding knowledge. As with other disciplines, multiculturalism challenges the viewpoint basic to traditional history and in turn its authority to interpret the past. It raises questions about whose perspective is represented in traditional history and whose interests such perspectives serve. In the end it queries whether the non-Western or the nondominant Other can be represented fully in any form resembling traditional history.

Dereferentialism

Far more challenging to traditional historical understanding and therefore the guild's practices in writing and reading than denaturalization, demystification, and even some aspects of dehierarchization are deconstruction and dereferentialism. It is these last two sets of presuppositions that some scholars see as the ultimate grounding of the linguistic, interpretive, and rhetorica

turns, and that others accuse of reducing all life to language, all scholarship to sound and fury ultimately signifying nothing.

Taken to its logical limit, conceptual dehierarchization challenges the whole idea of according some foundational assumptions ascendancy over others for the grounding of judgments, be they conceptual or aesthetic. In the realm of ideas, it is antiessentialism, hence antifoundationalism in its strongest form.8 Such a perspective impugns the capacity of theories to mediate as metajudgments between concepts and reality. Even scientific theory is denied status as a superior form of discourse. Science is reduced to the narrative it uses to announce its discoveries.9 Dehierarchization in aesthetics opposes universalism, elitism, even in a sense aestheticism. In its strongest version it denies the traditional distinction between literary and other forms of language. Eagleton's claim that the relationship between "literature" and other discursive practices is arbitrary is supported by Vincent Leitch, who asserts: "Literature" is not an immutable ontological category nor an objective entity; rather it is a variable functional term and a sociohistorical formation.30 Literature, like science and history, is demoted to just another text, like films, cartoons, and other cultural objects.

Theory is never accorded superiority over other language uses and never separated from its practice as a socially based discourse. The questioning of all essentialism as a form of unwarranted privileging implies that conceptual and aesthetic judgments are as much politics as philosophy, as much ideology as ideal. Accordingly, Barthes declared, "The disease of thinking in essences ... is at the bottom of every bourgeois mythology of man."31 In politics, dehierarchization once again implies antiprivilege and antielitism; to resist authority is to oppose the standard ways of looking at things as well as the standard ways of governing people.

The dehierarchization of language eventuates in dereferentialism and ultimately in deconstruction. Conceptually, dereferentialism questions the extra-
linguistic "reality," or transcendental signification, as well as persisting essentialism of abstract categories. That textual or other representations do not correspond to an extratextual, extralinguistic reality challenges referentialism in literature, the arts, and especially in history and the social sciences. Not only are such categories as race, ethnicity, and gender thereby transformed into cultural constructions, but even such other conceptions as social class and the state are categorized as essentialist and foundational if they are not construed as culturally arbitrary in definition because they are historically and socially specific. To historicize such concepts undermines their traditional utility as historical explanation or as historical concepts.

In the end, transforming the social construction of concepts into culturally construed categories reduces all modes of human communication to their forms of signification or representation. When dereferentialism questions the real status of the subject or object, it also questions the nature of the entities that go into constructing a context. Such obscuring, if not denying, of the referentiality of the subject undermines the legitimacy and authority of all traditional representations by normal historical (re)construction.

**Deconstruction**

Deconstruction—no matter how many ways it is defined today—is the ultimate dehierarchization of language, for it treats texts and discourses as nondeterminative of their ostensible meaning. The method denies the apparent unity of a text in favor of its heterogeneity and its internal tensions by revealing how a text subverts its own message through self-contradictions, ambiguities, and suppression of contraries. Deconstructionist critics expose authors' attempts to naturalize, essentialize, or universalize the categories they employ as foundational to their texts. Deconstruction aims at bottom dehierarchization of language, for it treats texts and discourses as products of socially based discursive practices. Extreme or pan textualists extended the premises of their approach to the very understanding of life itself as a text. From this viewpoint, not only do human behavior and social interaction produce texts, but humans and their societies understand themselves through and as interpretive textualizations. It is only through such textualizations that humans can reproduce their cultures and social institutions. All behavior can be interpreted like texts because it was produced in the first place through a process of textualization broadly conceived.

**The Postmodernist Challenge**

Is the writing of history possible, or do the theoretical contradictions of its practice deny its empirical pretensions? Although the question had been posed before, the answers seemed to change as a result of poststructuralism and postmodernism. For most of the twentieth century, both the question and its answer were framed in terms of the modernist paradigm. Scholars who raised these issues wondered how historians could unite in their practice the dual but contrasting perspectives of art and science said to ground the discipline. Historians sought in their writing and teaching to combine intuitive insights with rigorous empiricism, generalizations and abstractions...
with concrete and specific facts, argument and analysis with story-telling, interpretive understanding with logical explanation, creative organization with objective reporting, impartiality and detachment with moral judgment and advocacy. What historians strove to join together in their practice, scholars in other disciplines put asunder in their theorization. What historians tried to unify as a single way of understanding through their practice, other scholars criticized as ways of understanding as they separated the strands of that historical practice. While historians attempted the reconciliation of art and literature with science, all too many philosophers, literary theorists, and social scientists pointed out the dilemmas if not the confusion and impossibility of such an aim. Whether, let alone how well, historians could reconcile intuition and empiricism, generalization and specificity, analysis and narrative, interpretation and explanation, creativity and reporting, objectivity and advocacy depended as much on what other disciplines defined as the nature of these various practices as on how historians went about their business in these matters.

On the whole critics and advocates operated within the modernist paradigm. They assumed that the dichotomies reflected the inherent conflict between the positivist program of the sciences and the humanist foundations of the arts. Both programs were predicated on the separation of fact from value and the past from its representation. Commitment to a realist epistemology and ontology, however, allowed historical relativists and historical objectivists alike to assume that historians could know what the past had to have been even if they could not always represent it accurately or completely.

Although the question remains the same today, the answers seem increasingly different as scholars attack the premises of the modernist paradigm. The traditional dichotomies are denied as invalid, irrelevant, or improperly framed. The gaps between science and literature, fact and fiction, story and explanation, objectivity and advocacy narrowed or disappeared as the problems of representation increased under the aegis first of structuralism and then of poststructuralism. The implications of these theories can be seen not only in the repudiation of history as some grand teleological enterprise but also in the changed definitions of historical practice itself or in the panicky reactions of those opposing postmodernist trends.

The definition of history takes on quite a new meaning under the aegis of dereferentialism and textualism. Thus Hayden White defines a "historical work as what it manifestly is—that is to say, a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them." The French linguistic scholars A. J. Greimas and J. Courtés take a similar view in their *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary*, under "hi/story":

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1. By hi/story (history) is understood a semantic universe considered as an object of knowledge, the intelligibility of which, postulated *a priori*, is based on a diachronic articulation of its elements. In this sense, "history" can be considered as a semiotic system as object (or as a set of semiotic systems taken prior to their analysis) the approach of which is determined beforehand by certain postulates.

2. Hi/story (as story) corresponds, on the other hand, to the narration or to the description of actions the veridictory of which status is not fixed (they can be past and "real," imaginary, or even undecidable). From this viewpoint, hi/story is to be considered as a narrative discourse.

We can get a better idea of what is at issue in this latter definition by looking at how they define "truth": "Truth designates the complex term which subsumes the terms being and seeming ... It might be helpful to point out that the 'true' is situated within the discourse, for it is the fruit of the veridiction operations: this thus excludes any relation (or any homologation) with an external referent."[41]

Such a definition of history questions the ability to recover the past as history, complicating, perhaps denying, the connection between history as a text and the past as what occurred. Sande Cohen makes this complication clear in the semiotic definition he offers as part of his political critique of narrative history:

History is a concept of last resort, a floating signifier, the alibi of an alignment with obligatory values. It pertains to no signified at all; depending upon how the past is positioned, it can preclude confusion of temporal coordinates, preserve the imaginary idea of collective relations, substitute when for where, or dismiss present intensities. "History" must be radically severed from "past": the former is always calibrated with cultural contradictions, whereas the latter is much more fluid a notion. "Past" is involved with both active and involuntary memory, but "history" can only project the simulation of the remembered.[43]

How far removed in conception as well as in phrasing these definitions are from what is usual in the historical profession may be seen in the definition of "history" provided by Harry Ritter in his *Dictionary of Concepts in History*:

1. In ordinary usage, the human past. z. In professional usage, either the human past or (more significantly) inquiry into the nature of the human past, with the aim of preparing an authentic account of one or more of its facets. The term may also refer in both popular and professional usage to a written account of past events. From the *historical* viewpoint—that is, from the standpoint of the history of historical thinking itself—history may generally be defined as a tradition of learning and writing, dating from ancient times, based on rational inquiry into the factual nature of the human past.[44]

Aside from their contrasting rhetorical styles, the four definitions rest upon quite different approaches to language and its relation to the world it suppos-
edly represents, and therefore to the linkage between history as actual past and history as present record.

As the most extreme challenge of all, the strongest versions of demystification and dereferentialism deny the primary premise of the historical profession: the separation of history as the past from history as writing about that past. Radical dereferentialism by reducing the past to its textualization denies the ability of historians to know the past as such. For all practical purposes, the past and written history are the same, for only as a present-day text is the past constituted. Radical demystification by reducing historians and their histories to their social location make their practice just another form of contemporary ideology. And histories as ideologies transform the past into its textualization just as surely as dereferentialism does. Both radical demystification and radical dereferentialism reinforce each other's tendencies to treat written history as a present-minded, ideological practice, although the basic reasons for this conclusion differ greatly between the two. Thus both tendencies contradict historians' belief in their ability to use the separate reality of the past to validate their interpretations of it. No wonder some historians have reacted with dismay to this double whammy. Although those advocating radical demystification and radical dereferentialism did not always deduce the same lessons, they emphasized the same horn of the dilemma.

Gertrude Himmelfarb has pointed out the implications of such postmodernist premises for the traditional approach to texts, whether as documentary sources or as modern representations, in the historical profession. She objects to the extension of deconstruction from literature to history because it removes the authority that customarily grounded the discipline of history:

In literary criticism, deconstruction means the liberation of the text from all constraints that have traditionally given it meaning, starting with the intentions of the author—the "authorial voice," as is said. The author, according to this view, speaks with no more authority than the reader or the critic. To the extent to which the author (putative author you might say) is presumed to exercise authority over the text, that authority is "authoritarian." (The play on words is deliberate, and deliberately pejorative; that illicit authority has been described as "tyrannical," "reactionary," "imperialistic," "fascistic") The deconstructionist also liberates the text from the tyranny of what is called "context"—the context of events, ideas, conventions, which informed the text not only for the author but for contemporary readers. "Nothing outside the text," Jacques Derrida has proclaimed. And the text itself is said to be "indeterminate" because language does not reflect or correspond to reality; there is no correspondence between language and fact, between words and things. Indeed there are no facts apart from language—which is why "facts" in deconstructionist discourse normally appears in quotation marks. Moreover language itself is "duplicitious," "cryptic": it has to be "decoded" before it can convey any meaning. And since there is no single correct code, no reading of the text, no interpretation, has any more authority than any other. This interpretation is as "indeterminate" as the text itself.46

The collapse of text and context through such an approach to the past (and the present) indicate at least to Himmelfarb that those historians who would follow deconstructionist tactics would deconstruct themselves as well as misunderstand what peoples in the past meant and how they understood themselves. Himmelfarb resents that a deconstructive hermeneutics of suspicion has in effect discovered the word "lie" residing subversively in the word "belief," thus jeopardizing any practical historical exegesis, let alone authoritative narrative history.47

From the conceptual point of view, denial of referentiality and the collapse of history into its representation pose major problems for traditional historians' assumptions about the categorical differences between texts and contexts in the past and as subjects of their discourse, between textualism and contextualism as ways of understanding the past as the context of history, and between reading histories as texts and reading the past—that is, all of history—as a text. The implications of what we might call the strong program of the linguistic and rhetorical turns for traditional history (reinforced by radical demystification in the form of extreme historicization) are summarized by John Toews in a long essay review in 1987 on the ramifications of the linguistic turn for intellectual history:

If we take them seriously, we must recognize that we have no access, even potentially, to an unmediated world of objective things and processes that might serve as the ground and limit of our claims to knowledge of nature or to any transhistorical or transcendent subjectivity that might ground our interpretation of meaning.... This perspective... is radically historicist in the sense that all knowledge and meaning is perceived as time-bound and culture-bound, but it also undermines the traditional historian's quest for unity, continuity, and purpose by robbing them of any standpoint from which a relationship between past, present, and future could be objectively reconstructed.48

Emphasizing the same horn of the dilemma between radical dereferentialism and radical demystification but with quite another lesson are those who agree with Bryan Palmer about the consequences of the "descent into discourse," as he titled his polemical book on the implications of poststructuralist theory for the discipline. As a result of this "hedonistic descent into a plurality of discourses that decenter the world in a chaotic denial of any acknowledgment of tangible structures of power and comprehensions of meaning," such theory discounts or denies entirely the realities of class and economic systems in historical analysis.49 Poststructuralist theory in stressing the power of language to shape reality discounts the power of social, economic, and political forces to shape language like all other social reality. This reduction of life into language destroys the conceptual foundations of political commitment in the contemporary world. Palmer accepts the validity of historical materialism in order to criticize contemporary society and condemns this latest version of historical idealism as empty both morally and conceptually. Although he sees
some value in discourse theory for studying how a society conceptualizes gender, race, and colonialism, in his view the gains of poststructuralist theory have been more than offset by the political paralysis resulting from the reduction of lived experience to linguistic texts.

Those who choose radical demystification based upon the social realities of class, gender, and race face the same dilemmas confronting Toews in his effort to contextualize meaning in experience. In the end, radical social relativization and extreme social constructionism lead in the same direction as, and reinforce, radical textualization and dereferentialism. Radical demystification in the strongest version of social constructionism makes the texts that historians produce just another social practice grounded in the social system, hence just another ideology. In this sense, both radical de-mystification and radical dereferentialism reduce the past realities of historians to the texts describing those realities. Even a weaker version of the demystification and the social construction of historical practice historicizes historians and their practice, and in doing so transforms history into a historiography that studies changing ideologies as propaganda appropriate to their social contexts. That history may serve as ideological critique in political discourse contradicts the traditional ideal of objective reality that supposedly grounds the discipline and justifies the profession in the eyes of so many.

A Problematic Defense

As literary theorists turn to history in their criticism and explication of texts, should historians turn to literary theory in their description and explanation of contexts? If historians recognize that "Fable is always the double or other of History," the ultimate "revenge of literature," as Linda Orr argues, must they adopt a broader view of their enterprise, whether as product or practice? Do literary and rhetorical theory offer what historians need at this time, or should they continue doing what they do because the very success of history as an enterprise depends upon its practitioners not recognizing the impossible contradiction that lies at the bottom of their endeavor, as Orr also maintains?

Probably most anglophone historians hope that the historic turn has restored the profession to what they would regard as its traditional common sense. Until recently, if one is to measure such trends by articles in the major professional journals or by books written by those active in the field, these historians have denied the conceptual threats of the various intellectual turns in the human sciences by simply proceeding with business as usual. The ideas advanced and developed by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things and by Hayden White in Metahistory have been pursued mainly in fields other than history. Intellectual historians were the first to discuss these matters. While some explicating the importance of European theorists for written history, others warned against the danger of conceptual nihilism and the skeptical relativism inherent in the more radical claims of the linguistic and rhetorical turns.

Thus in his review essay, "Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn," John Toews argues that the issues center on the relationship between "the autonomy of meaning and the irreducibility of experience." The dilemma arises from two seemingly valid but ultimately irreconcilable propositions: (i) all experience is mediated by meaning, which is "constituted in and through language," but (ii) experience constrains or determines the possible meanings. He admits that language is not a transparent medium and that therefore neither is written history. To the extent that language not only shapes experienced reality but in the process constitutes it, it also reduces experience to meaning. Such a view, however, affords no grounds for arbitrating between meanings and experiences, no last resort or objective Archimedean place for distinguishing between the interpretations of reality and reality itself. In the end, history, like other specialized assertions of knowledge, is constituted by its system of language, but Toews denies that all knowledge is therefore reducible to language constitution or ideology. Although the linguistic and rhetorical turns stress the structures of meaning apart from the users and uses of language, the historic turn need not go so far, he argues, for "within that perspective, historiography would be reduced to a subsystem of linguistic signs constituting its object, 'the past,' according to the rules pertaining in the 'prison house of language' inhabited by the historian." Thus he goes on to argue that a dialectical unity of and difference between meaning and experience exists. In the end, viewing (intellectual) history "as the investigation of the contextually situated production and transmission of meaning," he prefers experience to meaning as the ultimate explanation of ideation.

Thus Toews concludes according to the ideology customary to anglophone history:

Although expressions of apocalyptic fear of the end of history as we have known it or millenarian hopes for a totally new kind of history can occasionally be discerned in the current literature, the predominant tendency is to adapt traditional historical concerns for extralinguistic origins and reference to the semiotic challenge, to reaffirm in new ways that, in spite of the relative autonomy of cultural meanings, human subjects still make and remake worlds of meaning in which they are suspended, and insist that these worlds are not creations ex nihilo but responses to, and shapings of, changing worlds of experience ultimately irreducible to the linguistic forms in which they appear.

With this affirmation of traditional historical premises, Toews concludes that historians should and must find a path beyond the skepticism, relativism, and politicization of the linguistic and rhetorical turns in order to "connect memory with hope," but he does not suggest a way to find this path in the brave new world postulated by some literary and rhetorical theorists and a few intellectual historians.
For Toews and most other anglophone historians, the solution is to grant ascendency to the Anglo-American empirical tradition over continental idealism or skepticism, to experience over meaning, to reality over its postulation. Stressing as it does lived experience over its representation in others' texts, it possesses wide appeal for those who espouse traditional anglophone common-sense philosophy. According primacy to social reality, it also attracts those who favor a materialist over an idealist explanation of history. In many of these cases such a resolution supports the political goals of groups both in the "real world" and in academia. By reinforcing the intellectual authority claimed by the discipline, it provides a basis for both the political and conceptual ends of historians.

Only very recently have anglophone historians outside intellectual history begun to discuss the implications of the various turns in the human sciences. Social and political historians condemn their moral relativism and paralyzing political consequences. Bryan Palmer, for example, argues that the "reification of language" subverts the political realities of social class and class struggle. For him, "critical theory is no substitute for historical materialism; language is not life." He warns that linguistic indeterminacy, if permitted to dominate the profession, will destroy political advocacy. Palmer and others fear that Clio will turn to the right rather than to the left if she follows intellectual fashions in literary circles. Gertrude Himmelfarb, from the opposite political perspective, is equally worried by any prospect of a postmodernist history, which she sees as leading to "intellectual and moral suicide" in the name of "liberation and creativity." Because it denies traditional criteria of reason and a humanistic appreciation of the individual, postmodernism, in Himmelfarb's view, supports a new left agenda. As a result of its assumptions about linguistic indeterminacy in texts and the arbitrary relation of signifier and reality, postmodernist history, for Himmelfarb, is "a denial of the fixity of the past, of the reality of the past apart from what the historian chooses to make of it, and thus any objective truth about the past." It "recognizes no reality principle, only the pleasure principle—history at the pleasure of the historian." Thus she assumes that pleasure and arbitrariness, in politics as in history, support radical causes.

The arguments of Palmer and Himmelfarb echo the political debate in literary and rhetorical studies about the intellectual implications and political challenges of poststructuralism and postmodernism for disciplinary findings and practices. Are these orientations or practices radical, in that they oppose and resist established outlooks and practices in academia and the larger society, or are they accepting of and complicit with dominant disciplinary, social, and political structures? Should literary studies aim to destabilize disciplinary, academic, and societal systems alike? This debate involves, among other matters, the nature of the individual as subject and the nature of power in our society. Is the notion of the freely acting, autonomous individual a liberal humanist delusion or a realistic basis for social and ethical theory and therefore also for political practice? On the one hand, the debate over the power of the individual versus the power of society focuses on the classic issues of what ought to be the nature of the good society and what sorts of theorization as well as practice produce that kind of society; on the other hand, it presumes knowledge of the actual nature of existing social and political arrangements. The politics of modern varieties of liberalism, like those of modern radicalism, claim sure knowledge as a basis for both what is and what ought to be in our society. Palmer's and Himmelfarb's positions represent only two in a wide array of stances regarding theory and politics now beginning to circulate in historians' debates. But there is no consistent clustering of opinion, along either political or theoretical lines, by either proponents or opponents of poststructuralism and postmodernism.

Similarly, proponents and opponents alike take both sides on other conceptual issues, including the relationships between texts and contexts, authors and readers, theory and practice. Whether they address the nature of discourse, the connections between poetics and rhetoric, the role of social institutions in disciplinary methodologies, or the connection between literary theory and politics, these debates frequently try to reconcile the classic dualism between idealism and materialism.

The debates concern the practice of history in at least two ways. First, to what extent must resolution of these political and theoretical problems—if the two can be separated analytically if not in practice—be found in the historicization of subject matter in all disciplines? If discussions of these problems like all other discourses are specific to their times as well as to their places, then some form of history must be created to describe and perhaps ground the resolution of poststructuralist and postmodernist concerns. Second, do poststructuralism and postmodernism deny the fundamental premises necessary to the practice of history as a discipline, as Himmelfarb and others charge? The two questions, of course, demand answers that are sometimes contradictory. In the end, the theory and politics of poststructuralism and postmodernism demand the application of those theories and politics to themselves. Thus demystification, denaturalization, dehierarchization, deconstruction, and dereferentialism undermine the grounds of poststructuralist and postmodernist theories as much as they do late modernist and structuralist ones, because they contradict themselves in application.

Texts and Contexts
The dilemmas of the opposing positions in this debate and their underlying paradigms receive focus in differing definitions of that word so basic to the
Historians ordinarily distinguish among three basic kinds of context, all tied to the relationship conventionally presumed to exist between past and present in historical methodology:

Hi. The first kind of context is the network of relationships in the actual past itself and the experiences of the people in it. Since no historian can mediate or intervene in the past as such, this context exists independently of its study. This understanding of context grounds all forms of historical realism, from the most sophisticated to the most naive interpretations. Historical method is employed to reconstruct this actual past from the evidence remaining from that past. In the process historians hope to represent the actual context through their histories.

Hz. The second kind of context consists of the documentary and other artifactual sources remaining from the past itself and, perhaps, those historical representations constructed close to the documentary or other artifactual sources themselves, such as edited letters and diaries or reproduced artifacts. From the texts of the past, historians hope to infer the contexts that make sense of those texts so they can present them as part of their histories.

H3. The third kind of context is the historian's construction or interpretation of the past as the larger framework of past beliefs and behaviors. This is the represented context synthesized from the evidential or documentary context that allowed the reconstruction of the context of the actual past.

Paralleling these definitions of context is a series of assumptions about their nature as social reality. Strong contextualist presuppositions about how people experience and know reality provide the starting point for defining context and therefore what grounds contextualizing as a method from this position.

Ci. The strong contextualists' first context presumes the reality of the world and the experiences of the people in it. At its most extreme, such a position presumes that the results of the process of contextualizing are transparent to the reality past peoples experienced. Therefore, this first context is directly lived and felt: it is the unconstructed and uninterpreted—in short, prelinguistic—experience of past persons.

Cz. The second context in a strong contextualist series presumes to understand how past reality, social and otherwise, is experienced and, possibly, interpreted by those living it. We might label this approach ethnocontext because the contextualizer seeks to place matters within the context and terms of those living and experiencing it. Frequently such an approach tries to reconstruct it through evocation or other methods of "recapturing" past peoples' experience of their times. The measure of successful ethnocontextualization is correspondence to the unreconstructed actual context (Ci). To consider whether there is any difference between the living and experiencing of the actual context (Ci) and of ethnocontext (C2) and the scholarly interpretation of those two contexts requires a third definition of context in this series.

C3. The third context refers to the interpretations or constructions of those studying and describing the previous two contexts. Hence we might call this the interpretive context. At their most extended, these interpretations lead to constructions of such contexts as (a) society, culture, polity, gender, or other system. For both those who live the actual context (Ci) in this series and those who interpret it as (C3), the past as history or historicization is equally given and real. Thus, both past and present texts, according to contextualist premises, are the works or artifacts themselves, but their production is according to extratextual, socially specific discursive practices, and their interpretations are grounded in specific, extratextual interpretive communities or reading formations.

Postmodernist theorizing challenges this scheme of classifying contexts through what is called textualism or textuality. Textualism as orientation and method begins with a new definition of text. Theorists of textuality do not accept a written, oral, or other communicative artifact as a concrete phenomenological object with a fixed meaning. Rather, they regard such artifacts as sites of intersecting meaning systems receiving diverse readings and various interpretations. Texts are "read" as systems or structures of meaning flowing from the semiotic, social, and cultural processes by which they are constructed or textualized. Such an approach to texts and their systems of textualization broadens the potential array of communicative artifacts. Paintings, films, television programs, clothing styles, sports spectacles, political rallies, and even societies and cultures come to be read as texts in addition to the books, letters, speeches, censuses, or other artifacts that historians customarily consider documents.

Theorists and critics read these textualized meaning systems variously as formal structures of rules based on semiotics models, as "processes of signification" in Roland Barthes' phrase, as "discursive practices" in Michel Foucault's terminology, or other ways of showing how the process(es) that constituted the text also provide its meaning for its producers and perhaps for its various audiences. Whether explicated and interpreted as and through universalist formal structures (structuralist and semiotic models), as readings by interpretive communities and audiences (reception and reader-response models), as supplementation and criticism through deconstruction and ideological demystification (poststructuralist and post-Marxist models), or as products of anonymous but socially and historically specific sets of rules (Foucauldian models), all such readings of texts produce their own supple-
mentary or countertexts, which in turn can be read as further text(ualization). Whether textualists take as their topic explicit or implicit meaning systems, they frequently reveal the subtext of what they explore as they reconstitute it as a text(ualization).

Textuality has important implications for traditional historical methodology and representation. It adds complexity to the reading of documentary remains from the past by conflating what they signify with how they signify. It supplements, when it does not dissolve, the notion of authorship and intention into the social, cultural, or other textualizing practices that produced the document or remain, thereby repudiating the traditional notions of intention and authorship that had supplied the premises necessary to interpret documents as evidence for the reconstruction of the past as actual context. By fusing past and present as textualization, textualism also unites history and historiography, in contrast to usual disciplinary practice. How can historians in the end distinguish between context and text when they appear to be the same under textualist readings?

Thus textualism challenges the traditional method of reconstruction and its mode of representation, which was postulated as fundamental to historical practice. Another series outlining the contrasting approach of the strong textualist position highlights what is in contention. The staunch textualist position starts and ends with the notion of text itself, even when it seems to extend beyond it, and produces a quite different series with quite different implications for historical discourse.

Ti. The first textualist definition of context reduces it to the system or structure of words or signs themselves in a text. Contextualization according to this definition might be called autotextual or, better, intratextual because the process of contextualization supposedly remains or occurs within the text itself by comparing one part to another or a part to the whole. In normal reading and reviewing such (con)textualism shows as the consistency of the argument or story, especially through a comparison of annotation and the content upon professional discursive practices. Historians begin with other historians' interpretations and address the past in terms of how the discipline defines it. Even what constitutes a source, how it should be read as evidence, and what facts it provides depend upon professional intertextual conversations. As these examples illustrate, intertextuality translates the intersubjectivity of the contextualists into its textualist analogue.

T3. In the third textualist definition, the context of a text is found outside texts and so might be called extratextual. Such an approach to context seems to be the same actual past customarily presumed by historians as foundational to both their methods and their representations, but both the antipositivist and antifoundationalist premises of this perspective lead elsewhere. In the strongest versions of textualism, not only do human behavior and social interaction produce texts, but humans and their societies can be understood only as textualizations they produce about themselves. A set of behaviors is constituted as a set through collective interpretation as a category. As a set of behaviors is defined through interpretation, its components are isolated from their general context as a sort of textualization.

In historical practice, of course, all past behavior is interpreted like texts because it is only (re)constructed by means of textualized evidence. In all cases, the context of such textualization is also constructed through isolation, categorization, and interpretation, and never more so than through such abstractions as society, culture, and polity. Since the latter are obvious textual constructions, so contextualizations employing them are also textual constructions. In this series social construction therefore becomes sociality as text.

Critics of strong textualism accuse all three definitions of being products of structuralist and poststructuralist emphases on language, because each of them derives from a linguistic and symbolic context. Opponents charge that such an approach is tautological because, in the end, the referent is reduced to the signified or, worse, to the referent as such. As Art Berman expresses this critique: "The system of linguistic signs becomes a self-contained, endless, internal self-referential system of signifiers, whose meanings are generated by their own network." Thus critics of textualism consider the intertextual context (T2) to be as self-referential and solipsistic as its intratextual context (Ti), for the interpretation (constitution, derivation?) of the intertextual context (Tz) is still within the closed conceptual realm postulated by the linguistic turn. Although the textualist's extratextual context (T3) appears to break out of this circularity of signifiers to provide a referent in the outside world, that social reality is both constituted and understood through textualization broadly conceived.

In the eyes of its critics, textualism's linguistic solipsism appears to lead only to a useless skepticism or an unacceptable idealism. Its approach to context contradicts the traditional understanding of context in the historical guild
because it depends upon evidence or analysis internal rather than external to
the text or set of texts even when appearing otherwise; hence the complaint so
often leveled against the New Historicism by historians. Opponents of this
approach might label it "textual fundamentalism." Others have characterized
this position as "vulgar linguicism" or "vulgar representationalism." To

Since the two versions of contextualization start from contrasting positions
and problematics, they end up in different places. Although the contextualist
third mode of interpretive contextualization (C3) relies upon the same kind
of textualization and re-representation as the textualists' extratextual context
(T3), its premise, like its method, is based upon the assumption that the
extratextual world is both actual and knowable as such. As a result of this
premise, most historians and other anglophone scholars would label only this
approach truly or properly contextualist in problematic and methodology,
and it is the usual definition of context employed in historicization, whether
by scholars of literature, music, and art or by historians and social scientists.
Textualist opponents of this whole approach ask how, in light of the chal-
genues raised to all text(ualization)s by the linguistic and rhetorical turns,
strong contextualists can describe the social reality they presume grounds
their approach to context without employing textualization. Do not all the
contexts of the contextualists reduce in actual practice as well as in theory to
the contexts of the strong textualists?

This brief examination of the contending approaches to context and how
it applies in historical practice reveals that the notion is as ambiguous and
contestable as that of history. Similarly to history, contextualism as a meth-
odology refers both to a social reality described as a context (usually in terms
of a strong contextualist approach) and to its textualization as a description
and interpretation of that context (increasingly understood according to
textualist definitions of context). Thus the idea not only is basic to historici-
ization but also shares its problems of conceptual ambiguity. Such an impres-
sion of context(ualism) as dual-sided both oversimplifies and clarifies some of
the disagreements among historians about their practices and among other
scholars in the human sciences who take a historic turn.

Thus the popular contemporary advice always to historicize only takes one
back to the fundamental issue of how to construct a history. Describing
contextualism in terms of contending positions points out what is at issue but
not how to do it. Neither proponents nor opponents of textualism and
contextualism specify what should be included in and as context. Each group
offers clues in its own way about the framework of the story and the grounds
of the explicit and subtextual argument. Each supplies the ends but not the
means to determine what should be contained in any given example. Each
offers generalizations as conclusions but no guidance on how to organize the
facts that support them. For both contextualism and textualism, how to
textualize is ultimately an arbitrary matter.
CHAPTER TWO

Narratives and Historicization

ONCE upon a time and until fifty years ago, according to the story of history-writing given by Lawrence Stone in his article "The Revival of Narrative," all histories were narrative histories. Historians and their readers understood clearly what the relationships were among history, story, narrative, plot, voice, and viewpoint. A history was a true story about the past. Historians arranged their empirical evidence and facts into a story modeled upon the narrative conventions of nineteenth-century realistic novels. A plot was the author's arrangement of the actions in the story according to the chronological conventions of history-telling. Voice and viewpoint gave historians a synoptic, if not also an omniscient, outlook upon their subjects.

A good sense of what narrative once meant in the profession is conveyed in Savoie Lottinville's advice to the neophyte historian in *The Rhetoric of History*:

All successful historical construction of the narrative kind exhibits these characteristics:

- It develops the required setting and the time of historical action.
- It develops action swiftly and economically through conscious and unremitting attention to the actors in the historical action.
- It utilizes such well-established narrative conventions as viewpoint, the plant, characterization, all the devices of continuity and the maintenance of the suspense implied in A. J. P. Taylor's dictum that historical characters do not know what fate has in store for them.
- It treats chronology as unfolding rather than as past time.
- It utilizes indirect discourse, when it may legitimately be drawn from documents, as an admissible convention in place of novelist's dialogue.
- It intends to recreate what did in fact take place at the time of its occurrence. Its concern is the now of history, not the was.

In recent decades, according to Stone's narrative, various historical schools had repudiated story-telling along with the subjects traditional to historical expositions. The *Annales* school of French historiography emphasized long-term trends and demographic and environmental factors at the expense of specific individuals and events. In the end, some theorists of the school even denied change and chronology as the main focus of historical studies in their pursuit of the *longue durée* as opposed to the history of mere events. Social science history, particularly in the United States, sought nomological or generalized explanation through the explicit testing of social science theories and substituted a purportedly analytical model of the customary story. Its practitioners condemned narrative history for failing to explain through precise causal modeling the phenomena under investigation. In opposition to this trend Stone believed he saw the beginnings of "the revival of narrative" as some of the most noted French historians moved away from describing climatic influences on social change and preindustrial cycles of life to emphasizing the *mentalités* of the peoples they studied. Although these historians concentrated upon the poor and obscure rather than upon the rich and famous, included analysis with narrative, stressed symbols as well as behavior, and told their stories in ways somewhat different from classic nineteenth-century models, they nevertheless employed narrative forms, he argued, to explicate their understandings of past societies.

Stone's perspective on the history of history-writing shaped his definition of narrative in opposition to analytical approaches to the past:

Narrative is taken to mean the organization of material into a chronologically sequential order and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with subplots. The two essential ways in which narrative differs from structural history is that its arrangement is descriptive rather than analytical and that its central focus is on man not circumstances. It therefore deals with the particular and specific rather than the collective and statistical. Narrative is a mode of historical writing, but it is a mode which also affects and is affected by the content and the method.

In addition to using a nineteenth-century rather than a twentieth-century model of narrative, Stone oversimplified the relationship between narratives and the structuring of the past as history with respect to four factors: (1) the role narratives play in general in historical practice and the resulting similarity as well as difference between narrative and nonnarrative histories; (2) the relation between history and fiction—or the connection between the structure of interpretation and the structure of factuality—in a specific text and in history in general; (3) the difference between argument and narrative in historical practice and their relationship to narrative and nonnarrative histories; and (4) the relationship between structures of expression and structures of content in patterning historical discourse.
The Paradigm of Normal History

Among the current challenges to professional historians, few seem more important—and less heeded—than those advanced by literary and rhetorical theorists. Why many historians find the implications of literary and rhetorical theory so devastating becomes clearer if we follow the process by which they presume to create written history from past evidence. What must historians predicate about the past in their methodology in order to conceive of it as history in general and to represent it in what we today call a history? How and what can they presume to know about the past if it no longer exists? Historians answer the how by reference to the idea of contextualism and the what by reference to the notion of plentitude. In this case, the how determines the what, for the assumption of the past’s plenitudinous complexity requires contextualism as its chief methodology, if we are to make sense of the methods by which historians supposedly create written history. These methods and their philosophical justification are founded upon the paradigm of what might be called “normal history.”

Normal historical practice depends on the use of professionally accepted methods for obtaining facts about the past from surviving evidence, or sources. But combining those facts into a coherent narrative or other form of synthesis is even more important, if a history is to be more than a mere assemblage of facts. Thus from sources presumed to be about as well as from the past or history, the normal historian creates generalizations that are assembled into a synthesis that is once again in the present called (a) history. The ambiguity of the word “history” is deliberate, for the written history is supposed to reconstruct or portray past events, behaviors, thoughts, and institutions as they once existed. The presupposition grounding normal historical practice is, therefore, that historians’ works are accurate representations of an actual past, ideally as photographs are popularly thought to be of their subjects or at least as maps are of their terrain, in a more frequently used analogy.

Thus written history acts as if it were a transparent medium between the past and the reader’s mind. F. R. Ankersmit argues that the common assumption of transparency by historians presumes two postulates:

1. In the first place, the historical text is considered “transparent” with regard to the underlying historical reality, which the text reveals for the first time. Thus the historical text is seen as transparent with regard to the historian’s judgment of the relevant part of the past, or, in other words, with regard to the historiographical intentions with which the historian wrote the text. According to the first transparency postulate, the text offers a “view through the text” of a past reality; according to the second, the text is the completely adequate vehicle for the historiographical views or intentions of the historian.

Although both historians and readers would deny these postulates if raised to their consciousnesses, the central presupposition of the idealized historical enterprise still premises a transparency of medium if the exposition is to convey, or at least parallel, past actuality. Otherwise, why assume that the truthfulness or validity of a history can be tested by reference to the actual past itself—although the past is presumed to embrace far more than the sources or the remains from which it is derived?

Figure 2.1 portrays the idealized process of normal historical practice. In this diagram and the next, the solid lines designate the links established in actual practice, and the dotted lines represent the inferences underlying those practices according to the normal paradigm for constructing history.

```
History ← synthesis
   ↑
   ↑ facts
   ↓
Past   ← evidence
```

In normal historical practice, then, historical methods usually refer to the ways in which historians derive facts from sources rather than how those facts are combined into a larger expository synthesis. The standard handbooks discuss how to validate sources as evidence and how to derive reliable facts from such evidence, but they say little about how to connect those validated facts into a coherent narrative or other exposition. Since historians believe that moral and political judgments shape both the selection of topics and the synthesis of facts and that historians’ perspectives on basic human nature and social arrangements also influence these steps, the diagram above should be modified to reflect this two-way process. Figure 2.2 also indicates that I use the term “methodology” to mean the philosophy of methods rather than the methods themselves.

Professional historians’ theorizing about the nature of their task usually ends at this point, because beyond this stage of practice understanding the past or its representation as history no longer seems very problematical. Yet this is the very point at which the philosophers and literary and rhetorical theorists begin their analyses of historical practice. Literary and rhetorical theory raises issues that force a reconsideration of the entire left side of the diagram in Figure 2.2.

Such a conception of the historian’s tasks still neglects the question posed earlier: what must normal historians presume about the past in order to conceive or represent it as (a) history? To consider historical sources as evidence of the past, historians predicate that they remain from past real events and behaviors and bear such a relationship to those past realities that
the historian can reconstruct those past events and behaviors from them. Whether documentary or other evidence stands in some sort of direct, symbolic, imitative, or other semiotic relationship to past thoughts and actions is fundamentally important to working historians than the general proposition that surviving artifacts, no matter how numerous, are but a small part of what were once produced; they necessarily reveal only a minute portion of full living past reality.

Normal historians and scholars in other disciplines, often of quite different methodological persuasions, worry about "capturing" the plenitude of the past in its full complexity. As the American intellectual historian Thomas Haskell succinctly stated: "No paradigm can master the richness of reality." Likewise, the historical sociologist Charles Tilly concurs that "it is not humanly possible to construct a coherent analysis of the history of all social relationships: the object of study is too complex, diverse, and broad." Regardless of its difficulty, the French philosopher Henri-Irénée Marrou makes just this effort the chief goal of normal history: "explanation is the discovery, the comprehension, the analysis of a thousand ties which, in a possibly inextricable fashion, unite the many faces of human reality one to the other. These ties bind each phenomenon to neighboring phenomena, each state to previous ones, immediate or remote (and in like manner to their results)." Each of these scholars in his own way conceives of past reality according to the postulate of plenitude.

To the extent that historians and other scholars presume the past as plenitude, they confront a paradox: how (what?) can they know of the larger past for which they have no evidence but which they nevertheless presume is basic to understanding part or all of the past as history? To the extent that they acknowledge the existence of the paradox, they must seek modes of interpretation or explanation to transcend it, whether in the writing of a monograph or a general history or in thinking about history in general. This is not the issue of selection that all historians stress so

Often in the choice of a topic, the way of interpretation, or even the modes of proof and the choice of evidence, important as these may be to working historians and their readers. Such selection is necessitated by the postulation of plenitude, but selectivity is not the mode of comprehending history as plenitude. Rather, the problem of reconstructing plenitude cuts to the core of how historians conceive of and interpret the past as history, because it connects how much they can know of the past to how they know of history in general.

Contextualism as a Methodology

For the historian the notion of context is a way of both comprehending past plenitude and portraying it through "thick description," to borrow a term from Clifford Geertz. Contextualism is the primary mode of historical understanding, even for those who espouse other forms of exposition than narrative.

So basic is the idea of context to historians' ways of looking at the past that it rarely receives explicit formulation except from philosophers and theorists. Yet historians constantly urge themselves and others to "put things into their context(s)." Classroom students and readers of histories, like neophyte historians, soon learn the meaning and wide applicability of the term. Words and sentences must be read in the context of the document, and the document as part of its community of discourse or of the ideological and belief system that gave it meaning at the time. Discourses and worldviews in turn demand the context of their cultures and times. Likewise, human activities and institutions are to be understood in relation to the larger network of behavior or social organization and structure of which they are said to be part. Social, political, religious, economic, family, philanthropic, and other institutional practices make sense only when placed in their proper social and cultural contexts. Although historians may differ among themselves about what constitutes a proper context in any given case, they do not question the basic desirability of finding one as the appropriate background for understanding past ideas, behaviors, and institutions. As we shall see, even quantitative and sociological historians see the past in essentially contextualist terms. Thus eras and nations, wars and social movements, individuals and events, and speeches and diaries must all be situated in their contexts.

Historians share the notion of context with other disciplines. Like literary scholars, they seek the authorial, discursive, and cultural contexts of texts and documents. Like anthropologists, they develop the cultural and social contexts of the subjects they study. Like social scientists, they attempt to place social, economic, political, and other institutions in the network of relation-
ships said to constitute a society or a nation. Historians cannot even claim that they alone seek to place things in the context of their times, although this claim is the supposed differentia of the discipline. No greater historiographical sin exists than committing anachronism, by representing something outside the supposed context of its times.

Important as the process is to them, however, historians rarely discuss what "putting things in their context(s)" involves as a practice or what the larger implications of such a practice are for the profession or its audience of students and other readers. Handbooks of historical practice presume the practice without discussing it as method. Usually only intellectual historians explicitly debate the role played by context in the interpretation of a book or document, but their arguments all too often center on issues of reductionism: How large a role did the social and cultural context play in generating a text? Should the author's invention as well as intention be explained mainly or solely by his or her social and cultural context? Does such a contextual explanation oversimplify the novelty of great ideas and prevent appreciation of a great work of literature or major feat of science for what it was?

To discover the intellectual presuppositions of contextualism that are basic to historical practice one must turn to philosophers of history and other theorists. W. H. Walsh described the process of contextualization under the term "colligation":

The historian and his reader initially confront what looks like a largely unconnected mass of material, and the historian then goes on to show that sense can be made of it by revealing certain pervasive themes or developments. In specifying what was going on at the time he both sums up individual events and tells us how to take them. Or again, he picks out what was significant in the events he relates, what is significant here being what points beyond itself and connects with other happenings as phases in a continuous process.

As process, then, collagatory contextualism is always relational but need not be strongly integrative. In his book *Metahistory*, Hayden White described at some length how contextualism operates as a methodology:

The Contextualist proceeds ... by isolating some (indeed, any) element of the historical field as the subject of study, whether the element be as large as "the French Revolution" or as small as one day in the life of a specific person. He then proceeds to pick out the "threads" that link the event to be explained to different areas of context. The threads are identified and traced outward, into the circumambient natural and social space within which the event occurred, and both backward in time, in order to determine the "origins" of the event, and forward in time, in order to determine its "impact" and "influence" on subsequent events. This tracing operation ends at the point at which the "threads" either disappear into the context of some other "event" or "converge" to cause the occurrence of some new "event." The impulse is not to integrate all events and trends that might be identified in the whole historical field [plenitude?], but rather to link them together in a chain of provisional and restricted characterizations of finite provinces of manifestly "significant" occurrence.

Underlying this approach is the principle of historicism: what happened is described and thereby explained or interpreted in terms of when it happened and what happened around it at the same time or over time, depending upon whether synchrony or diachrony is emphasized. Whether events are configured or clustered as coexisting at the same time or whether events are described as part of a process or development over time, their meaning derives from interrelationships embedded in some temporal framework. Hayden White explained well what such an approach entails:

The informing presupposition of Contextualism is that events can be explained by being set within the "context" of their occurrence. Why they occurred as they did is to be explained by the revelation of the specific relationships they bore to other events occurring in their circumbent historical space ... the Contextualist insists that "what happened" in the field can be accounted for by the specification of the functional interrelationships existing among the agents and agencies occupying the field at a given time.

Whether or not contextualism achieves true explanation according to scientific standards, its exponents believe they establish a pattern that is more than mere temporal contiguity or randomness. Even though such loose contextualist patterns do not explain according to a strict determinist mode, they meet the explanatory criteria of normal historical practice, despite any assumption of contingency and free will. While social science historians and other advocates of a general scientific model of historical explanation may question whether contextualism explains anything well or at all, they themselves can present no better methodology for understanding the plenitude of the past that they too postulate.

Once again this is not to argue whether historians do or do not abstract, generalize, select, and organize data as they contextualize, for they do. Rather, the question is how these methods and ways of understanding contribute to contextualism as the primary mode of comprehending the past as plenitude. Most historians and other scholars subscribe to contextualism as not only the basic way but the only way in the end to weave "all," or at least so many, of the facts of the past together. It is in this sense that Clifford Geertz's term "thick description" applies to normal historical practice.

Contextualism as a strategy of understanding is both relational and integrative. Through relating elements or parts to each other and thereby to some explicit or implied whole, it explains the parts and the whole simultaneously. Such explanation is "presumed to 'be achieved when the unit of study and its context become the same or coincident. In this way contex-
tualism tries to bridge the dispersion inherent in the multiplicity of particulars basic to the notion of plenitude with the coherence and integration essential to the description and understanding of a past as a story about that plenitude.

Thus the approach seeks, in essence, "unity in diversity" to describe and thereby to explain and interpret the past as history.\textsuperscript{25} Walsh presented it in the following terms:

The underlying assumption . . . is that different historical events can be regarded as going together to constitute a single process, a whole of which they are all parts and in which they belong together in a specially intimate way. And the first aim of the historian, when asked to explain some event or other, is to see it as part of such a process, to locate it in its context by mentioning other events with which it is bound up.\textsuperscript{16}

Contextualism, then, as the preceding quotations show, postulates a holism that is purposely left vague. Whether it employs functionalist, organicist, systemic, or mechanistic models, whether it is called a system or merely an

The methodological assumptions of contextualism tend to present a subject or unit of study as unique, whether the subject is a set of events, an era, or all of history. As the context—be it cultural, social, or other-of events, behaviors, thoughts, and so on is-enlarged, the overall pattern of meaning that is discerned and elaborated emphasizes the nonrepetitive elements at the expense of those that might be common. Contextualism thus stresses the individuality of the overall network of relationships. In the end, the subject of study and its context become the same or coincident under contextualization as both a method and a mode of understanding. The more fully coincident the network of relationships becomes with an entire culture or society, the more peculiar or unique the overall pattern will be in relation to other societies or cultures.\textsuperscript{27}

Because contextualism renders the unit of study and its context unique, for the historian using it as a method for either understanding the past as plenitude or representing that past as history, comparative history practically becomes an oxymoron. Most historians consider comparison and history to be mutually exclusive. The "French historian Paul Veyne, for instance, flatly denies that history can ever be comparative, for it depends upon types, which "are nothing but concepts."\textsuperscript{28} The few historians who urge comparison upon their colleagues see its usefulness as primarily heuristic in framing inquiries and designing research. At most they support its use for testing theory, never for generating theory. Raymond Grew, editor of the journal \textit{Comparative Studies in Society and History}, advocates what he calls comparisons in the "middle range":

The term is imprecise, but obviously comparison is most enlightening when the choice of what to compare is made in terms of general and significant problems, the elements compared are clearly distinguished, and attention is paid to the intricate relationships between elements compared and particular societies in which they are located. These criteria are most likely to be met when there are models or theories that can be concretely applied, when the evidence is extensive and rooted in its historical context (which often means it has been generated with just these problems in view), and when the cases are delimited. Then one teeks explanations and generalizations but not universal laws.\textsuperscript{29}

George Frederickson suggests that historians who do comparison are taking a holiday "from their normal role of historians of a single nation or cultural area."\textsuperscript{30} Thus he distinguishes between historical sociologists and historians "squarely in the historical profession."\textsuperscript{31} In Frederickson's view, "History . . . remains—or should remain—distinct from the more systematic social sciences in its feel for the special or unique in human experience. Producing a comparative historiography that does justice to diversity and pluralism without becoming so particularistic as to make cross-cultural reference impossible or irrelevant is a difficult task."\textsuperscript{32} As Grew remarks,

for many professional historians comparative study evokes the ambivalence of a good bourgeois toward the best wines: to appreciate them is a sign of good taste, but indulgence seems a little loose and wasteful. In part such hesitance reflects some of the admirable if modest qualities most widely respected and fully shared in the historical profession—caution, accuracy, unpretentiousness, and respect for the integrity of documents and for the particular.\textsuperscript{33}

Those few historians who claim to practice comparative history often do no more than place a nation's events or period's ideas in a larger but still unique context, usually through some classificatory scheme.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, in his well-known work \textit{The Age of the Democratic Revolution}, Robert R. Palmer compared the various national revolutions in the latter part of the eighteenth century, but in the end, as his title in the singular indicates, he integrated them into one overall historical setting.\textsuperscript{35}

Given that contextualism presumes and therefore produces uniqueness as its chief explanatory or interpretive mode, it also predicates that the past, or at least a part of it, when transformed into history can be comprehended as a singular, hence single, story. Although the "revival of narrative" discussion among historians oversimplifies current conceptions of narrative, Lawrence Stone correctly set forth the implications of narrativization for historical practice. To repeat the crucial sentence: "Narrative is taken to mean the organization of material into a chronologically sequential order and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with subplots." Narratives embrace more forms and pervade more aspects of historical discourse than Stone allows, but his emphasis upon the sin-
gularity of the story holds important implications for conceiving of the past as history. As a consequence of contextualism's presuming and producing uniqueness as its chief explanatory or interpretive mode, normal historians tend to describe past ideas, activities, events, and institutions as more and more self-contained and distant from the present day as they are increasingly contextualized to their times. This distancing of the past as history through self-containment underlies the notion of anachronism. Such disjunction is especially apparent in synchronic treatments, in which the historian slices time horizontally, so to speak, in order to stress the interconnections and interdependencies existing at a certain time. Whether embracing a short span of time or a century or more, whether using the older notions of Zeitgeist and the "climate of opinion" or the newer ones of "paradigm" or "episteme," the historian pictures a sharp break or "rupture" in continuity as the analysis freezes the action, as it were, at a moment in time. Diachronic treatments, emphasizing change over time, can also make ideas and institutions more relative to our times, especially the longer ago they are said to have taken place. Dialectical analysis, for example, postulates transformative breaks between stages of society or social formations so that later or present stages are different from previous ones. Even events and activities as recent as a generation ago can be seen as quite different from those of the present if they are strongly enough contextualized to their times, as those who compare the radical 1960s to the conservative 1980s like to point out. Given this perspective, historians place things in their temporal context by presuming various degrees of historical relativism, which, today depends on the allied notions of cultural and social relativism. Does historical relativism also imply moral relativism? Should the actions of the past, heinous or beneficial, be judged by the standards of their times or of all times (which must, in the end, mean our times)? Are the Holocaust under Hitler in the twentieth century and the enslavement of Africans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries better understood as part of their respective times? Or are some events and practices so terrible that they are wrong for any (and all) time?

The Multiple Roles of Narrativization

Contextualism and narrativization are two sides of the same historiographical coin. Normal history, as a consequence of its contextualist search for unity in diversity, presupposes narrative as its main way of describing the past. Conversely, in normal historical practice contextualism operationalizes the narrativization of the past as history. To context as plentitude and method we must therefore add the ideas of narrative as product and of narrativization as its process if we are to understand what historians must presuppose about the past in order to conceive of it as history. Although scholars postulate that narrative is cross-cultural and transhistorical, they disagree about the exact nature of narrative and narration. At its heart is some sense of story. A story presents a sequence of events or actions, but just as a chronology is not a history, so a story is not just one random thing after another but rather one thing because of another. Either one thing follows after another in sequence because they in a sense cause each other, or several things work together to bring about a situation or condition without necessarily "causing" one another in a strict sense. Whether or not historical narrative explains is a controversial topic, but a one-thing-after-another sequence is customarily labeled an "annal" or a "chronicle," while a one-thing-because-of-another sequence is termed a proper "history." The author or narrator connects the events and actions of the story through a plot, and the actions and events form a plot through a causal network of narration. Narrative, in short, constructs a context by connecting what seems unrelated into a story. Just how narrative should be conceived as a form or logic in general or in historical discourse in particular is less important to my argument at the moment than considering in which phases of historical practice the normal historian utilizes narrative thinking. Historians apply plotting and narrative logic (no matter how defined) not only to their synthetic expository efforts but also, I would argue, following the reasoning of Louis Mink, to the past itself conceived as history. Postulating the past as a complex but ultimately combined or unified flow of events organized narratively allows normal historians to presume that their sources—as created by a past so conceived—enable them to "reconstruct" the story of that past according to some narrative structure. Historical methods can operate only if historians conceive of contextual plentitude as a continuum of structured events organized according to the same narrative logic as they employ in their own synthetic expositions, which in turn supposedly represent the past as homologously structured. Hence the importance of the argument over whether or not people in the past conceived of their activities according to narrative forms and acted correspondingly. Simon Schama, for one, sees the correlation between life as narrativized by those living it and history as narrativized by historians as fundamental to any historical practice. Modern historical practice makes sense only if historians predicate that the living past as contextual plentitude, or any part of it, can be comprehended as a unified—or at least a combined—flow of events that in turn can be organized into some kind of unified exposition or story. Once again, the exposition as story and the flow of actual past events are presumed to be maplike or at least homologous. Whether the past is actually structured as we conceive narrative or only our understanding is structured in
this manner, we can see through a simple diagram (Figure 2.3) how such
predication of narrative structure affects historical practice and methodol-
ogy. (In this and succeeding diagrams, unlike in the previous two, the solid
lines designate what I take to be empirically based in normal historical
practice and the dotted lines represent connections made through presup-
position.)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{postulated} & \quad \text{history-as-} & \quad \text{synthesis} \\
\text{unified story} & \quad \text{written} & \quad \underline{\uparrow} \\
\text{past-as} & \quad \text{facts} & \quad \underline{\downarrow} \\
\text{evidence} & \quad \underline{\downarrow} & \quad \text{lived} \\
\text{unified flow} & \quad \underline{\downarrow} & \quad \text{of events}
\end{align*}
\]

\textit{Figure 2.3}

From the diagram we can see that normal historical practice uses narrative
structuring in two ways to transform the past into history. First, the paradigm
of normal history presumes that there existed a “whole” or “total” past that
can be understood and constituted as history, even if only in the mind of a
God or his secularized successor, an Omniscient Historian, according to
narrative logic in some form. Second, each partial version of history can be
organized according to the same logic both as a synthesis of factuality and as
the actual past it supposedly resembles. If we recall Stone’s definition of
narrative and Walsh’s description of colligation, we see that they apply to
both the partial and “total” versions of history. Only by predicking that the
plentitude and context of the past considered as history are comprehended
from the viewpoint of a third person, an omniscient, or at least synoptic,
narrator, can normal history practice be understood: first as the partial
histories historians produce and, second, as the whole or total historical
context of which they are said to be part.  

To suggest this multiple application of narrative organization to the postu-
lated actual past as larger whole and smaller parts and to the representations
of those pasts as histories, I would add the notions of the “Great Story” and
the “Great Past.” The Great Story, or what others might call the “metastory”
or the “metatext,” applies both to the larger context of the partial histories
and to the whole past conceived as history that justifies the synthetic exposi-
tions of normal historians. The “Great Past” (or what others might term the
“metapast,” “Ur-text,” or “metasource”) narrativizes the source material as
evidence for all of the past as history. Figure 2.4 shows the relationship
among these concepts.

The left side of this diagram, designated the philosophy of history, indi-
cates, first, that the Great Story was the province of classic, or older,
philosophy of history and, second, that the presuppositions of historical
practice are the subject of recent analytical philosophy of history in
Anglo-American practice as well as in the metaphysics of the poststructuralist
trend.

As the diagram makes clear, the Great Story can mean either the larger
(hi)story presumed in a partial history or the past itself conceived as a
history. (The Great Past would also have two meanings correspondingly.) In
terms of my argument about the role of narrative in traditional historical
practice, the Great Story need not be any well-known “master interpretive
code,” “grand governing narrative,” or metanarrative, because it can be
organized according to a scheme different from any of the classic or more
recent metanarratives. Hence I do not intend my term “Great Story” to be
merely a translation of métarécit, or “metanarrative,” although it, too, is
always constructed in some way to give meaning as well as context to a
history. Although the Great Story need not be equivalent to any one
metanarrative, all metanarratives are Great Stories. As a consequence, one
can speak of a Great Story in addition to the Great Story.

Thus the notion of the, or a, Great Story represents narrativization of both
larger and smaller portions of the partial or greater past, because it design-
ates the “larger context” of the partial and larger histories. Thus a, or the,
Great Story can be the explicit or presumed larger contextual (hi)story behind
the biography of a life, the history of a specific place or region, or the account
of a year or a decade. On a broader scale a, or the, Great Story can depict the
rise and spread of capitalism or nationalism or imperialism across continents
and centuries. The notion of a or the Great Story also embraces the macro-
processes and grand transformations that historical sociologists see as shaping
the modern world.
The most thrilling Great Stories are those that seem to make sense of the grand sweep of history and illuminate human destiny itself. Such metanarratives as the Spenglerian decline of Western civilization or the stages of class struggle in history according to Marxian dialectics test the very limits of what is proper history according to normal historical practice, for these Great Stories seem to "fit" poorly the Great Past postulated by the normal historical paradigm. Speculation about the ultimate meaning of History as a totality stands outside the pale of professional discourse. It is considered the subject matter of old-fashioned philosophy of history and is relegated in current historical practice to that hell enjoyed only by the likes of Hegel and Spengler. Although historians certainly point out the meaning of the events and actions they cover in their books and articles, they plead agnosticism and maybe atheism on the larger meaning of History itself considered as an entirety. At best such misbegotten philosophical musings are studied as intellectual history to exemplify the quaint worldviews of past persons and eras. Nevertheless, historians do convey the meaning of their specific histories explicitly through their contextualization or implicitly through a Great Story. Even a denial of meaning to the course of history is, of course, a philosophy about the meaning of history.

Great Stories and the Search for a Larger Context

Great Stories function as the larger or largest context for a normal history in at least three ways. First, a Great Story provides a device for embedding partial (hi)stories in their larger context in order to show their significance or lessons or meaning. Second, a Great Story likewise offers a—really, the—larger context, and framing device, for an overall approach to a national history (so beloved of the profession that its academic organization is ordered accordingly). Third, the presumption of the singularity of a Great Story as context ultimately distinguishes the province of normal history proper from either comparative history or historical sociology. How a Great Story serves these functions can be shown best through examples.

That historians assume in practice a Great Story (and therefore a Great Past also) as the larger or largest context of their subject matter is poignantly demonstrated in the quest of American historians for a synthetic principle to tie the United States experience together. According to their story of their doing history, such a synthetic principle was once found in the conflict between haves and have-nots for control of the government and economy. When the have-nots won, democracy increased. When the haves prevailed, aristocracy flourished in the period before the Andrew Jackson presidency, and plutocracy overpowered the gQod and decent in the subsequent eras. The struggle for control provided the plot, the central subject, and the political meaning of the story. Such a progressive tale of middle-class morality found its supreme and exemplary expression in the two volumes of The Rise of American Civilization, by Charles and Mary Beard, published in 1927. The so-called Consensus history after the Second World War, which emphasized the shared values throughout history of all groups in American society, repudiated the dramatic plot of conflict unifying the earlier so-called Progressive history by the Beards and others. Social scientific and social history, which stressed the quantification of variables and the application of social science theories, fragmented the central subject by focusing on statistical groupings in U.S. society and presented at best a skewed sampling of past American experience. Recent attention to race, gender, and ethnicity as the principle factors influencing American history only further fragmented the central subject and the unity of the narrative.

In light of this pluralization of subject and loss of plot, Thomas Bender seeks a unified focus and perhaps a central subject in the competition and conflict of various groups in the creation of a public culture at a time and over time. He aims to use the scholarship of recent decades on the diversity and disunity of the American experience to reveal "a public realm that is not given but is, rather, a product of historical processes, one that is made and unmade in time. The process of making and unmaking supplies a focus for new historical synthesis." For him, "The key to such a synthesis is an understanding of difference in America that is relational, that does not assume a discontinuity in social and individual experience." Thus he hopes to make the best of the conflicts within contemporary scholarship by offering a reconceptualization of our history that stresses the interplay of various groups, usually characterized as homogeneous, whether defined socially (for example, ethnic groups) or as private worlds (for example, the family), and the larger, heterogeneous, and contested political and cultural realm of the nation. How do the worlds of private life, the group meanings and interests of smaller social units, affect and effect the configuration of public life? How does the character and quality of relations with public life affect private life and the life of social groups? The present task is to begin establishing the relationship over time of the interclass, multiethnic, and multicultural center, which I call public culture, and the smaller, more homogeneous geteinschaftlich groups on the periphery . . . A focus on public culture and its changing connections with cultures smaller than the whole offers an image of society capacious enough to sustain a synthetic narrative.

Accordingly he advises his colleagues in the profession:

Monographic studies of various groups need to be consciously oriented to the larger historical process of interaction in the formation of public culture. Rather than condemning, rejecting, or devaluing continued specialization, my aim is to suggest a reorientation in its conceptualization in the interest of a relational understanding of its parts. It is understanding parts in relation to other parts, as
opposed to conferring upon them, whether by intention or through inadvertence, a false autonomy, that history becomes whole, a synthetic narrative.63

Despite Bender’s efforts to use the current state of scholarship as the basis of his synthetic principle, scholars responding to his article rejected his vision of the contest over public culture either as too limited to capture the nature of American experience or as too unscholarly and premature.64

Likewise, the changing political fortunes of post-19zo Germany have elicited a succession of master narratives or Great Stories to provide the larger context needed to comprehend the continuity of that history or its rupture with the past. Although Michael Geyer and Konrad Jarasch point out the differences between German and American approaches to finding the meaning of Germany’s history, they show how historians in both countries utilize a succession of Great German Stories in pursuit of the best overall interpretation of what happened. Historians in the 1980s, like those of earlier decades, continued to seek some Great Story as a single best interpretive framework.65

Albert Borgmann summarizes a thousand years of Western history in two paragraphs as prelude to his vision of what lies beyond the "postmodern divide." In his Great Story, colligatory terms and proper names provide shorthand clues to the substories encompassed by his master narrative.

Schematically speaking, this essay begins by noting the three features that distinguish the Middle Ages from the modern era: local boundedness, cosmic centeredness, and divine constitution. The events we associate with Columbus, Copernicus, and Luther shattered the medieval edifice and opened up vast areas of exploration and construction. For heuristic purposes, we can think of Bacon, Descartes, and Locke as the founders of a new era, the designers of the modern project whose elements are domination of nature, the primacy of method, and the sovereignty of the individual. Technology and economy were the disciplines whereby the modern project was worked into a social era characterized by aggressive realism, methodical universalism, and an ambiguous individualism.

Toward the end of this century, realism, universalism, and individualism have become the subjects of withering critiques. Although the modern project still drifts ahead as political and economic movement, it has lost its theoretical confidence and credibility. Yet the postmodern critique of modernism offers us no more than the weakest of constructive proposals: respect for nature, particularism, and communitarianism. One can detect a more concrete and consequential paradigm in the economy, a paradigm characterized by information processing, flexible specialization, and informed cooperation.66

As this synopsis shows, a good Great Story not only orders the past and interprets the present but also predicts the future.

The singularity of the Great Story presumed by narrativization reinforces as it derives from the presumption of uniqueness in contextualism. Hence historians’ wariness of comparative history, which seems to demand a viola-

tion of these basic premises. To the extent that comparativists share with normal historians a respect for the singularity of the Great Story, certain kinds of comparative studies seem congenial to normal historians. This is not so much a matter of whether the comparative histories employ primary or secondary sources, concrete or abstract units, or present their findings as synthesis or narrative as of whether the comparative history assumes at bottom the contextual uniqueness and unified story framework that lies at the heart of normal history.67 The more a comparative work predicates the basis of its overall synthesis in the contextual uniqueness of the partial and Great Stories, the more historians will find the study congenial (if not always useful). Thus those historical sociologists who argue for "world-time," "large-scale social processes," "great changes," "great transformation," or a similar conception essentially share with historians an ultimate commitment to plotting their history as a Great Story.68 Perhaps one of the best-known examples of such an approach to historical sociology is Immanuel Wallerstein’s notion of a "modern world-system" or "capitalist world-economy."69 His approach to history as Great Story does not differ markedly from that of Palmer in The Age of Democratic Revolution, much as they might differ in political outlook and the lessons of the past for the present. Both scholars frame their studies according to a single historical setting with variations within it.

Those comparative historical sociological explorations labeled "individualizing," "universalizing," or "encompassing" under Charles Tilly’s classification in his aptly titled Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons or "general model builders" in Theda Skocpol’s scheme in Vision and Method in Historical Sociology presume a unique Great Story, even if historians sometimes profess not to recognize the historical sociologists’ Great Past as the same one they predicate.69 On the other hand, those studies seeking, in Tilly’s and Skocpol’s terms, "variation-finding" or "causal regularity" pursue social scientific generalizations that are free of any specific historical context. Such historical sociologists as Tilly and Skocpol recognize the historicity of the social processes they expound. For them certain macroprocesses or major historical trends constrain and shape the subjects that sociologists too often try to make ahistorical and universal. For Tilly these macroprocesses include the great changes in the organization of capitalist economies and the increasing powers of the centralized state.70 For Skocpol, they embrace "world-wide commercialization and industrialization, and the rise of national states and the expansion of European state systems to encompass the globe."71 From this perspective of macroprocess, historians can espouse world or global history and still condemn comparative history as such through their allegiance to the singularity of the Great Story.

Today’s historians and social scientists can agree on world history of the proper kind as desirable, because they cannot write and teach without some
Great Story either to understand their own times as a product of the past or to interpret the past through the lens of the present. To what extent, then, is the historic turn a (re)turn to new metanarratives about the heritage of the present? To what degree is the revival of narrative a revival of the use of Great Stories to frame the (hi)stories that contemporary historians want to tell? Although historians may be wary of Great Stories, given the profession’s bias against such moral fables and their seemingly poor fit with the postulated big picture of the Great Past, it seems that they cannot do without them. Their histories need the larger or largest contexts that Great Stories provide, especially if the Great Past is conceived of as the Great(est) Context of all stories, small and Great. Great Stories give meaning to all kinds and levels of histories. Great Stories at bottom not only serve as the larger context for histories by colligating facts of (a) history but also provide the political and ethical grounding for history as text and as discursive practice. In this sense, Great Stories serve a symbolic or allegorical function in the narrativization of histories. Given the necessary function of Great Stories in historical narrativization, the postmodernist’s slogan about the crisis of metanarratives resides in the dilemma between post-structuralist efforts to deconstruct all grand themes and revisionist desires to reconstruct allegorical Great Stories for ethical ends.

Recent Great Stories, like those of previous historians, contradict one another, and this incompatibility raises perplexing questions for the practice of history according to the normal paradigm. Can the plurality of Great Stories in actual practice be reconciled with the singularity of the Great Past presumed in theory? Does the notion of context, no matter how small or large, presume, even demand, one and only one Great Story in practice as well as in theory? Are the variant versions of the same subject or périod equally valid, or must all variants be reconciled, that is, contextualized, by reference to a (the?) single Great Story? What criteria should historians and other scholars use to judge the value and merits of various works called history, or, more precisely, histories, if the premise of a single Great Past in its guise as the Great Story is challenged by postmodernist theory and multiculturalism?

Great Stories matter greatly to professional historians and the public alike, as conflicting approaches to the five hundredth anniversary of the historic events associated with the name of Christopher Columbus demonstrated. The debate about whether the story of what he did should be labeled a discovery, an invasion, a conquest, an encounter, an interaction, an intervention, or something else indicates the magnitude of the problem of finding the best Great Story for the history of this matter. The controversy over whether what followed in the history of the Americas should be depicted as the gift of one civilization to another or as the genocide of indigenous peoples and the enslavement of Africans signals the problem of constructing the larger context for that history. Scholars agreed no better than other persons on the difficult problems of larger context and Great Story in this matter. Facts alone did not settle the issues. Since perspectives and points of view seemed incommensurable among the proponents of various interpretations, no easy resolution or compromise existed for specifying a single Great Story portraying what Columbus did and what happened afterward.

Despite—perhaps because of—the multiple interpretations so prevalent in the historical profession, its members seek principles to guide them beyond the relativism embodied in competing stories, Great and small. The question therefore remains for normal historical practice: are some interpretations better than most or all others? Although historians cannot agree on the single right or best interpretation of any given past any better than they can on the “whole” of the past they call history, they still seek criteria for limiting the profusion of narratives and arguments about any given past. What must historians postulate about the past to justify their approach to interpretation? What implications does such an approach have for the reading and writing of history today?
Historians attempt to cope with the obvious difference between the numerous versions of the same or seemingly similar events and processes in their practice and their preference for a single (hi)story or Great Story by distinguishing between interpretations of history and History itself. The distinction serves the same methodological purpose in historical practice as those between parole and langue in linguistics and between "discourse" and "story" in narratology: to divide the changing in practice (the first term) from the unchanging in theory (the second term) in order to render the complexity of each field comprehensible. Historians recognize that interpretations arise in normal practice, but they attribute such differences to historical representation and not to history itself. Although there are multiple interpretations, there is only one (hi)story; although there are plural partial histories, there is only one Great Story as their larger context because there is only one Great Past. Therefore, to write as if historical practice were naught but interpretations denies a fundamental postulate of the guild. As Jerald Combs, who devoted an entire book to two centuries of changing interpretations in American diplomatic history, warned his readers in the preface: "One further caution. A historiography such as this one inevitably will be somewhat misleading by emphasizing the theses of books rather than factual content. This may drive the neophyte to the conclusion that history is indeed only fiction temporarily agreed upon. Or it may inspire another round of the 'graduate school game'—since one can never know the truth about the past, memorize historical theses rather than historical data." The author goes on to advise his readers:

It would be unfortunate if this book encouraged such aberrations. I believe that the information historians provide is more important than the theses they propound. There is much basic information that all historians agree upon. In addition, most historians have admitted the tentativeness of their interpretations and have sought to moderate the oversimplified assertions of the more popular accounts of politicians and journalists or those of their more polemical colleagues in the historical profession. If overall they have reinforced and legitimized their generation's perceptions of American diplomacy, they have also urged caution, emphasized complexities, and provided opposing views. Above all, in their extensive factual accounts they have presented material from which readers could draw their own inferences to refute the authors themselves. In the end, that is the historian's greatest contribution. Combs expresses the ambivalence that all normal historians feel about a word they use all the time: interpretation. All historians must interpret their materials in the quest for historical synthesis, yet all interpretations are secondary to the true end of history: factual knowledge. As Peter Novick summarizes some of the tenets of "objectivism" underlying the profession's approach to history:

Historical facts are seen as prior to and independent of interpretation: the value of an interpretation is judged by how well it accounts for the facts; if contradicted by the facts, it must be abandoned. Truth is one, not perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are "found," not "made." Though successive generations of scholars might, as their perspectives shifted, attribute different significance to events in the past, the meaning of those events was unchanging.

The Great Story, like the Great Past, is singular by methodological necessity. It is also timeless in the sense that its inscription as History does not alter once the Past is past, no matter what histories are written. Thus do historians exempt their paradigmatic assumptions from the working premise of change presumed so basic to their applied practice. As a direct corollary of this presumption that the singular Great Story follows from the unique Great Past, normal historians try to reconcile variant interpretations by reference to facts rather than by arguments over the nature of narratives as such. Dominick LaCapra calls this the "documentary model" of historical knowledge. He outlines its premises:

In the documentary model, the basis of research is "hard" fact derived from the critical sifting of sources, and the purpose of historiography is either to furnish narrative accounts and "thick descriptions" of documented facts or to submit the historical record to analytic procedures of hypothesis-formation, testing, and explanation. The historical imagination is limited to plausibly filling gaps in the record, and "throwing new light" on a phenomenon requires the discovery of hitherto unknown information. It does not mean seeing the phenomenon differently or transforming our understanding of it through reinterpretation. Indeed all sources tend to be treated in narrowly documentary terms, that is, in terms of factual and referential propositions that may be derived from them to provide information about specific times and places.

Historians must presume in practice that the factuality of a partial past and the Great Past possesses some sort of coercive reality in their synthetic expositions. Thus, when one young critic accused Natalie Zemon Davis of interpretive license in The Return of Martin Guerre, he appealed to the "sovereignty of the sources, the tribunal of the documents," to set her straight.

As a grounding for these beliefs, normal historians subscribe to a philosophy of realism as fundamental to their practice. As Harry Ritter puts it, realism for the historian is "the belief that historical inquiry refers to a 'real' past that was once, but is no longer, present, and that written histories are valid to the extent that they accurately correspond to this real past." Peter Novick believes that such realism is a basic tenet of the "objectivism" he sees underlying professional practice: "The assumptions on which it rests include
a commitment to the reality of the past, and to truth as correspondence to that reality; a sharp separation between knower and known, between fact and value, and above all, between history and fiction. And, he might add, between conceptual framework and finding. Peter Gay expressed this credo with great gusto:

The objects of the historian's inquiry are precisely that, objects, out there in a real and single past. Historical controversy in no way compromises their ontological integrity. The tree in the woods of the past fell in only one way, no matter how fragmentary or contradictory the reports of its fall, no matter whether there are no historians, one historian, or several contentious historians in its future to record and debate it."

In this view, actuality is the foundation of historical knowledge; factuality is the goal of historical practice. Both are the basis as well as the measure of historical synthesis, no matter what form that synthesis takes. Moreover, that reality is in the end a single Great Past. Although Gay maintains that interpretations can complement each other, in proper historical practice they can never contradict each other: "For the historian, an interpretation is a general explanation of events, nearly always providing a hierarchy of causes. To the extent that it is correct, any conflicting interpretation is false." Thus he regrets subtitled his magisterial work, The Enlightenment, "An Interpretation" rather than "The Interpretation," as he first intended.

Two politically and morally important examples show the hold the notion of a single right or best interpretation and its factual decidability has over the profession and its public. One example comes from U.S. legal history and its implications for interpreting the Constitution today and goes under the name "original intent." This debate is framed in terms of whether the authorial intent of the founding fathers represents the single best way of interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Not only do the supporters of this approach argue that such a construal of intention is the best way of interpreting the Constitution legally today as well as historically in the past, but also they presume that one can know the (collective) intentions of the founding fathers unambiguously. Thus what are legal and normative questions for lawyers present a major problem of interpretation for historians about the very construction of history itself. Both "originalists" and those who challenge them construct present-day interpretive texts as they discuss the relevant text or texts of the past. Although the two sides may differ in their interpretations, both argue that their own texts best represent what the founding fathers thought or what should be thought about the whole matter. They also point to the "facts" to support their contentions, even though they differ over what constitutes a fact according to their interpretation and its larger Great Story. Thus even those who admit that one cannot document with certainty what the founding fathers intended or even whether one should or can aggregate the differing opinions of those who left an evidential record assert the superiority of their interpretation as the single right one.

Another important example of historians' commitment to the quest for a single best interpretation is the debate about how to textualize the enormity of the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis' "Final Solution." In some ways this quest for the definitive singularity of the Holocaust resembles the preceding debate over "original intent," for it too searches to comprehend the causes and the results of the Holocaust through an examination of the participants' intentions and attitudes as perpetrators and as victims. Still other quests for interpretive singularity center on finding the proper, that is, the best, Great Story as the context of the events. Was the Holocaust the inevitable result, that is the natural evolution of German history itself, and thus attributable to some special quality of being German? Or was it part of the development of European society or of capitalism? Was it the failure of the Enlightenment or even of civilization and humanity itself? As these searches for the best Great Story of the Holocaust—whether focused on intentions or on Germaness, Europeanness, and humanness—demonstrate, the acknowledged facts are not enough to guarantee a single best interpretation. To admit such interpretive diversity, however, is not to endorse the so-called revisionist denial of the acknowledged horrible facts. Rather, it shows that these facts can be admitted and still not provide a definitive (con)textualization of the set of events colligated by the term. The very colligatory term of "Holocaust" is already a complex interpretation itself and suggests a moral judgment as well as a Great Story. Since a Great Story is the context of ultimate resort in historicization, the very premise of its singularity, and thus its superiority, supposedly supports one interpretive version against all others in the professional disputes among historians.

To normal historians, then, a plurality of interpretations in practice never implies a plurality of (hi)stories, let alone a plurality of pasts. Multiple Great Stories and Great Pasts are inconceivable according to normal methodological assumptions. Many historians therefore argue that the successive interpretations or versions of history in the profession approach truth about the past asymptotically. But how can they know exactly what or where that truth is if the community of responsible scholars cannot agree? How do they recognize that truth in practice if multiple versions exist? Since the Great Story is nothing but a paradigmatic postulation of normal historical practice, what (or who) decides the validity of one version over another? Other historians would use the analogy of the proverbial blind sages feeling an elephant to describe their approach to the past. Although the six blind sages mistook the various parts of the elephant for the whole elephant, at least they were all feeling the same elephant. Such a synecdochal maneuver, however, predicates what historians cannot know from their practice: that all historians study the same past. Does the measurement against the Great Past or Ur-text decide
between the variants or interpretations? But once again, the Great Past seems as much a paradigmatic presupposition as its synthetic equivalent, the Great Story. If past historical reality is reduced to the evidence persisting into the present about it, then what limits the interpretive stories and arguments that might be derived from these remains in the present?

The Fallacy of a Single Right or Best Interpretation

That two or more stories can be told about the same set of events deeply disturbs even sophisticated normal historians. William Cronon, for example, in a recent article on the role of narrative in historical writing expresses perplexity (and maybe some exasperation) that two books about the Dust Bowl in the 1930s United States with nearly identical titles "dealt with virtually the same subject, had researched many of the same documents, and agreed on most of their facts, and yet their conclusions could hardly be more different." Moreover, he notes, "Although both narrate the same broad series of events with an essentially similar cast of characters, they tell two entirely different stories." For Cronon such a postmodernist possibility, as he labels it, raises the question of whether "the past is infinitely malleable, thereby apparently undermining the entire historical project." His article describes his personal "struggle to accommodate the lessons of critical [narrative] theory apparently undermining the entire historical project." In his own attempt to specify the criteria that would limit the proliferation of stories and establish one or some superior to others, Cronon first resorts to historians' customary obsession with "the facts." Thus he repeats the historian's first commandment: "Good history does not knowingly lie" by contravening accepted facts about the past. Likewise, good history must not contradict standard models of nature, human or physical, and behavior, social or individual, in ascribing cause, effect, or contingency. In historical narratives witches can no more violate the laws of physics than abundant rainfall occurs in arid zones; gods can no more intervene in the outcome of wars than human beings can be assumed unequal by race according to standard scholarly models today. Last, and most important, the accuracy, the fairness, the truthfulness, the inclusiveness, and even the factuality of historical narratives are constrained by criticism from the community of historians and the public. Such public exposure limits the variety of acceptable narratives.

Cronon's provocative and personal intellectual journey raises more questions than it answers. Will the criteria he adduces curtail the proliferation of narratives and interpretations any better than those he presents as common to the profession as historiographic rules of thumb? What of the traditional historians' resort to the facts? Although a single fact can "disprove" an interpretation, no number of facts can definitively "prove" one. As Cronon
admits, narratives thus create their facts as much as facts create the narrative. What, then, is the relationship between facts, interpretations, and narratives in historical practice?

If public exposure limits the variety of stories historians tell, it also creates that variety. To what extent that perspectives and points of view appear incommensurable among (and to) communities of scholars, basic interpretations, as historians call multiple stories, Great or small, multiply to the chagrin of the historical profession. Can these be limited by the means traditional to history or suggested by Cronon? What criteria should historians use to judge the value and merits of any one history if the premise of a single Great Story is abandoned?

Even the criterion of standard models of nature and human nature fluctuates with the times, as any number of histories of the physical and social sciences will "prove," let alone those that chronicle morals and manners. In "fact," a good deal of such historical publication goes to show just how variable morals, models, and metastories have been over time. All these histories testify to relativism more than to explanatory and narrative security. Literary scholars face the same problems of pluralism and relativism in interpreting literary works. Paul Armstrong in his book Conflicting Readings: Variety and Validity in Interpretation argues that literary scholars follow rules or "tests" in practice for distinguishing among and limiting the proliferation of rival readings of a literary text. The first criterion is inclusiveness. The better reading embraces the most elements of the text without any obviously false assertions about what is there. "According to the test of inclusiveness, a hypothesis becomes more secure as it demonstrates its ability to account for parts without encountering anomaly and to undergo refinement and extensions without being abandoned." The second criterion stresses intersubjective agreement on the interpretation. Can it win the assent of others as to its claims? The third test asks if the interpretation has "the power to lead to new discoveries and continued comprehension."

Once again, valuable as these are in perhaps limiting the number of rival interpretations, each one alone or even together, Armstrong argues, cannot produce only one correct interpretation from among others. Although the criterion of inclusiveness eliminates bad interpretations, it does not produce a conclusive resolution among the good ones: "Different interpretive methods based on different presuppositions can pass the test of inclusiveness with equal success." Similarly, the test of intersubjective assent does not reckon with the power of rhetoric or social force to achieve disciplinary and cultural consensus. Does democracy in the interpretive community(ies) lead to the proliferation of interpretations among people of goodwill? Ought, furthermore, a majority vote determine the best interpretation? Even what constitute new and interesting discoveries are prone to the same problems as the preceding criteria.

In the end, the quest for a single best or right interpretation denies multiple voices and viewpoints. In the contention among these voices and viewpoints for primacy, facts are never enough, because they cannot be universally, that is univocally, interpreted and accepted by all in the same way for the same purposes. Facts, from this standpoint, become playthings in the political battles for scholarly supremacy through interpretive warfare.

The Insufficiency of Facts

Although facts are essential to historical interpretations, they are not enough to prove an interpretation. Surely wrong facts or a lack of facts can undermine the validity of an interpretation, but such refutation is more difficult to achieve than historians would like to admit. Just as the American public seems reluctant to accept the facts of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and prefers a conspiratorial interpretation of his death, so many historians do not think that inaccurate transcriptions or mistranslations of documents or even errors of fact necessarily invalidate an interpretation of the collapse of the Weimar Republic as prelude to the rise of Adolf Hitler.

It is a good thing that historians know a fact when they see one in practice, for their efforts to theorize about them would suggest otherwise. Even though methods books devote many pages to authenticating evidence from the past and deriving and validating facts from the evidence, the notion of fact remains slippery and vague in the theory of doing history. The problem with historical facts, as with histories themselves, is that they are constructions and interpretations of the past. Evidence is not fact until given meaning in accordance with some framework or perspective. Likewise, events are not natural entities in histories, but constructions and syntheses that exist only under description.

Even to look at a series of factual sentences shows the difficulty in separating facts as referring to a past reality from interpreting that reality and ultimately describing it in conformity to some conceptual framework. All of the following thirteen sentences except the last could be found in a purportedly factual discussion of George Washington in a history book:

1. George Washington was born on February 22, 1732, in Bridges Creek, Virginia.

2. George Washington was the first president of the United States of America.

The truth of these two seemingly factual sentences can be challenged. The date of birth as given accords with the new instead of the old calendar; the actual date at the time of his birth was February 11. Since Washington was inaugurated as president only on April 30, 1789, almost two months after the
new federal Constitution had gone into effect, was the president of the old Confederation Congress the first actual president of the United States under the Constitution in the interim?

3. George Washington was (one of) America's greatest president(s).
4. George Washington was a founding father of the new nation.
5. George Washington was the most important founding father of the United States.

These three sentences can be construed as factual only if the reader subscribes to the interpretive framework of their author in each case—and to the metaphor in sentences 4 and 5.

6. George Washington was over six feet tall and held himself aloof from ordinary people.
7. Because he was so tall and aloof, George Washington was a charismatic leader.
8. Every new nation needs a charismatic leader until its leadership is routinized, and George Washington provided that leadership in the infancy of the United States.

Even if the reader agrees with the characterization of Washington in sentence 6, the other two sentences depend for their acceptance as fact upon a Weberian theory of leadership applied to a newly emerging nation.

9. George Washington was a plantation owner and a successful businessman.
10. George Washington was a slave owner.
11. George Washington was therefore hypocritical about the human equality asserted in the Declaration of Independence.
13. George Washington dreamed about Abraham Lincoln emancipating the slaves and thus fulfilling the clause in the Declaration of Independence about the equality of all men.

Sentences 9 through 11 combine fact and opinion. Moreover, to describe Washington only as a plantation owner without mentioning his exploitation of African Americans "whitewashes" the father of his country and from a multicultural viewpoint conceals by omitting some of the American experience. To say that plantation owning is a business implies that such an economy was based upon capitalism rather than upon precapitalist paternalism. Either assertion rests upon a lot of theory. Last, although the statement that all men are created equal does appear in the Declaration of Independence, how should it be understood in light of women's history or the histories of peoples of color? Does the fact that George Washington did not sign the Declaration of Independence make him less of a hypocrite about race relations? Is the sentence about the ownership of slaves the most important of all these sentences, because of the Great Story summarized in the title of Michael Goldfield's article "The Color of Politics in the United States: White Supremacy as the Main Explanation for the Peculiarities of American Politics from Colonial Times to the Present"?

At the least, these dozen sentences suggest differing degrees or orders of factuality, depending upon the proportion of empirical evidence and theory or ethics. Sentence 13 must be omitted from any professional history because no documentary evidence exists for such a dream. Finally, here, we encounter squarely the role of factuality and documentary evidence in historical practice. But even this sentence can be reworded so that its generalization is rendered factual in a historical account. Although no historian could include this dream as such (unless some new documentation is found), she or he could argue that the Civil War or Abraham Lincoln constituted the fulfillment of the American Revolution or the Declaration of Independence with regard to equal rights for all men. In this example the larger generalization or "truth" appears the same even if the modes of its presentation are quite different.

Despite difficulties of interpretation, all except the last of these sentences could appear as "factual" in a history book. If a dozen of these sentences could be found in a factual history, then the truth of a history is more than just counting the proportion of factual propositions to the other meanings represented in the text. To reduce a history text to a number of factual propositions about a past reality overlooks the rest of the text as a multilayered form of representation. Thus the validity of an interpretation or a text cannot be a mere matter of calculating its proportion of factual propositions. It must also be based on the nature of the narrative organization or the rhetorical exposition. Hunting for factual propositions not only masks the larger truthfulness about the past that historians say they seek; it also reduces the text to a series of sentences while neglecting its cumulative effect. Such an approach fails to look at a text as a totality whose sum is greater than its "factual" parts. Only such a conclusion would seem to make sense of the many contradictory histories proposed on a subject or for a period.

If the methodology of history is both factual and interpretive, can—should—the criteria for the truthfulness of history be unitary? If history is a hybrid of understanding, then the tough question is not so much what is wrong with any given history, but what is right and how to "prove" it, how to judge not what is false but what is "true" among the competing interpretations of facts, and why. Although historians reject some interpretations or explanations as manifestly wrong on the basis of factual inaccuracy or outdated worldviews, such as a providential interpretation, more often they
differ on how to derive what they see as the larger meaning of the events they isolate for study or how to present the synthesis of the facts for the best understanding of them. Hence the conflict over interpretations cannot be resolved by facts alone, much as such an easy resolution appeals to those normal historians who swear by the notion of the Great Past as a single transparent Great Story.

Would not one need as many criteria as there are parts or layers to a history text? Such traditional criteria as accuracy and truth refer not so much to the larger interpretive framing of a text as they do to some of its aspects. Thus historians presume that other historians’ transcriptions of the sources are accurate, that their translations are competent, and that they do not make up the evidence they purport to use. Even many facts are agreed upon by historians. No historian would argue that George Washington rather than Abraham Lincoln was the sixteenth president of the United States. On the other hand, the surplus of meaning supplied by historians in their texts through interpretation cannot be judged by the usual theories of truth. As F. R. Ankersmit argues in Narrative Logic, none of the normal theories of truth—correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, or performative—works for determining the “truth” of a historical narration, as he calls it, given its nature a re-presentation and its problematical relationship to the reality it is said to represent. To speak of interpretations or Great Stories as “right” or “wrong” is a summary way of assessing those qualities of comprehensiveness, persuasiveness, suggestiveness, and other criteria usually used for discussing the larger implications of a historian’s text. Some interpretations are considered interesting and important even when some of the “facts” are wrong. Other interpretations are deemed unimportant even though no one disputes their factual accuracy. Conversely, many genuine facts pertaining to a set of events or a period are not necessarily relevant to a given interpretation.

Historical facts have no one-to-one relationship to historical interpretations, and vice versa. The same basic set of facts can support several points of view. On the other hand, as Ankersmit argues, a point of view, by providing a perspective from which to view the evidence, not only influences the choice of facts but, more important, provides the basis for many of them. Different facts derive from the same events depending upon the historical perspectives or political interests of the interpreters. Finally, facts exist on different levels of the historical text depending upon the conceptual frameworks that provide their context. Although all normal histories pretend to operate predominantly with facts specific to particular events and persons or to particular societies and times, they also create facts that rely upon such middle-range or global theories as class conflict, long-range social or economic trends, and other macrohistorical developments. For these many reasons, facts do not determine an interpretation; rather, all interpretations are underdetermined, as Michael Krausz puts it. Facts are necessary but not sufficient to produce a proper history, just as a Great Story is necessary to supply context but not sufficient to comprise all of a proper history.

In the end viable and important interpretations of the same set of events or the same era must be considered incommensurable if they do not complement each other. To the extent that interpretations and Great Stories about the past are contested and contestable, they are living and relevant to the present. To the degree that they are living and relevant to the present, contests over them are as much political as they are epistemological. Thus whether or not the ultimate judgment about an overall historical text as interpretive structure or Great Story should be aesthetic, based on artistic coherence, or ontological, based on factual fit, is a matter of philosophical argument and political preference. Even if one criterion is preferred over another, judgment between them cannot be resolved by the simple “truth” and well-documented facts alone, for, as argued earlier, histories are complicated layers of textuality of which the factual aspect is only one (small?) part.

Thus interpretation plays a much larger role in normal history than the profession likes to admit in its texts, reviews, classrooms, or meetings. Historians’ textual creations, especially those most prominent or popular in the profession, are more structures of interpretation than the structures of factuality they purport to be. In fact, I would argue, the more prominent the book or article, the more likely the structure of interpretation substitutes for factuality. Praise in the profession reflects the professional preference for metastories that are accepted as referential, but a close reading of any well-hailed text will show its major generalizations to be more metanarrative, hence metasource, than textual evidence from the actual documentary sources it cites.

The importance of metastory is most evident in the case of interpretations relegated to the scrap heap of past historiography. Thus, because of its racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, and imperialism, among other academically disfavored ideologies, it is difficult for anyone today to take seriously Frederick Jackson Turner’s claim that the American frontier was the chief determinant of the nation’s destiny and history. Because Turner’s work relied so heavily upon certain mythopoetic stories beloved of once dominant white Americans, his facts no longer made “sense” once the intellectual climate that validated those ideologies as facts also passed. One can also accuse currently popular interpretations of being so much dependent upon ideology and metanarrative as they are derived from the cited evidential material. For example, in Sean Wilentz’s effort to find continuity in movements in the history of the American working class in New York City, he entitles one chapter “Subterranean Radicals” while admitting that he is hard pressed to locate any authentic oppositional movements in the 1840s. In Wilentz’s case as in Turner’s, the Great Story creates the major factual generalizations presented and therefore the reading of the evidence. Even in monographs and articles purporting to be almost solely factual, a check of footnotes against their supposed evidence
will quickly show how easily sources become metasources according to some preconceived metasemantic. The more general and more inclusive the thesis is, the greater will be the proportion of the representational over the supposedly (f)actual.

Representation and Referentiality as Interpretive Structures

So far it appears that normal historians subscribe to at least four principles of historical realism as necessary to grounding their methodology: first, the reality of the past and the assumption of its actuality lie at the foundation of any practice; second, the establishment of facts rests on an evidentiary basis provided by remains from that past; third, the nature of the expository synthesis bears some sort of correspondence to the actual past; and, fourth, that correspondence can only issue forth in a singular account because the actual past itself was unique. Even historians who generally subscribe to all four parts of this credo need not—and probably do not—think that they reproduce in their books and articles past reality as it was. That is, they do not assert that loyalty to historical realism need issue forth in mimetic or literal realism in their actual works.

This mimetic "gap" suggests another definition of historical realism as a textual form that conveys the illusion of reality by its mode of representation. Realism as a mode of representation can take different forms, such as paintings, motion pictures, novels, and histories. In each case the supposed realism of the representation varies in accordance with the conventions of the form; the imitation of reality in a painting or a motion picture is quite different in form from the appearance of reality produced in a novel or history. The old expression "A picture is worth a thousand words" implies that showing establishes a more direct connection between the representation and its subject than does telling. Picturing, like writing, however, has only a cultural or conventional relation to its subject, as the variety of artistic styles shows. Even plays and so-called documentaries that imitate life through reenactment do so by means of conventions. Narrative histories, like novels, convey realism by such means as constructing characters, setting scenes, and plotting events over time. Nonnarrative histories impart realism by equally conventional devices, such as the models of factual presentation and objectivity provided by the literature of the sciences, mathematics, or philosophy. Like all other forms of realistic representation, historical realism tries to bridge or conceal the gap between its form and its subject—to give the illusion of reality through its form. Hence the aptness of the title of one of Hayden White's articles: "The Fictions of Factual Presentation."

As textual form, then, historical realism embraces and presumes its own set of principles or assumptions parallel or additional to those listed earlier as the basis of normal historical practice. Given their foundations in social and disciplinary conventions, these can be labeled discursive or cultural historical realism. First, the realism of what is represented in a text depends upon the generally accepted worldviews of (Western) society as to what is real and what is mythical. Thus what is conceived as the real world is the conventional postulation of the professional historians' society and their own subgroup. Such postulates limit the nature of what counts as explanation, what serves as subject, and what separates imagination from fact. Second, textual historical realism presumes the conventions of the genre with regard to what constitutes a realistic approach to the subject matter. Although the text cannot reproduce reality, it conveys the illusion of realism according to the "social contract" between historians and their readers. The basis of that contract is modeled on the realistic novels of earlier times or the scientific models of today. Third, textual realism objectifies the past so as to make readers believe that the text does not intrude between their apprehension of the past and the past itself. Although the readers of a history, especially as argument but also as story, are always aware of the text as the representational intermediary, even the most technical monograph presents its case as if its readers were considering the past for itself as opposed to reading a text for itself. Fourth, historical realism in a text represents the past as objectively understandable in the same way for all its readers regardless of their gender, class, ethnicity, generation, or other social location or cultural orientation. Hence, normal historical realism naturalizes the conventions of textual realism to present the past as an autonomous world that can be considered from the viewpoint of whoever creates it as history. In all these ways, discursive or historical realism presents what is abstract in practice as if it were concrete reality and out there rather than in the text.

To the extent that a doctrine of realism presumes social convention, then mimesis is a discursive, or social, process. The Canadian historian Ruth Roach Pierson, summarizing the principles of realism in historical practice, frames the problem thus:

Historians tend to operate on two such collective hunches, one ontological, that there is a reality out there in the past, and the second epistemological, that that reality is knowable, albeit imperfectly and incompletely. In other words, while few historians in the twentieth century would claim that it is possible to know precisely "wie es eigentlich gewesen" (how it really was), most would maintain we can establish dass es gewesen ist (that it really was). Historians on the whole are still "locked within" what [the French feminist theorist] Michele Barrett would call a very traditional philosophical framework that "presupposes a somewhat optimistic confidence in empirical method and ontological reality."

How many of the various postulates of historical realism are necessary to historical practice lies at the core of the dispute between literary and rhetorical theorists and normal historians. To explain how many of these working fictions
generate the texts that normal historians produce is not the same as arguing how many of these postulates need to ground historical discursive practice.

The problems arising from what some scholars see as an overextended commitment to the many conflicting principles of objectivist realism in historical practice receive focus in the relationship between what we might call representation, defined as the (total) structure of interpretation as embodied in the synthesis itself, and reference, or referentiality, defined as the (total) structure of factuality presumed as the basis of that synthesis in a history. Structures of representation and referentiality encompass the many dichotomies that historians once supposed they bridged in their practice: abstraction versus concreteness, fictive invention versus factuality, art versus science, imagination versus reporting, narrative versus analysis, construction versus reconstruction.

The literary job of normal historical realism is to make the structure of interpretation appear to be (the same as) the structure of factuality. The effect of such a representation is to impress the reader that the structure of interpretation is the structure of factuality, thereby reconciling and transcending the various supposed dichotomies endemic to the discipline. Rather than showing the reader how the (re)representation is structured to look like total factuality, the normal historian's job is to make it appear as though the structure of factuality itself had determined the organizational structure of her or his account. Such a fusion of representation and referentiality is meant to convey the illusion of realism. We might christen this fusion the "referential illusion," after Roland Barthes' explanation of what he called the "reality effect." Barthes quoted the program for writing history proposed by the French historian Louis-Adolphe Thiers as his example of the referential illusion: "To be simply true, to be as things themselves are, to be nothing more than by them, like them, as much as them." The rhetorical device of presenting an abundance of seemingly surplus facts with little apparent organization or relevance to the main exposition only enhances this realistic effect, making the description appear to be a transcription of what really was.

By supposedly separating representation from factuality in their syntheses, historians hope to gain the authority to reconcile variant interpretations of partial and Great Stories by reference to the past itself rather than by the nature of their representations. On the other hand, by presuming the-separation of representation from referentiality, they can make factuality the seeming test of the validity as well as the basis of their singular syntheses. Thus the task of the historian is to make the structure of factuality appear to be its own organizational structure. Historians seek to conceal—or at least to suppress—how their representations are structured to look like total factuality as opposed to what they manifestly are: rhetorical representations. By supposedly substituting the structure of reference for that of representation, historians hope to make their text appear transparent to the reality they purport only to describe.

According to my argument so far, history is distinguished from the past in normal disciplinary practice inasmuch as historians divide representation from referentiality in order to make factuality the supposed test as well as the supposed basis of synthetic exposition. Figure 3.1 shows the implications of such a presupposition. The diagram indicates the general relationship between representation and referentiality, basic to normal historical practice, by showing their connection to narrative and factuality. In sum, it links methods and history-as-written with the postulated unified stories through synthesis as historical construction and as narrative. Representation, then, concerns both the mode of presentation as embraced in that linkage and the nature of what that mode of presentation covers in the whole process of doing normal history. Representation, as the upper half of Figure 3.1 indicates, embraces both the synthesis produced and the way it is understood as "history." The diagram also connects methods and pasts, partial and Great, as sources through evidence, as historical reconstruction, and as (f)actuality.Referentiality designates the mode of understanding presumed by the (supposed) recourse to (f)actuality and supposedly achieved through historical reconstruction. Referentiality, as the lower half of Figure 3.1 exhibits, encompasses both the process of creating facts from evidence and the methodological presuppositions about the past requisite to the process.
As Figure 3.1 shows, the normal historical paradigm connects representation and referentiality through the transition from the derivation or creation of facts from evidence to the synthesis of those facts into an exposition. Hence the statements so customary in the profession that history is both science and art, both a reconstruction and a construction. The two realms are postulated as connected but separated so that produced history can claim to be both empirical and factual but also literary in its larger sense—factual because of reference to (f)actuality, literary because of its synthetic (re)presentation of the partial and Great Stories.

In the end, reference is only part of representation in a historian’s text. To judge a history solely, or even primarily, on the basis of its factuality is to ignore the larger tasks of historical representation. Professional reviewing, according to the normal history paradigm, usually neglects how a text goes about masking the representational as referential.

The Role of Meta-Understanding

Contemporary literary and rhetorical theory questions specifically the strict separation of representation and construction from referentiality and reconstruction and, in doing so, challenges the basic paradigm of normal historical practice. The core question that poses all the problems is quite simple: Just what is the referent for the word "history"? It cannot be the past as such, because that is absent by definition. If words, according to linguistic analysts, are signs or signifiers that denote subjects in their stead, then "history" designates a doubly absent subject. Normal history exists as a practice precisely because of the effort needed to imagine (predicate) in the present a past presumed to have once existed. Because the past is gone, no one can point to it in the same way that one can point to a horse and tree (or even a picture of them) as the objects to which the words "horse" and "tree" refer. As the famed Dutch historian Johan Huizinga pointed out long ago, there is really no es, "it," in Leopold von Ranke’s famous formulation of the historian’s goal: *tveie es eigentlich gewesen, "as it really was." Historians can point, at best, to actual remains that supposedly come to us from the past” as the sources of the evidence they use for their historical reconstructions. Interpretation prefigures both remains and evidence and enables their use in historical practice. Remains need to be interpreted in the present just as they were themselves interpretations in the past. Moreover, according to the notion of plenitude in the paradigm of normal history, these sources are used to create pasts, whether partial or Great, that are larger than (what is inferred from) the sources themselves. Those pasts, however, depend upon still another predication or construction as observed by those interested in the poetics of historical practice.

The only referent that can be found for "history" in the eyes of such critics and theorists is the intertextuality that results from the reading of the sources combined with (and guided by) the readings of other historians of those same or other sources as synthesized in their expositions. "History," in the eyes of these critics, refers in actual practice only to other "histories." Thus they fail to see much, if anything, in the distinction drawn by normal historians between fact and fiction, for factual reconstruction is really nothing but construction according to the working "fictions" of normal historical practice, which in turn are the premises of historical realism and, far too often, even a naive objectivist realism that confuses the conventions of mimetic realistic representation with the knowing and telling of the past as it was.

As a result of such an approach to historical productions and practices, much, if not all, of what normal history presents as factuality becomes submerged under the synthetic side of historical practice and therefore open to question as to just what it does represent. In terms of Figure 3.1, representation embraces almost the entire process of doing history, with referentiality referring to, at best, the actual documentary record or other remains in the present presumed to come from a past postulated as passed. In contrast to normal history, according to this view, most (all?) of what is presented as (f)actuality is a special coding of the historians’ synthetic expository texts, designed to conceal their highly constructed basis. Regardless of how a historian might view the relationship between language and extralinguistic phenomena, the factuality of the overall synthesis is not of the same order as that of the individual facts constituting it. As a result, this argument about the constructed nature of the synthesis holds, I believe, independently of one’s philosophy of language.

That normal historical practice attempts to make its representation appear to present information as if it were a matter of simple referentiality indicates that some premises of realism as a literary form are basic to the paradigm. The illusion of realism enters historical practice to the extent that historians try to make their structure of factuality seem to be its own organizational structure and therefore conceal that it is structured by interpretation represented as (f)actuality. Once again, this is as true of analytic as of narrative expositions: in the former, art is presented as science quite literally, while in the latter supposed historical science is transformed into an art.

Many contemporary scholars outside the profession who advocate such a revised theory of historical practice see history as just another mode of coding words and texts according to conventional presuppositions about representing the past as history. For many literary and other scholars today who regard realism as a cultural and not a natural category of representing things, that such coding is socially conventional also means that it is arbitrary. In the end, such beliefs about realism and the arbitrary coding of the past in the
present collapse most if not all distinctions between the structures of representation and referentiality, for according to this view the latter can only be the former. The signified (the past) is naught but the signifier (history); no referent for the past itself exists outside the history texts themselves. Ultimately, according to this view, the Great Past is the Great Story and nothing but the Great Story. Like the partial stories and pasts, the Great Past is coded according to the same paradigmatic presuppositions of realism. But the Great Story is no less a predication or presupposition of the normal history paradigm than the Great Past. Its referent can no more be pointed to than that of the Great Past. It exists in the mind of God or the Omniscient Historian to test and organize the variant versions of partial stories as (hi)stories. In practice, the Great Story is extrapolated from the many partial (hi)stories, and they must, in effect, be the referent for the Great Story, if it can even be said to have one apart from its own wishful predication according to the normal history paradigm. In the end, the only referent for history in general is the paradigmatic presuppositions of the (a) Great Story extrapolated from the written, partial stories. Under this view of history as a mode of understanding or representation, the walls so jealously erected by historians between history as such and historiography, philosophy of history, and metahistory crack or tumble. Normal historical practice depends upon meta-understanding in all aspects of the basic process of creating a history—despite historians' rhetoric to the contrary.

Even if historians could by some means recreate the actual past in its totality, the result would not be history as we conceive it today. Historians would still need to select their themes and understandings of the past from the bewildering multiplicity of phenomena confronting them. Interpretation and representation would be as necessary if time machines existed as they are without them. As the Harvard Guide to American History advised decades ago: "If a time machine were available to carry the historian back through the past at will, he would confront, on stepping off the machine, the very problems of interpretation he thought he left behind." Even if the total of past actuality were reconstructed for historians, it would still not be the Great Past, let alone the Great Story, without analysis and interpretation by professional historians, because the past as history cannot be predicated without interpretation according to some customary presuppositional framework, be it one Great Story or another.

Now it is possible to modify the previous diagrams to include the place of meta-understanding in historical practice from the viewpoint of a poetics of history. The presuppositions that ground the synthetic constructions of historical production or the coding of the past as a narrative in its most general meaning can be labeled "metastory," "metanarrative," or perhaps in some sense, "metatext." The terms "metasource" and "Ur-text" designate the presuppositions necessary to interpret sources as intertextual evidence of the story of the past as history, and "metapast" to indicate the premises behind the narrativization of the Great as well as partial pasts. Metanarrative, in its most general sense, therefore pervades the paradigmatic presuppositions of normal history both through the connection of referentiality to representation and through the link between the partial and larger pasts. Because metahistory embraces the whole paradigm of presuppositions that create normal historical practice, it can replace the philosophy of history on the left of the diagram.

Metahistory equates metastory with metapast; that is, it collapses the presuppositional framework underlying representation with the one underlying referentiality, because the latter is considered primarily a postulation of the former in the paradigm of normal historical practice. Given this picture of the place of metahistorical premises in normal history, it is small wonder that some theorists of historical methodology see history, historiography, the philosophy of history, and metahistory as all quite interrelated, even coincident, to the chagrin of normal historians.

One challenge of poetics and rhetorical analysis to history lies in the implications of this equation of representation and referentiality, of the collapse of history into metahistory. Normal history is shown to be a culturally conventional (hence politically arbitrary) mode of coding communication as factuality by presenting the representation as if it were entirely referential and realistic. The transmutation of so much—some would charge all—of the referential side of history into the representational and narrative side of history destroys the overall factual authority claimed for historical texts.

Demystification of the historical enterprise, in this view, therefore legitimizes it as a discipline. To many normal historians such radical demystification appears to be the "end of [normal] history," because it implies that historical discourse refers to little or nothing beyond itself. After all, they would ask, of what use are maps or photographs if one cannot be sure what
they represent according to the usual realistic or mimetic criteria or even if they represent anything beyond their own surface configurations? Thus by opening history construction to greater possibilities of story-telling and interpretive coding than normal history allows, metahistorians appear to have eliminated the legitimating authority of factuality for history itself according to traditional premises.63

History versus Fiction

To question or even to collapse the distinction between the structures of reference and representation in historical practice seems to gainsay the hal- lowed distinction between history and fiction. Of the traditional dichotomies said to characterize normal historical practice, none seems more vital to the truthfulness (and the (true worth) of history than the distinction between fictive invention and factuality in historical practice (especially as a textual-ized production), hence to the legitimacy as well as the self-definition of the profession.64 Literary and rhetorical theory does not deny the traditional difference assumed in normal historical practice between history and fiction; rather, it challenges the nature and force of that distinction in theory and in actual practice. Not all of the principles of cultural or discursive historical realism need be assumed an illusion, but the textualization of that realism is achieved mainly through mimetic illusion. The problem is not whether reality exists—let us admit it does—but rather the difficulty of knowing how a representation goes about its construction according to whose theoretical problematic.

The differences and similarities between history and fiction may be highlighted briefly through the example of historical fiction—a seeming oxymoron from the viewpoint of normal historical premises—versus a notion of fictional history.65 The author of a fictional history could have a person of the American Revolutionary era, perhaps even George Washington or Thomas Jefferson, dream of the Civil War or Abraham Lincoln as the fulfillment of the human equality mentioned (promised?) by the Declaration of Independence. No historical novelist or historian could include such a dream unless some new documentation were found, but both could state on his or her own that the Civil War or Abraham Lincoln constituted the fulfillment of the American Revolution with regard to equal rights for (most adult white male) individuals. Supposedly no historical novelist would write that George Washington and Abraham Lincoln met and shook hands, but a fictional historical novel could. Thus traditional historical novelists, like historians, keep distinct the realms of fiction and fact in their books, even though the former might invent the chief characters of the novel but place them in as real a historical context as possible.

In recent decades many novelists have written books that cross the boundaries between history and fiction as traditionally conceived. Thus E. L. Doctorow's Ragtime (1976) presents both fictional characters, such as the black pianist Coalhouse Walker, and real historic persons of the era from 1906 to 1914, such as Emma Goldman and J. P. Morgan. The historical individuals meet and act together in the book even though no evidence exists that they ever did; moreover, fictional and historical persons interact with each other. Each case, from the normal historian's viewpoint, violates and distorts the historical record established by surviving sources. Doctorow and other recent novelists deliberately blur the distinction between historical fact and their imaginative invention in order to highlight both the fictionality of fact and the truthfulness of fictional representation. One traditional intellectual historian complains that Ragtime cannot be read "consistently either as playful fantasy or serious history. It is too historical for farce, too light-hearted for the rage of black humor, and too caricatured for history."66 Whereas the notion of literary genre provides a clue, even a framework, for the reader on how to read and interpret a work, the blurring of genres confused the reader about how to interpret not only the nature of the text but also its content and its import.67

As these examples suggest, history, historical fiction, fictional history, and fiction all exist along a spectrum ranging from supposedly pure factual representation of literal, historical truth to pure nonliteral, invented fictional representation of fantasy. No work of history conveys only literal truth through factuality, and few novels, even science fiction ones, depict only pure fantasy. Like histories, most historical novels have until recently tended toward invoking the authenticity of the time they describe, but both histories and historical novels employ devices of interpretation to flesh out the documentary and artifactual evidence. Similarly, novels, like historical novels, may evoke a time's reality to give context to their imaginary characters and plots. But even realistic novels, like fantasies, create the worlds their characters inhabit. Thus the issues of differences and similarities among these literary genres center upon both the actual existence of the characters and the reality of their larger contextual world, hence upon what readers expect from each genre.68

Perhaps it is the expectations of readers and their interpretive communities that are most important in assigning a text to a genre. A history is presented to its readers as a true story as opposed to, say, a novel because it alludes or refers to, and therefore implies, a world supposedly not of the author's imagining but of factual recreation. Historians refer to and try to (re)present actual events and persons in the past. They are not allowed to make up persons or events like novelists, who produce imagined or created worlds or persons and events. Realistic as a novelist's created world may seem to the reader, the novelist does not claim that these persons or events need actually
have existed apart from the text in which they are found. A novel may be praised for its verisimilitude because of its simulation of reality even as its author makes up conversations, actions, places, characters, and plots.69

Historians, on the other hand, claim accuracy with regard to their subjects and fidelity to the past in their texts on the grounds that they do not create persons or actions as existing without some evidence from past sources, do not allude to acts or events for which they lack documentary information, and do not put words into their characters' mouths or minds without specific evidence of such (although they may imply that they know the entire climate of opinion of the times or the collective opinion of a group of people on the basis of documentation derived from only a few cases at best). When one of their tellers makes up a document, as Simon Schama did in his narrative experiment, Dead Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations), his fellow historians castigate him severely for violating the historian's first commandment: Thou shalt not create documents and their evidence.70

In the end, novelists do not pretend that the worlds they depict actually existed, but historians assert that the world they recreate has happened in terms of its essential actions, persons, and so on. Thus many of the artifices of fiction, such as interior monologues and direct speech, do not seem available to historians even though, unlike most modern novelists, they seem to claim a godlike omniscience about the events and persons they describe. Whereas novelists create or construct the worlds their texts depict, historians (in their own opinion) recreate or reconstruct the worlds of the past in their texts.71

In this sense, referentiality is but one mode of representation for coding the historian's communication among several other conventional approaches to claiming the reader's attention. If historians assumed with Roman Jakobson and Roland Barthes that referentiality is just one means of representation in putting together a text, just one part of a text's complex structure, then normal historical reviews, meetings, and books would take quite different forms from those they do now.78 Thus we can talk about a historical text as a complex structure because its contents are layered and variously coded, and factuality of a positivist sort is but one layer or way of representing matters. Considering history as a complex textualization melds together the antinomies traditional to the discipline: abstraction versus concreteness, art versus science, interpretation versus empiricism, construction versus reconstruction,
Contrasting Views of History as a Text

The differences between a normal and a metahistorical or rhetorical approach to history come down in practice to how a (the) text is viewed as the vehicle for representing the past as history. Historians and literary and rhetorical theorists alike agree that professional books and articles contain more than a series of sentences or propositions about humans and events in (purported) past reality, but just how much more is a matter of considerable dispute between the two camps. For historians and literary theorists alike, narrativity, representation, and referentiality all receive their embodiment in the text, but they approach the understanding of the text in opposite ways. Although both look at how the text constructs the world it purports to represent, historians and their readers de-emphasize the actual text in favor of what it describes or talks about, that is, the world it purports to represent; rhetorical and literary theorists concentrate on how the text is constructed or how it goes about saying what it does. In essence they reverse the signifier and the signified; historians read their texts as history, literary theorists read history(ies) as text(s).

Historical Representations and Truthfulness

The chief way in which historians traditionally connect a text's contents to its represented world of the past, or the melding of representation and referentiality, is through the notion of an interpretation. Historians admit that interpretations shape their texts, but they do not see their texts' construction as primarily shaped by the interpretations. Thus they agree that interpretations are constructions but see them as not very arbitrary. For them, interpretations are always influenced, even demanded, by the facts themselves. Facts are presumed to be prior to interpretation. Interpretations refer to, or at least represent, not themselves but the actual past realities outside the text. Although there are plural interpretations that can be better or worse in historians' eyes, the structure of facts on which they are based is evaluated as right or wrong. Such an assumption or practice seems to reinforce the paradigmatic presupposition that representation is to be tested against some coercive, singular structure of facts.

But literary theorists and philosophers of history argue that no set of facts can go unstructured or unorganized according to some mode of representation, as historians would admit. Interpretations not only determine which facts they contain through selection and organization according to certain ways of coding or representation (which historians would also admit) but also constitute facts through collapsing a (the) structure of representation into seeming referentiality (to which historians would not agree so readily). For literary theorists, interpretations organize histories and therefore history; for historians, history ultimately organizes interpretations, because they supposedly follow how the past as history is organized.

Historians therefore see the melding of representation and referentiality as interpretations representing—designating, referring to—a real world outside the text. Whenever literary devices are used, they are incidental to the larger purposes of history as a true story. Whenever models or formal arguments are employed, they are germane to the understanding of the past as reality. On the other hand, literary and rhetorical theorists see historians as constructing that real world through the forms they use to give their texts the appearance of history. Moreover, to the extent that history is a story, ultimately it obeys the conventions of story-telling. In the eyes of literary theorists, historians' understanding of interpretation seems inadequate in two regards: it neglects the conventions governing its own construction, and it postulates an overly simple way of knowing the reality by which it purports to measure its own validity. To express this difference in terms simply of realism and factuality misrepresents by abridging the complicated process of transforming sources into facts, let alone the profound authorial intervention needed to combine those facts into a synthesis.

As a consequence historians and literary theorists view each other's understandings as not only wrong but also wrongheaded. Too many literary theorists in the eyes of normal historians seem to reverse the priority of
experience to language. To historians the collapse of referentiality into representation appears to deny reality in favor of language games and halls of philosophical mirrors. By reducing all history to its vehicle, all histories to text(s), the reality of the past seems to be equated solely with the discourses that describe it. That linguistic conventions constitute a history and therefore the past looks like a form of latter-day idealism to most historians. Even though normal historians accept that there are no histories without texts (or their contents), they also argue that history is more than the texts and their contents. They privilege, or give priority to, material over idealistic explanations of their practices as well as of the Great Past. They prefer what they phrase as reality over rhetoric, and they eschew applying the word "fiction" to their actors' inventions whether as ideologies or as institutions.

On the other hand, textualists would argue that texts contain far more than the bare facts that normal historians and their philosophical defenders assert constitute the truth of a history. Not only does any given text present less clearly factually-based sentences, but the text as a whole possesses many more meanings than the explicit factual message historians claim as the core of historical understanding.

Interpretation, Metahistory, and Truthfulness

Demystification of the role of story in normal history would seem to deny that any one single narrative or metanarrative need organize either the partial or Great Stories. Thus the story of the past should not be read simply as a history of progress or decline, as cycles or catastrophes, as class conflict or consensual pluralism, or even as change or continuity. No longer can any single master interpretive code be privileged over another as if one were somehow more correspondent to the (a?) "real" past than another. The denial of a single, metanarrative, Great or partial story to organize history challenges the omniscient viewpoint, probably the third-person voice, and maybe the ethnocentrism so evident for so long in history productions. That the discipline is conceptualized basically by national histories and organized by national professional associations only demonstrates how deeply ethnocentrism pervades the profession and how natural it seems to the discipline as organized professionally.

Demystification therefore frees the historian to tell many different kinds of stories from various viewpoints, with many voices, emplotted diversely, according to many principles of synthesis. By denying the standard presuppositions of normal history, the historian could liberate the ways of representing the past as history as well as how it is coded. For Hayden White, the demystification achieved through metahistory was intended to free historians to emplot their narratives according to choice—or will—and therefore to move beyond the modernist stance of irony. If historical practice denied the premise of the single basic story as an ideal, would there be as many Great Pasts as there are Great Stories?

To many normal historians, however, such a radical demystification of the role of narrativity in historical practice appears to be the end of (normal) history. In their opinion a plurality of possible (hi)stories in theory as well as in practice certainly questions, if not eliminates, the legitimating authority of the discipline, which rested upon the search for the one and only Story as the single True account of the partial and Great Pasts. For normal historians, opening history as construction to the greater possibilities of story-telling and interpretive coding than they prefer appears to have abolished the factuality of history itself according to the traditional premise that the "best" representation of a set of facts comes in a single "right" version.

To measure truth in and of history would seem to demand an approach as flexible and diverse as history itself is said to be. If historians try to fuse or combine disparate ways of understanding into a unified mode of presentation, then should not the criteria of what is truthful vary by the mode of understanding? Thus judging the validity of (a) history as an artistic or literary production would be a different exercise from judging its validity as a scientific enterprise, but both activities would be appropriate to understanding historical discourse itself. To the extent that, say, story-telling or imaginative organization of the material produces a (specific or partial) history (rather than history as such), then aesthetic, stylistic, or other criteria might constitute the proper bases for determining the truthfulness of a history. To the extent that, say, analytical argument or social scientific explanation constitutes a history, then logical consistency and explanatory power might provide the grounds of judgment. To the extent that analogy or allegory is the lesson of a history, then the truth of a text lies not in the text but is the very text itself. Allegorical and analogical truthfulness is nothing more, and nothing less, than the text as a whole considered symbolically. Such truths must be judged by the moral, political, or other criteria appropriate to the higher hermeneutics that establish the greater or ultimate meanings of histories and history for readers.

If the practice of history is pluralistic, can the criteria for the validity or truthfulness of (a) history be unitary? If a historical synthesis is a multilayered text as presentation, then such truth criteria as coherence or correspondence (to use classic terminology), aesthetic wholeness or scientific verification (to use newer terminology), seem too dichotomous to be adequate to the task. If the criteria and therefore the nature of truthfulness multiply as Clio's tasks become more diverse, so too do the criteria and nature of what constitutes proper understanding in historical presentations as representations. In step with this diversity go varying tests of what constitutes the proper nature of categorizing what is at issue.
Thus the criteria of historical truthfulness are as varied as the nature of its textualization. Referential or empirical truth claims can be judged by correspondence to the evidence, but the degree of that correspondence is not self-evident to all alike. If the degree of correspondence can be debated, then other truth claims can also be argued in and outside the profession. Truthfulness can be measured by intertextual agreement, or how well any given history coincides with other histories. If historians usually read sources with other histories in mind, then their texts as fact and interpretation are intertextual from the beginning of their conception. The truthfulness of a history can also be judged by how well it accords with a reader's understanding and experience of how the world operates. Whose experience counts here and whence comes such experience offer grounds for argument among readers. A history's validity might be judged by how well its models of human behavior and societal workings correlate with its reader's models, but once again whose models count most? The overall validity of a history might be gauged by a reader's sense of aesthetic wholeness and order. Surely the verities of Great Stories are in the realm of allegory. Finally, the truth of (a) history will be held accountable to a reader's values and politics.

In each instance, readers accept a truth claim or value in accordance with what they take the world to be like, but not all readers agree upon what the world is like. Readers' politics and ethics, like their disciplinary paradigms and belief systems, all operate as determinants of historical truthfulness, whether of a text, a Great Story, or history itself. In all cases, far more is at stake than the mere factuality of some propositions in the text. Only to the extent that documentary interpretation of the sources as evidence is at stake do the normal procedures of historical method seem to determine historical factuality, and even then their applicability is influenced by the other modes of evaluation. Disciplinary procedures always operate within a larger social context to measure the truthfulness of a history and of history itself. That truth claims operate both within a text and within the worlds of its readers provides grounds for both agreement and disagreement on the validity of histories.

Such a mixed-genre approach to the nature(s) of histories and the truths in and of them provokes uneasiness even in sophisticated practitioners of history who also theorize, as the reasoning of Lynn Hunt demonstrates. She begins by stating: "History is about telling stories. It is not a repository of facts or anecdotes because it has no ontological status whatsoever. No particular fact or anecdote that comes from the past can be presumed to have any particular truth status just because it comes from the past." On the other hand she argues: "History is 'out there' in some sense, but its thereeness is not fixable... History is a search for truth that always eludes the historian but also informs her work, but this truth is not an objective one in the sense of a truth standing outside the practices and concerns of the historian." Hence, she goes on, "history is better defined as the ongoing tension between stories that have been told and stories that might be told. In this sense it is more useful to think of history as an ethical and political practice than as epistemology with a clear ontological status." Still, "on the other hand," she argues, "a concept of a history 'out there' does inform most historians' work and for good reason: it stands as a constant reminder that we cannot get at 'real' truth and yet that we must always try to do so." In her view, such an approach to history vindicates Nietzsche's admonition "that many eyes will tell us more than one" and that multiperspectivalism will result in a more "objective" historian and therefore a "more complete" (better?) history.

Hunt concludes that histories do not have "an unproblematic ground of truth," because their stories are "a field of moral and political struggle in which we define ourselves in the present. The struggle will continue because power is control over the storytelling function." In the end, therefore, is the "truth" of (a) history or a Great Story only one according to the rules of its own interpretive community and therefore valid only as it is constituted by that subcommunity?
CHAPTER FIVE

Emplotment: Historicizing Time

Since the ways of representing time and the ways of representing history overlap in historical practice, the rhetoric and poetics of narrative and argument should be supplemented by a rhetoric of temporal arrangement and a poetics of temporal ordering in historical representations. To the logic (content) and psycho-logic (expression) of historical representations must be added the chrono-logic of those representations—the patterning of time in that content and the timing, as it were, of its expression. Just as narratives and arguments must be arranged, so the representation of time in them must be ordered and apportioned. Such patterning takes the form of emplotment broadly conceived.

The Time of Normal History

Time is basic to history both with regard to what historians purport to represent about the past and with regard to how they go about representing it. Although history is a genre of time par excellence, historians rarely discuss its nature or how it is textualized. They presuppose time and employ temporal ordering in three different but related ways.\(^1\) The three ways exist in tension, and their synthesis poses problems for the textualization of a history even while each way provides resources and opportunities for the textualization of history in general.

First, and most obviously, historians make events and persons in past time the subject matter of their texts and professional discourse. Most important, historians assume the otherness of past times: the longer ago they are, the more the then and there differ from the here and now. They talk about events and actions that occurred in previous times; they discuss persons and institutions that existed in the past. Historians represent past time(s) as real, hence as the referent of their discourse. Histories therefore describe the past and its ordering as what really happened. This first principle of historical realism is construed according to calendar time and aided by the grammatical construction of verbal tenses. Physical time is domesticated into human time through the socially invented calendar. The calendar both measures and expresses history in terms of events. The past as historical time is described from the moment in the present of the speaker or writer as enunciative narrator. Verb tenses designate what once took place narratively as really happening and is vital to the narrator’s linguistic construction of a text as a history.\(^2\)

Second, historians represent time through their textualization of it. Their discourses not only refer to the past but embody the representation of it through both argument and narrative textualization of those prior times. The historicization of time is achieved only through such textualized representation. Conversely, historians textualize time as story through what happens in it as if it were an empty vessel to be filled. According to the normal paradigm, time itself has no content; only through being given content can it be historicized. The idea of time as an empty vessel to be filled with history is another way of interpreting Paul Veyne’s dramatic pronouncement that “time is not essential to history.”\(^3\) As Savoie Lottinville advises the beginning historian:

The narrative management of time is best when it is unobtrusive although fully present. This kind of management is successful, usually, when the writer is busy advancing the topical significance of his account so that days or months or seasons emerge naturally from the story. Thus the emphasis is upon something other than time itself, which, while important sequentially, must always be secondary to action and significance in historical contexts.\(^4\)

Arrangement is central to time as something to be filled: both to what fills it as content and to how it is filled through expression. Thus emplotment is fundamental to history both as referent and as representation, as explicit and implicit narrative or as the subtext of an argument.

Third, historians produce arguments and narratives that take time to read or tell. They use time in the present to describe time in the past. The ordering of past time as the content of history demands present time for explicating or narrating that history as expression. Representations of past times, as a result of the sequential arrangement of the text, require their own time to be heard or read. Even so, the sequence of past time as represented in that text is understood, paradoxically, all at one time at the end of its hearing or reading. Historical patterning, whether representing time as sequence or as setting, that is, as diachronic or as synchronic, dialectical or functional, is ultimately synchronic in its understanding by historian and reader alike, no matter how dynamic its content as story or argument.\(^5\) The difference between synchrony

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\(^{5}\) The difference between synchrony
and diachrony, between dialectical and functionalist analysis, lies in the
referential story or argument and not necessarily in the sequential
arrangement of the discourse itself or in the duration of its consumption. Although
the representation of synchronic and diachronic time may be textually the
same as discursive arrangement or in consumption time, there is a world of
difference between the two kinds of emplotment from the standpoint of what
they claim to do and how they go about it conceptually.

The goal of normal history is to synthesize the discrepancies among these
uses of time. Historians assume that they unite the time of the real world of
the past (RWP) and the time of that world as referred to in the text (TWT)
through chronology. They seek to reconcile the time of that referred-to world
in the text (TWT) with the timing of its textual ordering as the content of the
representation (CR) through emplotment. That the sequential ordering of the
discourse in the text (DT) need not follow the order of time in its referred-to
representation (CR) let alone in the referred-to real world (TWT) complicates
the plotting of history.

What normal historians seek to unite textually through chronology and
emplotment, rhetoricians of history attempt to separate analytically through
story or argument and discourse. Rhetorical and literary theorists explore
the relationship between time in the referred-to real world (TWT), the time
of that world as represented in the text (CR), and the timing or order of its
textual presentation (DT) as part of their notion of the textual content
as story or argument as opposed to its textual expression as discourse. The
distinction between story and discourse in narrative history specifically and
between expression and content in historical representation generally also
rests upon certain assumptions about the nature of time as chronology. In
turn, a conception of time as chronology creates problems for emplotment
in historical representation even while it enables normal historical method-
ology.6

For the reader and critic, therefore, the rhetoric or poetics of temporal
order in historical representations examines timing, or its patterning, in at
least three ways as central to its analysis of histories as texts. First, how is the
timing of the world of the past patterned or plotted by the historian? Time in
the past is the world represented as the subject of historical texts, so what do
the texts say explicitly about the arrangement of time and timing on various
levels of the content? Second, what kind of patterning or plotting during
representation does the patterning and plotting of the past receive in the text
itself? How, in other words, is the expression patterned and plotted to convey
its message about the patterned past? The first set of questions centers on the
pattern of history itself as represented; the second set focuses on the pattern
of the representation itself as presented in the text. A third set of questions
concentrates on the timing of the textual presentation, on how the text goes
during the time of its consumption. Since the presentation of what is talked
about as history in the text takes its own time to consume in the present, how
do historians time their own sequential presentation of historical patterning?
How long or short a time do histories devote to a topic through the allocation
of textual space?

In one way, then, time is both trope and topic to historians and readers alike.
Time as chronology both prefigures and figures historical representation. Time
as timing or sequence constitutes both the subject of historical representation
and its means of doing so. Historians take time as the topic of their presenta-
tion as they periodize or pattern the past to describe or explain what happened
in history as the past. They arrange their argument and narration about time
by how they emplot each to represent what happened in the past as history. In
all these senses, then, the conception of timing as patterned for representing
the past in the present leads to the multiple significance of what we can call
plotting or emplotment in general historical practice. Emplotment in its broad-
est sense operates throughout the layers of a text, whether displayed as narra-
tive or as argument, whether manifested in surface or in subtext, whether
presented as referential fact or as interpretive structure.

Textual or Discourse Time versus Chronological Time

Historians and readers, metahistorians and critics alike presume time to be of
a certain nature in order to serve as the framework of chronology. Although
the times of histories are obvious social constructions, historians treat chrono-
logical time as if it were natural, physical time itself. Thus chronological time
combines the human-invented calendar time of events with the naturalized
time of a Newtonian universe. Historical time as chronology is treated as
exterior to the events said to occur in it but which also mark its passage.
Hence historians assume chronological time to be as universal, directional,
and measurable as physical time. Measurement and direction allow assump-
tions about chronology and its implications for historical method. Universal-
ity permits all events and times to be embraced by a single overall chronology.
Direction along with chronology enables assumptions about causality, con-
tingency, contiguity, and nonconnection among events. Chronological time is
homogeneous and unique in historical discourse. Such socially naturalized
time exempts its own social construction from history; it is timeless in practice
despite what historians know about its history.7

Historians postulate the existence of a time that is sequential, external,
universal, and yet specific to the events that take place in it. Such a notion of
temporal succession as real is fundamental to the ordering of their data in
partial histories and Great Stories alike. What makes chronology work in
historical practice is the assumption of the order or sequence of time that

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measures both succession and duration. Thus a historic event embraces a specific span of time while simultaneously being before, during, or after other events at the same or different times. Historic time is both singular for the moment of dating and continuous for measuring duration. The irreversibility of historic time allows assumptions about causality, contingency, irrelevance, and anachronism.

For the purposes of historical method and dating, time is presumed to move in one direction only and to be homogeneous in its measurement and uniformly present throughout the universe. Seconds, hours, weeks, months, years, and even decades and centuries are the same no matter when or where, for time is standardized as well as universal. Histories may be plotted as discontinuity and rupture, but ultimately even these disjunctions are measured according to the same kind of temporal units as those representing continuity. Systems of dating may vary by culture, but the professional method of historicizing time through dating is the same for all times and peoples by paradigmatic premise. Thus temporal measurements hold true wherever and whenever history is said to occur. Historians measure the past like the present and future, whether conceived as process or passage, stages or succession, according to a universal, unilinear time that provides the chronological basis of the partial and Great Pasts, and thus of the partial and Great Stories.

If some scholars question whether the distinction between story and discourse ought to be made in fiction, can—should—the distinction be maintained in examining history texts, given that chronological order seems to preempt the whole issue by ordering histories as discourse or plot time as well as story and argument? But many narrative histories violate the strict chronology of the sequence of historical events through rearranging the order of their presentation in the discourse. Even those histories that attempt to recapture past reality through recapitulating past events according to their dated sequence of occurrence must depart from a rigid chronological recounting to incorporate simultaneous happenings, to comment on sources, or to connect causes and effects to certain events and persons.

Perhaps the most obvious example, discussed in the previous chapter, is the use of flashback from a dramatic event presented at the opening of a book or article. Flashback as a narrative technique depends upon an understanding, shared by the historian and the reader, of chronological time as a sequence or succession of events independent of their order of presentation in the text; the historian depicts a dramatic event before tracing the history or presenting the story that supposedly led to it, but the reader understands them in proper chronological sequence despite the order of presentation. Like flashback or retrospection, flashforward or anticipation or foreshadowing violates the chronology of the represented world to indicate in the narrative that some events in the historical present will affect those of the future. Both retrospec-
New Historicist work in literary studies depends upon Foucauldian premises, written for once and for all by some anonymous hand.¹⁸ Common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same periods of what he termed "normal science." Foucault applied "episteme" mental assumptions and questions shared by a group of scientists during a period in European history.¹⁷ The Archaeology of Knowledge, his book was hailed as both anthropology and history and as a premier contribution to the history of mentalités, or the life of the mind of common people.¹⁴ Even though his ethnohistorical account spanned at least a quarter-century, Le Roy Ladurie subordinated process to long-term structures in the first part of the book to describe what he called the "ecology" of Montaillou; and diachrony to synchrony to present the villagers' culture as a culture in the second part, on the "archaeology" of the town.⁵

Synchrony is also the basis of the notions of paradigm as advanced by Thomas Kuhn in his history of science and of episteme as advanced by Michel Foucault in his history of Western culture. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions appropriated the term "paradigm" to designate the set of fundamental assumptions and questions shared by a group of scientists during periods of what he termed "normal science."¹⁶ Foucault applied "episteme" in The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences to the field of epistemological premises that gave coherence to diverse disciplines during a period in European history.¹⁷ In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault explained an episteme as "something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that men of a particular period cannot escape—a great body of legislation written for once and for all by some anonymous hand."¹⁸ To the extent that New Historicist work in literary studies depends upon Foucauldian premises, it too is usually synchronous in representation. Because its practitioners dissolve the difference between literary texts and other texts through intertextuality, their profound interest in diachrony is subverted by their synchronic strategy of textualization. Since all texts circulate freely in a period, their methodological treatise indicates. The benefits and disadvantages of paradigms and epistemes in historical discourse are also those of synchronic analysis in general.

Sometimes the discrepancy between chronology and a historical discourse or representation seems to be used to clarify the narrative and make the argument stronger. Thus in A New England Town Kenneth Lockridge, as discussed in the previous chapter, places all instances of harmony, regardless of when they occurred during the first century of Dedham's history, in the first part of the book, which claims to portray the first fifty years of the town's existence; and all evidence of conflict, no matter when it took place during the century, in the second part, which is allegedly devoted to reporting the decline of community in the town during the second fifty years. In both parts the chapter titles are seemingly topical, but the chapters in the first part tend to be synchronous, whereas those in the second part are diachronic.

Paul Johnson in A Shopkeeper's Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837, used seemingly topical chapter titles—"Economy," "Society," "Politics," "Impasse," "Pentecost," "Christian Soldiers"—to explain through their very sequence the economic and social changes in the canal town that toppled an earlier elite's social leadership and subsequent elite efforts to control the new working class first through politics and then through religion. As in the second part of Lockridge's book, the simultaneous or overlapping events described in the various topical chapters are made to appear as sequential and thus as historically causative of each successive phase.¹⁰ Similarly, the central chapters of William Cronon's Changes in the hand presented more or less topical chapters in such an order as to suggest the sequence of the process whereby Native American societies were supplanted by English ones on the land.

Presentation of simultaneity or overlap as sequence and change, if not as causation, seems endemic to immigration history. Oscar Handlin used such a form of temporal manipulation both in his scholarly monograph Boston's Immigrants: A Study in Acculturation and in his interpretive synthesis The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made the American People. In the former book, two chapters portraying equilibrium before and after the migrations bracket topical chapters on "The Process of Arrival," "The Economic Adjustment," "The Physical Adjustment," "Conflict of Ideas," "The Development of Group Consciousness," and "Group Conflict," which appear to present through their succession the process of acculturation.
Although these chapters are arranged in such a way as to seem to convey events in temporal order, in fact the events described occurred almost simultaneously or overlapped greatly. Similarly, The Uprooted follows the immigrants as they leave their old homes and cross the ocean, first settling into their new surroundings, then engaging (seemingly successively) in economic, social, cultural, and political activities in the new homeland, and, finally, reestablishing roots. In both books Handlin expands the historical simultaneity of many of these events into the sequential narrative of an odyssey. That both Irving Howe in his popular World of Our Fathers: The Journey of Eastern European Jews to America and the Life They Found and Made and social historian John Bodnar in his scholarly synthesis The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America likewise present their histories as odysseys indicates that this is a standard way of plotting immigration history. Howe's narrative follows his Jewish migrants from the eastern European shtetl to the East Side of New York City (with a generous treatment of economics, politics, and culture there) and then to a final redispersion throughout the United States (and American culture); Bodnar's story follows nineteenth-century migrants from their European homes through their arrival in America, discussing work and unionization, the role of an immigrant middle class, the roles of church and club, and their ultimate relationship to the larger American society and culture.

Another manipulation of temporal order in historical discourse as text involves the discrepancy between the duration of referred-to time and the duration of its representation in textual or discursive time. In crudest form this discrepancy can be measured by the difference between the number of years elapsed in historical time and the number of pages devoted to those years in the text. A good example of this discrepancy in the duration of historical as opposed to textual time can be found in any textbook surveying what is taught as American history in high school or college. The number of pages devoted to the period from Columbus' landfall in the New World in 1492 or even from the beginnings of English settlement in 1588 to the American Revolution or the adoption of the U.S. Constitution are far fewer than the subsequent number of pages treating the remainder of U.S. history although the two periods are in fact of nearly equal duration.

In all the examples discussed above, the discrepancy is between the sequence of how—when—time is (re)presented in the text and a presentation following an absolute chronological sequence. The discrepancy results from how time is inscribed in the discourse versus how it is described, or more frequently presumed, in that same discourse as referential content. Whether considering these problems under normal historians' assumptions about the coincidence between the real past and its textual representation or the meta-historians' collapsing of referentiality into representation, both groups can subscribe to the distinction between timing in and of the representation. Such a variety of manipulations of chronological time in historians' representational sequences reinforces as it exemplifies the desirability of distinguishing between expression and content in historical works. This division results from the discrepancy between history's being about time and history-telling's taking place in time. History as representation of the past describes time through a sequence of events taking place over time, that is, through time. As a representation, however, the actual written history is sequential in its presentation by the historian and in its reading by its audience. Its reading, like its presentation, takes place over time, that is, through time as well. It is this difference in chronological settings and durations that allows—indeed, makes for—the divergence of expression and content in histories, whether they be predominantly narrative or nonnarrative. Thus the arrangement of the story or argument in its presentation need not—cannot—be consonant with the past chronology to which it refers and which it seeks to represent. Since the subtext, on the other hand, is always implicit by definition, its organization as narrative could in theory always be chronological. Once made explicit, however, the subtextual story would encounter the same problems of representation and textualization as other narratives in combining chronological and discourse times. These problems demonstrate why a rhetoric of temporal ordering with regard to arrangements of narrative and argument is basic to historical criticism.

History versus Chronology: The Problem of Patterning

To what extent must historians pattern the events in the past in order to fill the presumably empty vessel of physical time to give message and meaning to the (hi)story? That the arrangement or sequence of events as presented in the text or discourse usually varies from their strict arrangement or sequence in chronological or referential time (that is, time in the actual past as represented in the text) poses the challenge of emplotment. Emplotment embraces both kinds of timing. How should the historian arrange the sequence of temporal elements in a historical text as opposed to the actual order in chronological time? Discourse time gives meaning to the chronological story. If meaning is given to histories through their temporal ordering, then how does emplotment serve this end?

According to the philosopher Karl Popper, "History has no meaning," if by meaning one intends some grand philosophy of history, or what we today call a metanarrative for all of the past: historians cannot "find the Path on which mankind is destined to walk . . . discover the Clue to History . . . or the Meaning of History." On the other hand, he argues, "Although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and although history has no meaning, we can give it a meaning." Most working historians would
subscribe to Popper’s condemnation of any grand patterning of the past as history. At the same time they would also agree that “proper” histories must provide some patterning or meaning in their discourse. How historians draw the distinction between too much and too little patterning or meaning in history is the issue. That issue centers upon the nature and degree of plot(ting) in history.

W. H. Walsh, following Popper, clarified the distinction between finding “meaning in history” and trying to uncover the “meaning of history.” Because all historians believe that history can be made “intelligible in principle in the light of such explanatory procedures as we can bring to bear on it,” they can make sense of a set of historical events in order to create the causally plotted and implicated “unity in diversity” that constitutes a “significant history.” To that extent partial histories, in our previous terms, can be written.

But those seeking meaning in history lay claim to a much stronger sense of “meaning,” according to Walsh, in that they pose the alternatives more starkly: “Either (it is said) we must admit that history has a meaning, that there is point, significance, intelligibility in the historical process as a whole, or we must accept the view that history is a chaotic aggregate of unconnected events and processes, lacking all rhyme or reason.” But here the historian’s task ends, and the job of the historical sociologist and the speculative theorist of history begins.

As a matter of fact, those who have asked the question “Does history make sense?” have been concerned with two distinct enquiries. One group of them has sought to discover certain constant factors governing all historical change; they have found the clue to history in race or climate or the development of the forces of production. History on this view would become intelligible if we could show why it took the course that it did; the “why” here involved is a causal “why.” But other speculative theorists of history have not been content with this modestly comparative programme. They have wanted to find, not merely the factors governing historical change, but rather a single plot or pattern in the whole course of historical development. For them history makes sense only if it can be shown to be going somewhere, and only if the goal in question is something of which we can morally approve.

How can the philosopher who argued that historians seek unity in diversity in their discourses also assert that some historians might go too far in their search for meaning? His answer seems to depend upon some quantitative theory of the relation between his idea of proper history and his conception of historical reality. Proper historians bring understanding through ordering a part of history, while historical sociologists or other social science generalists seek causal sequences in and across such portions of history. Both in our previous terminology produce partial histories, but to different ends and with supposedly different methods. Speculators about the grand meaning of history take as their domain longer spans of time or “all” of history. Such a differentiation between historians and social scientists and metahistorians speaks from the viewpoint of normal history (and to its own vested interest).

Even while normal historians carefully separate “proper history” from mere speculation, they are equally finicky about distinguishing “proper history” from mere chronology. Chronology may supply order in the temporal arrangement of events, but it does not supply explicit patterning, and that is what separates proper history from chronicles and annals.31 The explicit plotting of time describes, organizes, and explains events, persons, and actions in the past all at one and the same time. Chronicles offer their readers “one thing after the other”; proper histories provide their readers with “one thing because of the other.”32 Proper histories thus contain self-conscious organization of arguments, interpretations, or narratives that offer the reader explicit closure through their arrangement in the text as opposed to their actual occurrence as “mere” succession or random conjunction in chronological time.

Whereas philosophers of history and historical sociologists seek (and find) too much pattern and meaning in representing the past, chronicles and annals seek (and find) too little. What does such a distinction presume about the nature of time and the plotting of history as temporal order? With what criteria are the distinctions made between finding too much or too little patterning in a small part of history, a larger part of history, and all of history? What is intrinsically different about putting some meaning or some pattern into partial histories but not into all of history, especially from a textualist perspective?

The Nature and Uses of Emplotment

Historicized time is given pattern and meaning through plotting, or emplotment.33 At a minimum, plot can be defined, as it is in A Dictionary of Narratology, as “the main incidents of a narrative; the outline of situations and events (thought of as distinct from the characters involved in them or the themes illustrated by them).”34 In previous terminology, plot arranges both the content of the story and its expression as discourse in a narrative. In a broader definition from the same dictionary, plot is “the global dynamic (goal-oriented and forward-moving) organization of narrative constituents which is responsible for the thematic interest (indeed, the very intelligibility) of a narrative and for its emotional effect.”35 In a still more general definition by another theorist, “Plot . . . is not a matter of typology or of fixed structures, but rather a structuring operation peculiar to those messages that are developed through temporal succession, the instrumental logic of a specific mode of human understanding. Plot, let us say in preliminary definition, is
the logic and dynamic of narrative, and narrative itself a form of understanding and explanation.\textsuperscript{36}

In their most general meanings, plot, narrative, and life all intersect, or interact, through the experience of human time, its understanding, and its representation. As Peter Brooks writes:

Plot... is the design and intention of narrative, what shapes a story and gives it a certain direction or intent of meaning. We might think of plot as the logic or perhaps the syntax of a certain kind of discourse, one that develops the propositions only through a temporal sequence and progression. Narrative is one of the large categories or systems of understanding that we use in our negotiations with reality, specifically in the case of narrative, with the problem of temporality; man's timeboundedness, his consciousness of existence within the limits of mortality. And plot is the principal ordering force of those meanings that we try to wrest from human temporality. Plot is... basic to our experience of reading, and indeed to our very articulation of experience in general.\textsuperscript{37}

As can be seen from this range of definitions, plot, time, story, and narrativity all have close connections in narrative practice and narratological theory. Emplotment transforms or configures a multiplicity of events, characters, and conditions into a narrative, and narrativity constitutes its form of understanding chiefly through emplotment broadly conceived. Whether defined narrowly as a story (out)line or broadly as a configuration of all story elements, whether defined statically as formalist elements or dynamically as structuring operations, emplotment is what makes a narrative a narrative.\textsuperscript{38}

Although emplotment is essential to understanding a narrative as a whole, it is not the same as the whole narrative. Nevertheless, emplotment is the "anatomy," "armature," or other similar metaphor for the underpinning of the narrative and therefore of its theorization as narrativity. Whether conceived as a formalistic, even static, grammar or more dynamically as a structuring or organizing operation, emplotment performs the same function in organizing the temporal aspects of the narrative. Emplotment injects as it constitutes the continuity, coherence, and causality or contingency of the events in time that make a temporal miscellany (chronicle, chronology?) into a story or narrative. Plot, like context, turns an aggregation of materials into a significant narrative structure. In all cases, emplotment of a narrative encompasses subplots and themes subordinate to the main plot as it develops the story through turning points, crises, resolutions, and other well-recognized narrative devices.\textsuperscript{39}

Some historians and philosophers debate whether present and past events possess emplotment and narrativity in their own right or merely receive emplotment and narrativity through their constitution as story. Interesting, even important, as this debate is in some ways to historians, its resolution is not necessary to an appreciation of the significant role emplotment plays in the construction of historical representations. We can study the function of emplotment in narratives without having definitive answers to the relation between life and its narrativization and whether or not narration is universal to humans, no matter how relevant, even vital, these questions are in other intellectual contexts.\textsuperscript{40}

What emplotment entails as a general operation in both fiction and history is basic to Paul Ricoeur's three-volume Time and Narrative. In an effort to be inclusive Ricoeur offers a model of emplotment as mediation:

First, it is a mediation between individual events or incidents and a story taken as a whole. In this respect, we may say equivalently that it draws a meaningful story from a diversity of events or incidents... or that it transforms the events or incidents into a story. The two reciprocal relations expressed by from and into characterize the plot as mediating between events and a narrated story. As a consequence, an event must be more than just a singular occurrence. It gets its definition from its contribution to the development of the plot. A story, too, must be more than just an enumeration of events in serial order; it must organize them into an intelligible whole, of a sort such that we can always ask what is the "thought" [point or theme] of this story. In short, emplotment is the operation that draws a configuration out of a simple succession... [it] brings together factors as heterogeneous as agents, goals, means, interaction, circumstances, and unexpected results.\textsuperscript{41}

Emplotment transforms events into episodes and chronicles into stories. To create narrative unity from chronological diversity demands nothing less, in Ricoeur's opinion, than the resolution of the paradox of time. "By mediating between the two poles of event and story, emplotment brings to the paradox a solution that is the poetic act itself" as it "extracts a figure from a succession" of events and enables the story to be followed.

It reflects the paradox [of time] inasmuch as the act of emplotment combines in variable proportions two temporal dimensions, one chronological and the other not. The former constitutes the episodic dimension of narrative. It characterizes the story insofar as it is made up of events. The second is the configurational dimension properly speaking, thanks to which the plot transforms the events into a story. This configurational act consists in "grasping together" the detailed actions or what I have called the story's incidents. It draws from this manifold of events the unity of one temporal whole.\textsuperscript{42}

If emplotment is the operation that derives narrative unity from the diversity of chronological incidents in a historical world, then it is the heart of what in Chapter 2 was termed colligation or contextualism. To the extent that all histories presume story as subtext and many present an explicit narrative, the notion of emplotment is basic to historical discourse as a whole, for it is the process by which history itself is created from a mere compilation of dates, names, and events.

To historicize time, therefore, is to emplot it as (a) (hi)story. In the best of all possible historicizing worlds, emplotment would be a simple congruence...
among the basic chronology, the (hi)story, and its discourse. The representation of past change and continuity would not need emplotment, because it would result seemingly naturally from its own constituent parts. Happy indeed would be those historians who discovered a conspiracy by past actors to bring about the resulting action. In that case the plots of the past, the story, and its discourse as history would all be the same. Such a Panglossian view is not held by even the most positivistic and traditional historian today. Normal historians seek plottings of their materials that extend beyond their presumed empirical and referential bases. From where do these plottings come? Are there certain modes of emplotment that historians share with the other members of their culture? Are there only a limited number of these plottings? To what extent does the nature of narrative as discourse limit or determine the emplotment of history?

These questions raise the most interesting implication of rhetorical and narratological analysis for the textualization of histories. The fundamental question becomes: to what extent do structures of expression constrain or create the structures of histories and perhaps all history? This question presumes other ones. Are there certain structures of narrative and argument that pattern expression as historical discourse? If so, how do they operate in normal historical practice? More important, to what extent do they determine historical representations and, ultimately, history? In the end, can representations of the past be given only certain patterns and plots if they are to be shaped as "proper histories" and not as chronicles or annals? Does the same hold true of long spans or all of history when conceived of as the Great Story? Too little thinking has been done on these questions to do more than suggest their implications. They presume answers that are controversial in literary and rhetorical theory as well as in the historical profession. One argument challenges whether textual representations can or should be reduced to formal rules and grammars. Another debates the relationship between structural analysis and voluntarism or agency in human affairs as applied to the interpretive and creative acts themselves in literary and historical practices.

Beginnings, Middles, and Endings

The quest for pattern and meaning as well as plot in histories is both encouraged and aided by the professional presupposition that time is directional. That things and events occur in linear chronology fosters before-and-after pictures in and of history. Although historians are handicapped by their inability to examine the past as such, they have the advantage of knowing how things turned out—at least in their opinion(s). Thus they know in theory the conclusions of their arguments and the endings of their stories from the beginning. Their endings in turn point to their beginnings. All they have to do narratively is to fill in the in-between. Significant and difficult as that filling-in operation may be, its subsequent textualization is determined conceptually by the beginning and end points. Grand-scale teleology may be dead in professional historical practice, but narrative teleology remains alive and well in historical texts.

A minimal structure of historical representation, like a minimal structure of narrative, must embrace at least two events or conditions and the change between them. Such historical notions—one might say metaphors or even clichés—as crisis, watershed, and transition have become compulsory terms for how historians synthesize minimal narratives of beginnings, middles, and ends. Perhaps this minimal triad of narrative representation accounts for the magic of the tripartite divisions in historical discourse: the classic first, second, and third generations of immigrant history, for example, or even the triple stages of the dialectic.

At the least, then, all historians face the classic Aristotelian problem of providing beginnings, middles, and endings for, first, their stories as plots and, second, their arguments as cases, whether the discourse is presented primarily as narrative or argument. Why do historians choose the particular chronological and discourse times they do for beginning and ending an article or book? How do beginnings and endings constrain interpretation even while they prove the story or case of a historian? This is a question not of the relation of teleology to plotting and narrative structure but rather of how a narrative or argument is constructed in textual practice. Endings give coherence to the overall story, just as beginnings are selected to make sense of that coherence.

Historians must find starting points for both their chronological (hi)stories and their textual discourses. This problem of dual beginnings arises from the discrepancy customary between time as textualized in the narrative or argument and the actual beginning chosen for the discourse of that story or argument. Thus Garrett Mattingly began his exposition of The Armada with the beheading of Mary on February 19, 1587, but his actual chronological history began centuries earlier with the Wars of the Roses and the long-standing rivalries among England, Spain, and France. Likewise, Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum began their text with the Salem witchcraft trials of 1692, but their chronological story actually commenced with the founding of Salem in 1626 or, implicitly, with its inhabitants' English heritage. Kenneth Lockridge, on the other hand, started right off, after a preface, with the founding of Dedham in 1635 and 1636, so that the beginning of his exposition coincides with the chronological beginning of his story. But the implicit beginning of his Great Story is early seventeenth-century English society, which not only produced the first Dedhamites but also served as a tacit basis of comparison throughout the book.
As with beginnings, so with endings: historians are faced with the dual problem of ending the textual discourse and the chronological (hi)story. In the original edition of *A New England Town* (1970) Lockridge ended his century of Dedham history not in 1736 with the reemergence of complexity but almost a century later with the classic individualism and economic liberalism of the nineteenth-century United States. In this way he sought to summarize the changes that occurred in the New England landscape as result of the Puritan commodification of that region's resources, but his latest chronological time appears at the beginning of his text, where he discussed Thoreau's Walden and the implications of early industrialism for ecology. In both Lockridge and Cronon, the implicit end time of their argument and narrative is the present day of their readers, for their histories are forms of the same Great Story of the rise of capitalism in American history. Thus their allegiance to a Great Story determines variously the beginning and end points in their represented chronological story, their implicit subtext, and in their explicit discourse times.

What can be asked of the beginnings and endings of partial histories can be asked also of a larger history, such as that of the United States. When, for instance, does that history begin, and why? Should it commence with the migrations of the Asian ancestors of Native Americans 12,000 or more years ago, with Columbus' expeditions, with the establishment of Spanish or English settlements in the area that is now the United States, or only with the Declaration of Independence and the winning of the American Revolution? When, for instance, does that history begin, and why? Should it commence with the migrations of the Asian ancestors of Native Americans 12,000 or more years ago, with Columbus' expeditions, with the establishment of Spanish or English settlements in the area that is now the United States, or only with the Declaration of Independence and the winning of the American Revolution? This question about the beginning of U.S. history is not about ultimate origins as such, but about the problem of plotting and patterning American history as an overall story. The choice of beginnings depends on which of the various Great Stories an author or teacher decides constitutes American history. Ultimate origins as metahistorical beginnings probably coincide with the chronological beginnings of a discourse only in Great Stories as metanarratives, for the function of a metanarrative is to explain through some sort of fundamental characterization how the present got to be what it is from how it all "started" in the past.

Likewise, how and when should U.S. history end? According to Frederick Jackson Turner, one phase of that history concluded with the closing of the American frontier at the end of the nineteenth century. If white expansion upon "free" land produced all those characteristics Turner believed to be uniquely American, how could democracy and individualism be preserved in a United States without a frontier? Has another phase of American history concluded again with the end of the so-called American century? As the United States increasingly shares economic and political power with other nations and faces a united European community and an increasingly stronger East Asia in the last decade of the twentieth century, will—must—American historians relinquish the exceptionalism that lies at the bottom of so much of their interpretation of their national experience? Is increasing attention to placing the history of the United States in a comparative context a sign of the end of the Americanness of American history? Is this the significance of debate about the decline of the United States initiated by Paul Kennedy's book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*? As in both of these *fin-desiècle* jeremiads about the ending of American democracy or power, all historians subscribe to their own Great Stories, with their own beginnings and endings.

Middles do not normally possess the same explicit textual significance in themselves as beginnings and ends, although they provide the expository and explicatory functions between the other two. Vital as those functions are to the text as a whole as both argument and narrative, such middleness is rarely the focus of the text itself. However, Richard White in his aptly titled *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815*, uses what one could call an extended middle as the narrative and analytic focus of his text. In seeking a narrative site "with no sharp distinctions between Indian and white worlds," he settles upon the region that neither European imperial powers nor Indian tribal societies could dominate sufficiently to establish a single hegemonic style of life. Instead the style that evolved, according to White, was a transacculturative combination of Native American and European practices of diplomacy, economics, religion, marriage, and war created by the diverse peoples of the region. Instead of the traditional discrete white and Native American social entities, White depicts a world of multiethnic villages composed of tribal remnants and factions and European and American traders and other agents; international and intertribal alliances for military and economic purposes; and multiple meanings attached to gifts, sexual unions, murders, alcohol, religious visions and conversion, and leadership. Thus the metaphor of his title serves also as his thesis, as a symbolic and moral as well as a physical and temporal space.

For White's narrative and argument to hold, he has to begin and end his book abruptly. "The Middle Ground" remains a narrative medial site between Native American and white worlds only to the degree that the author downplays both its origins and termination in the sustained imperial power relationships of France, England, their colonies, and later the United States in the Great Lakes region. Hence White devotes very little space to the background or even the description of the mid-seventeenth-century Iroquois wars that supposedly created the physical conditions that allowed the multiethnic middle ground to evolve. Likewise, his book closes abruptly at the conclusion.
of the War of 1812. Since the victory of the United States ended the balance of power and the opportunities for Indian participation produced by the century and a half of conflict among the international imperial powers, the author treats this culminating set of events as briefly as possible. Thus extending the middle ground as argumentative case and narrative to support symbolic and moral goals demanded the near elimination of a beginning and an end to the textual discourse.

Whether an event or series of events (as a colligatory term) is depicted as a beginning, an end, or even a middle depends on the needs of the argument. With this idea in mind, Judith Walkowitz offers two beginnings and four endings for one chapter in her City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London. In plotting her chapter on the "Men and Women's Club," she traces its "Beginnings" to the same date in July 1885 but to two different origins. One origin was private and lay in the personal and political agenda of its founder, Karl Pearson. The other was a newspaper expose of child prostitution in London (W. T. Stead's "The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon"), which provided public impetus to middle-class "radical-liberals," socialists, and feminists to join. In four separate sections, each labeled "Ending," Walkowitz provides four explanations for why the club disbanded in 1889: because men were dissatisfied with the women members' performance in studying sexuality scientifically, because the marriage of one of the women members to the founder cut short her scholarship, because the founder became increasingly absorbed by the scientific professionalism of biometrics and eugenics as the solution to the sexual question, and because the focus of public attention changed as popular newspapers switched to debating whether the institution of marriage was a failure and to covering the sensational murders attributed to Jack the Ripper. The book as a whole has multiple beginnings and endings because Walkowitz accepts that the same documentary artifacts have multiple readings in the present since they had multiple readers in the past. Conversely, similar readings can be given to different events. Thus the book concludes with a chapter discussing multiple interpretations of Jack the Ripper, but the epilogue provides a second ending with the seemingly copycat murders of the Yorkshire Ripper from 1975 to 1981.

Different beginnings and endings, whether of partial or Great (Hi)Stories, produce varying histories of what seems like the same basic subject, topic, or time in order to present different moral and political lessons, as Margaret Somers argues in her narrative analysis of the classic master narrative of English working-class history. That master narrative, according to her, posits a beginning in traditional society, a middle in the crisis of the Industrial Revolution, and as an end "resolution into modernity" plus "leading protagonists in action (classes in struggle) and causal emplotment (the engine of industrialization, proletarianization.)" Although such a narrative appears to offer a concrete version of events, Somers argues that it reified English history through a self-conscious effort to dehistoricize and denarrativize its concreteness in favor of its abstraction as an analytical social science quasi-narrative, which universalized its schema through the omission of specific spaces and times. In short, it denied historicity in the name of history. As a result of this reification and denarrativization, historians and social scientists alike ponder whether the English working class during the Industrial Revolution was reformist in its practices, "revolutionary in the 1830s but suppressed by the 1850s," or "backwardlooking" artisans rather than factory workers who were "reactionary radicals." The problem with these three approaches, Somers argues, lies in their addressing the same question—"why did the workers not act in 'classlike' ways?" Why "did the class in itself for its own prediction" fail? Those questions make sense only in light of the presumed, reified master narrative. In conclusion, she argues that the similarity of the three answers depends upon a question derived from the same basic story. They are merely three different endings for the same beginning and middle.

**Emplotment as Meaning and Lesson**

That historical time is conceived as having direction encourages historians to draw lessons "from" history in the discourses they construct. That the textualization of (a) history is always after the fact means that historians always know how (in their opinion) things might have turned out as well as how they did turn out. That such hindsight is always considered accurate grounds the very construction of histories and the practice of history in general. Reinforcing these foundational prejudices are certain long-standard ways of plotting histories in our society that give meaning to time as history and offer a message to the present. Such master narratives as progress and degeneration once patterned all of history as moral lesson in addition to providing an emplotment of that story.

Although historians today condemn the use of grand metanarratives as organizational frameworks for their discourses, master narratives all too often still provide both teleology and political lesson. Thus although William Cronon admits that "the-repertoire of historical plots" that might apply to his chronicle of Great Plains events "is endless," he divides all these many possible plots into two "large groups." One group narrates Plains history "as a story of improvement, in which the plot line gradually ascends toward an ending that is somewhat more positive—happier, richer, freer, better—than the beginning." In the other group the "plot line eventually falls toward an ending that is more negative—sadder, poorer, less free, worse—than the place where the story began."
Progress as a way of interpreting and emplotting history is both a methodology and a moral outlook. Such an interpretation presumes not only that the past leads to the present but also that the present is superior to the past. Progress presumes a moral standard by which to judge the events and peoples of the past in relation to those of the present and thereby provides a guide for the selection of events, peoples, and institutions to be included in a historical discourse. In that dual sense, such an approach to progress shapes what Herbert Butterfield called The Whig Interpretation of History. 53 He named such an interpretation after those optimistic nineteenth-century English gentlemen who believed that the history of the world was providentially intended to culminate in their times, which translated meant their England, their way of life, and ultimately their class. Such Whiggism also gave meaning to the so-called modernization or developmental theory so popular among social scientists after the Second World War and became inscribed in the terms First and Third Worlds. 54 Whiggish approaches to history still ground accounts of the "progress" of science, medicine, technology, or even democracy, philosophy, and the writing of history. 55 Even historians usually emplot the story of their profession as moving from poorer past histories to better present ones. 56

Whereas the theme of the decline of community and other typological categories contrasting the past with the present once illustrated progress, this theme as often now argues, either explicitly or implicitly, degeneration. Nineteenth-century and later scholars developed the typological categories of community to aggregative association, status to contract, traditional to modern, sacred to secular, and rural to urban to show how different modern times were from earlier eras, just as anthropologists and other scholars employed, sometimes even developed, these same typologies to rank "primitive" societies against contemporary European nations on the scale of social and cultural evolution. 57 By the twentieth century, the loss of an earlier, less complex society and culture was mourned by cultural critics reacting to industrialism, militarism, imperialism, liberalism, or other "ism." As a result of this history of its conceptualization, the loss of community theme seldom avoids some kind of moral judgment, even if only implicit in the contrast between then and now, through its representation in historical discourse. 58

Jeremiads about the "decline" of morals, manners, and the quality of life postulate an explicit or implicit richer, better past. Degeneration as a theme in history is as old as the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden and the golden ages mythologized by the ancient Greeks and Romans. Modern historians postulate their own golden ages, before community declined, capitalism prevailed, Western imperialism spread, industrialism triumphed, or patriarchy predominated. William Cronon depicts Native American tribal life as communal Utopias to heighten the contrast with the subsequent ecological degradation wrought by the extension of European capitalism to New England. The Great Story in working-class history begins with the paradise of a harmonious artisanal workshop before the specialization and degradation of labor resulted in class struggle under industrial capitalism. 59 Women's history likewise once supposed an earlier better time for women when they shared economic responsibilities for the family with men before capitalism removed the workplace from the home and separate spheres segregated men's and women's work. 60 In a more perverse view from today's middle-class values, the progressive rise of democracy can be seen as the decline of aristocracy and gentility just as the emergence of the bourgeoisie can be viewed as the demise of knighthood and chivalry. 61 With the resurgence of fundamentalism around the world, should the emergence of secularism in the modern world be depicted as the loss of religiosity rather than the rise of science?

Historians give cycles meaning by representing them as ups and downs rather than as mere phases. Should the story and its discourse begin and end with a trough or with an apex, with a moral low or a moral high? If the story goes from a trough to an apex, does it represent progress, while a movement from apex to trough shows the opposite? Should the story go from trough to trough or from apex to apex? The latter story might move from one stable equilibrium state to another stable equilibrium state, although apex-to-apex might be seen as progress to decline and back again, while the trough-to-trough story might be pictured as decline to progress and back again. Moral and political messages usually lie at the heart of those many histories based on cycles of religious enthusiasm and revivals, demographic changes (especially generational ones), and alternations in politics and world affairs. Choosing beginning and ending points to suit moral and political cases occurs even in the histories of economic cycles.

Trends in history as Great Story can be interpreted as either progress or decline. Progress as the Great Story of Western civilization configured the Whig interpretation of history. Although it is the fashion for historians to repudiate such (hi)stories as grandly ethnocentric and chronocentric, their discourses nevertheless carry on the tradition of giving meaning and lesson to history through such standard forms as progress and decline. In fact, a favorite version combines decline from the past with hope for future progress as the result of "learning" the truth about what happened in the American and European pasts. The Great Story of modern European history still offers lessons for today's students of wars, nationalism, racism, ethnicity, and gender. Even the Great Story of Western intellectual currents carries its lessons for how people today should understand their conceptual problems. Perhaps the grandest scheme is that enunciated by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things, but the story and the lessons are also provided by Jacques Derrida as part of his deconstruction of Western logocentrism. 62

Even an almost parenthetical paragraph can encapsulate both Great Story and lesson. Giles Gunn, for example, prefaces his argument for the revival of
pragmatism as a useful counterpoint to poststructuralist cultural criticism by suggesting the "remarkably parallel genealogy" of pragmatism and psychoanalysis.

Each is the product of a process of spiritual disinheritance from the common "cultures" of Judaism and Christianity—a process that began as early as the age of exploration and discovery in the early modern period; that was furthered by the development of physical science in the seventeenth century and the new spirit of enlightenment and philosophical criticism in the eighteenth century; that was propelled forward even more rapidly by the social, political, and economic revolutions of the nineteenth century; and that in the deep inward turn of the twentieth has now seemingly found its culmination in what Philip Rieff calls the "triumph of the therapeutic." Just as Gunn employs a Great Story of the rise of secularism as the basis of his intellectual history, so other scholars derive lessons from the emergence and development of capitalism and a market economy (the rise of the middle class) or the expansion of a world capitalist system and European imperialism (the rise of the West) as Great Stories. As part of Margaret Somers' argument about the nature and three endings of European working-class history, she presents as condensed a version of this Great Story and its supposed larger context as can be found:

Simply, it is the story of the Industrial Revolution—the emergence of an industrial capitalist society from a preindustrial past. It is, of course, a story told in many idioms—the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the emergence of the market society, the emancipation of civil society from the state, the increasing division of labor, and the rationalization of the modern world. For each, the societal transformation—whether it is called industrialization, proletarianization or the division of labor—ushers in "the birth of class society." It is a story that has economic, political, and cultural components. In the economic realm it is a process by which commercialization, an increasing division of labor, and technological development gradually break the bonds of relatively static preindustrial economies into industrial and capitalist growth. Politically, it is the story of the emergence of the liberal state that provides the framework and/or actively supports the new laissez-faire economy and its subsequent class relations. And it is a process by which "traditional" relations are transformed into class relations, and communitarian artisanal cultures organized by moral economies are supplanted by the force of new class alignments—from the "bread" nexus to the wage nexus.

Even if scholars can agree on the outlines of their Great Stories, they can differ over the lessons, and hence over their emplotments as history. Somers' own lesson is that as long as historians do not disaggregate this master narrative into its component parts through a more detailed and specific approach to narratives and histories, they will continue to be fooled into asking unhistorical questions of their facts and drawing incorrect lessons for their own political ends. Modernists, postmodernists, and antimodernists all draw their lessons to construct their histories as they argue over what the lessons of the Great Story are. In the ultimate inference of a moral from history, Immanuel Kant concluded, according to Hayden White, that the study of history taught three major lessons: that the human race was progressing continually, degenerating continually, or "remaining at the same general level of development continually." White then draws his own conclusion: these three lessons when cast as plot forms represent respectively comedy, tragedy, and irony. When considered as worldviews, they reflect respectively idealism, cynicism, and skepticism. Thus the lessons of history in order to authorize certain moral and political judgments must emplot the past according to certain standard forms. Perhaps the greatest lesson for historical practice is to suspect any history teaching lessons. Master plots provide Great Stories, which in turn serve as context for their "proof" through "facts."

Toward a Poetics of Emplotment

Narrative and rhetorical analyses imply, as all our examples suggest, that histories cannot just describe change without emplotting such change, or continuity, as explicit or implicit story. Now is the time to ask the converse of this point: to what extent does the very nature of emplotment itself, in its imposition of temporal ordering in and on a discourse, determine the content of that discourse as history? Are there, in short, certain (master) plottings of history that result from the forms that narrative emplotment itself must take? Do the plottings in historical texts, like those in other forms of literature, especially popular formulaic works, follow from certain standard conventions—even structures—of story-telling and emplotment? To what extent, in the broadest sense, do the structures of expression in historical discourse shape the nature of its content as history?

Without a great deal more scholarship on the possibilities of a poetics of emplotment, no satisfactory answer to these questions can be offered. Two different aspects of the emplotment of temporal order in historical texts, however, suggest some possibilities of how structures of expression shape historical discourse as content. One possibility centers upon what we might call broadly periodization in and of a history as text. The other possibility is inspired by the efforts of narratology to categorize and classify the basic forms and components of narrativity.

Time, to be narrated, must be filled; and to be measured it must be partitioned. Historians divide historic time both in their texts and in their practice by such conventions as years, decades, centuries, eras, and even phases and stages. In use each represents some sort of organized emplotment of that piece of time or method of timing. Thus years, decades, and centuries,
like eras, phases, and stages, represent more to historians than just their temporal duration or chronological location. Hence the year 1776 or 1789, the 1930s or the 1960s, or the twelfth or the eighteenth century calls up immediate images and stories of the European and American past to historians and their readers just as surely as does the mention of the baroque and jazz eras or the stages of capitalism.

Such devices of timing come under the rubric of periodization in historical practice. Periodization as a textual practice involves at least two complementary, overlapping operations. First, it designates the division of referred-to time in discourse by the various conventions. Second, it covers the ways of representing those periods in a discourse through their patterning, especially in the form of emplotment. In both cases, the rhetoric of temporal ordering overlaps with the rhetoric and poetics of narrative. As a result, we may get some notion of how standard modes of expression shape the content of histories—and history—by examining how the number of acts, stages, and eras or periods used in the plotting of a (hi)story as textual representation also divides time in those texts. In cleverly constructed texts, the organization of chapters and sections embodies as well as presents the periodization. Their sequence, like their division, represents as well as follows their emplotment as narrative and as argument. Their logic, expression, and temporal ordering all reinforce one another.

No better example of this correlative reinforcement in argument and story exists than Richard Hofstadter's chapters on the Populists in The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. Even the chapter titles reinforce the disparity he constructs between what the Populists believed about their world and what he contends was its actuality. The first chapter, "The Agrarian Myth and Commercial Realities," contrasts the agrarian myth of the yeoman farmer and frontier independence with the international market in which the Populists as commercial farmers participated. The second chapter, "The Folklore of Populism," further transmutes the oppressive forces the Populists claimed to see into an ideological mixture of bigotry, conspiracy, and oversimplicity. The third chapter, "From Pathos to Parity," argues that only as agriculturalists stopped confronting the inevitable advance of an industrialized and economically integrated United States through such means as third parties and instead lobbied to gain a bigger piece of the pie within the system through legislative remedies did they become realistic and therefore gain their ultimate goals. The sequence of chapters and sections and the sequence of the argument tell the story that Hofstadter wants his readers to accept as the truth about the Populists' ideas and their world.

In some histories the formal divisions of the text into, say, chapters and parts may or may not coincide with the temporal divisions represented as being in the past, but in many texts the formal divisions follow from even as they also constitute the narrative and argument. Many a (hi)story organizes its narrative, like its argument and discourse, as a trinity of stages, eras, or acts. This practice probably stems more from the perceived requirement of providing a clearly delineated beginning, middle, and end in the narrative than from any demands of the documentary evidence. The period after the American Civil War traditionally called Reconstruction provides a good example of the use of a tripartite temporal ordering and presentation as argument and story in historical discourse. Even though the moral judgments on and even the supposed facts of that era have changed greatly over the past century, the basic structure of the period remains represented in three acts: the time before, which embraces Abraham Lincoln's and Andrew Johnson's plans for the defeated Southern states; the in-between time, that is, Reconstruction itself; and the time after, once known as "Redemption." Likewise E. P. Thompson divides The Making of the English Working Class into three unequal parts. In his own summary:

In Part One I consider the continuing popular traditions in the 18th century which influenced the crucial Jacobin agitation of the 1790s. In Part Two I move from subjective to objective influences—the experiences of groups of workers during the Industrial Revolution which seem to me of especial significance. I also attempt an estimate of the character of the new industrial work discipline, and the bearing upon this of the Methodist Church. In Part Three I pick up the story of plebeian Radicalism, and carry it through Luddism to the heroic age at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Finally, I discuss some aspects of political theory and of consciousness of class in the 1820s and 1830s.

Whether or not Thompson's own summary does justice to his very long, multisectioned book, it does suggest the power of the dialectical trinity of stages as an organizing principle in historical textualization. As Somers points out, Thompson was but one in a long line who accepted as they contributed to the master narrative of English working-class history with its tripartite organizational framework.

As the examples drawn earlier from New England community studies show, the decline or loss of community as model is analytically dichotomous as an argument, but frequently trichotomous in its representation through emplotment of that story. Whether the historian is treating a Puritan community, a nineteenth-century factory town, or all of the United States at a certain period, the story is the same transition from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft as the original typology had it. The story portrays its subject as moving from a simpler community whose inhabitants shared meaning to an aggregation of people without those seemingly primordial bonds. Thus the beginning of such a (hi)story as discourse usually starts with a picture of the original stable community, moves through some sort of transition process, and ends with a new kind of society. The end point of what must be yet another Great Story form is as determined as the presumed community at the beginning.
Whether conceived as a two-stage before-and-after model or as a three-stage model of beginning state to transition to new state, the loss-of-community archetype posits a rigid narrative model of what I call the community-go-smash plot, no matter how skillfully it is concealed in its exposition or its moral lessons. Even historians who try to sidestep the traditional Great Story of community from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft organize their texts according to its model, so powerful is its blandishment conceptually. For example, David Grayson Allen, whose long subtitle describes his subject, "The Movement of Societies and the Transferral of English Local Law and Custom to Massachusetts Bay in the Seventeenth Century," offers the diversity of five colonial New England towns' legal and social institutional forms to prove the variety of communities existing there. Even though his book's chapters explicitly focus on societal diversity among the towns, he arranges those diverse forms along a spectrum from most to least community-like.

All the classic typological models of sacred to secular, rural to urban, traditional to modern society follow the same basic story line as loss of community, hence posit the same kind of plot and beginning and end points. The original purpose of these typologies was to show movement from an older, usually static model of earlier era or society to a new or present-day, usually dynamic society or era. Progress was both plot and lesson. In European history, the standard starting point for such employment was a stereotypic image of the Middle Ages, standing in contrast to the end point of an industrialized nineteenth or twentieth century. Radicals and other dissenters criticizing what Europe had achieved often used the same beginning and end points to impart their story of degeneration and their lesson of needed change through reform or revolution. The Whiggish reification of this Great Story of Euro-American history from the Middle Ages to the Second World War also became the conceptual and political foundation of modernization theory in the postwar period as applied by First World scholars to Third World societies.

This typological mythologization of a starting point in a static past and an end point in a dynamic present was applied in a variety of ways to American history. First, the history of the United States long stood as an exception to this story: European and American scholars alike maintained that this new kind of nation lacked a feudal past, and so was "modern" from its founding. Second, the original Native Americans lost not only their cultures in the past but also their histories in the present. Such an approach to the narrativization of their history presented as inevitable their supersession as "static" cultures and societies by a dynamic "America." Thus their inclusion was always presented in terms of conflict, defeat, and eventual disappearance. Third, American immigration history pictured European immigrants as leaving a passive peasant society to be transformed by the vigorous American one. Fourth, traditional or preindustrial society was opposed to modern or industrial society on the same terms.

So far these examples emplot their (hi)stories and frequently their discourses as two or three stages or phases of periodization. Such emplotment appears to follow the minimal narrative sequence of beginning, middle, and ending. These different modes of periodization raise the question of how many stages or phases might be usefully employed in any one history. Are there upper limits on the number of stages or phases that can make sense in and of a historical discourse? Although the number of periods into which the past can be partitioned appears unlimited, the number generally employed as the focus of argument and narration in a specific discourse may be limited. Almost no research has been done on how this aspect of expression influences the content of a history, but Philippe Carrard raises the issue in his analysis of Annaiste poetics. Although he finds that three stages are common in Annaiste literature, he also offers examples of four stages (for example, Philippe Ariès' representation of death in Western history) and even one of seven stages (Michel Vovelle, La mort et le VOccident). He suggests that seven may constitute the upper rhetorical limit of periodization, given the nature of human cognition. In textual explication, he goes on to argue, stages observe criteria of proportion and size just like chapters and parts of a book. Stages as discursive devices for narrative and argument must be roughly equal in length of exposition. His hunch about the upper rhetorical limit on the number of stages or periods a text can embrace challenges scholars of historiography to explore his hypothesis in other areas of historical literature.

If scholars of fictional narratives may legitimately search for the minimum number of basic plots and their elements across types of stories and across media, ought not historical critics also to investigate in how many—or how few—ways histories can be emploted? Are there only so many narrative plots? If so, how many are there, and what do such limits mean for textualizing history? Are only certain plottings available for use in history as Great Story as well as in partial histories?

Just how far we can carry this line of thought is tested by the recent efforts of Hayden White and a few others to discover what might be termed deep structure in historical narratives. This approach is inspired by formalist and other structuralist efforts to uncover a grammar or morphology underlying the narrativity of narratives. White acknowledges as inspiration the literary theorists Northrop Frye and Kenneth Burke, but most narratologists usually trace the history of their approach to Vladimir Propp's formalist analysis of Russian folktales. All such efforts search for the structural models uniting characters, events, plots, and even time across their specific narrative discourses. They seek a morphology of actions in terms of their narrative functions and a logic of actors in terms of the roles they serve in the story. Scholars dispute the value and applicability of such formalist approaches in narratology and poetics, but the increasing number of computer programs designed to aid writers are based upon much the same idea of generating...
plots, characters, and situations. Such stock approaches to the basic idea of what emplotment entails suggest that they are also useful for historical practice and criticism.

One suggestion along these lines about the limited number of emplotments in historical discourse comes from a study of the stories underlying four centuries of (white) American understanding of the alien Other through ethnicity. In Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture, Werner Sollors provides clues to what we might call a poetics of ethnic narratives. Such standard narratives as Adamic newness and innocence, Mosaic exodus and chosen peoplehood, Christ-like rebirth, melting-pot regeneration, the dire outcome of intermarriage, and the metaphor of generations reappear in literature through the centuries. More importantly from the viewpoint of this chapter, Sollors argues that these stories also provide the conceptual foundations for recent historical and social scientific monographs. Thus, for example, the saga form not only shapes many novels about immigrants but also grounds the histories of Oscar Handlin, Irving Howe, and John Bodnar.

What Sollors suggests about the limited number of stories that underlie the understanding of ethnicity in (white) American history (and fiction and social science), Dale Porter in The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation formalizes for the plottings M all histories. Borrowing from R. S. Crane's notion that in any narrative synthesis of action, character, and thought one of these will predominate over the others, he postulates that there are in historical narrative three basic categories of plotting: plots of fortune, which stress change of circumstance over change in character or perspective; plots of character, which emphasize the agent's choice; and plots of thought or perspective, which look more to internal or more abstract change in the evaluation of the actor(s) or situation. Under each of these major categories he describes four or five varieties to offer a total of fourteen plot forms. Combining these fourteen plot forms with his seven levels of abstraction (ranging from specific events, individuals, groups, and institutions and ideas or doctrines as concepts to larger historical forces or factors and what he calls "universals") produces a maximum of ninety-eight "categories of development, to which any event or narrative account can be assigned." He applies the scheme to clarifying the point of view and the varying levels of abstraction embodied in the three customary plot forms narrativizing the abolition of the British slave trade from 1784 to 1807.

Hayden White's tropological scheme for providing the deep structure of historical narrative not only suggests the most thoroughgoing critique of traditional conceptions of the relation between rhetorical expression and historical content; it also raises as a result the most serious questions about the entire role of structures of expression in determining the very nature of textualizing the past as history. His tetrad of tropes works in two ways to organize history as history as a result of their sequential ordering from metaphor through metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. If this sequence prefigures all the interconnected levels of chronicle, story, emplotment, explanation by formal argument, and ideological implications, then the content of a history as well as its representation is a poetic act largely independent of the supposed data and chronology. The tropological sequence orders the textual content as conceptual arrangement, as the application of his scheme to E. P. Thompson in the previous chapter was meant to demonstrate. To the extent that the tetrad as sequence also operates to characterize the succession of eras in European intellectual history, it configures the very conception of the subject in the discipline. Thus, for White, the succession of Foucault's epistemes from the Renaissance to the classical, the modern, and the contemporary can be translated as successive dominant verbal styles and modes of understanding according to the sequence of tropes.

Whether or not one is persuaded of the adequacy or accuracy of White's theory of historical tropes, its goal is as suggestive as it is provocative. White's formalist theory, more than any other one based on rhetorical and literary theory, keeps pointing to the obvious problem: how many conventions of form shape historical discourse and therefore the number of ways in which history can be represented? From the standpoint of the discussion here the question can be worded broadly: how many and what kinds of structures of expression constrain as they constitute historical discourse and therefore histories? Although White's and Porter's schemes may not answer these questions for many (most) scholars, their attempts offer a starting point for such explorations. The important lesson of their efforts is that scholars, but especially historians, need to investigate not only how literary and rhetorical conventions and forms shape historical discourse but also how those conventions and forms constrain the representation of history and thereby the patterning of the past itself as history.

Narrativity and the Great Past

Such narrative and rhetorical analysis ultimately raises questions about the nature of historians' conceptions of the past itself. Do rhetorical and narrative analyses suggest that there're only so many ways of conceiving of the past as history, or as the Great Past? Does the past conceived and represented as history in general have any plot, or is it mere chronology and chronicle? How many Great Stories of the past are there: one, several, many? Are the arguments over the number as well as the nature of master interpretive codes or metanarratives pertinent to answering these questions? Whether or not history possesses any ultimate meaning as philosophy of history or whether history is merely the presupposition of the Great Story, the conceptual prob-
lem is the same with regard to plotting or how to conceive of "all" of history. If the subtext of both narrative and nonnarrative histories is the past conceived of as a story, then how should the resulting Great Past be represented or told as a Great Story?

Do all the analyses of narrative histories apply equally to history conceived as the Great Story? Can, for example, all partial pasts and the Great Past be divided in terms of surface and deep structures like explicit stories? Should historians see Great and partial pasts as only so many stories? Should historians accept plural pasts if the number of plots is several or more? Further inquiry into the number and nature of grand governing narratives, metanarratives, and master interpretive codes would aid historians in approaching these questions.

One of the popular lessons of history according to professional and lay persons alike is summarized in the aphorism that there is nothing new under the sun except the history you don't know. Such a slogan implies either that past episodes recur or that their organization duplicates standard plots. Such a lesson presumes its own emplotment. Not only does history repeat itself; even the history of thinking about and textualizing history recurs. But all such lessons seem as much the consequence of narrative plots serving ideological needs and cultural practices as empirical methods proving foregone conclusions.

To argue that all history must be emplotted does not mean that all history need have only one plot or deterministic sequence. To maintain that the emplotment of history follows standard patterns does not imply that the actual past possesses a pattern as such. The rhetoric of temporal ordering only suggests that the emplotment of history through discursive representation must follow certain forms; it does not assert that the Great Past must be emplotted in any one way. All histories have patterns; all Great Stories have patterns. The Great Past when represented as a Great Story must have a pattern. Although the Great Past can be represented only through emplotment, the actual past need not be presumed to be patterned. Historians need not subscribe to any metaphysical or other metameaningful pattern of the past to believe that its representation will always occur through some form of patterning, even through only so many plottings of that patterning. The historicization of time through emplotment therefore does not imply any rigid, deterministic pattern of history of the sort Karl Popper feared under his definition of historicism.89

In the end, metahistorical analysis challenges whether the normal professional assumptions about time in historical narrative and argument limit current historical practice too much in the very act of constituting history as a genre today. To what extent do normal historians' notions of time circumscribe, first, their conception of what constitutes history and, second, the nature of their representations of it? Must, for example, the ordering of
CHAPTER SEVEN

Representing Multiple Viewpoints and Voices

HISTORIANS have authority over the past in the sense that they determine which voices of the past are heard through their expositions and thus which viewpoints are represented in their discourses. To what degree do present texts reiterate past voices or, more precisely, continue past discourses? Or do historians’ texts project present viewpoints in the past? Who speaks for the so-called inarticulate, the undocumented, in history? To what extent do historians use traditional notions of otherness to promote dominant stereotypes of self and to conceal the voices and thus the viewpoints of others within a society or across societies? Does the distinction between professional and folk history, documentary and oral histories, and learning over memory repress the diversity of past voices in favor of those of historians today? Can any one history embrace a variety of voices and various viewpoints? Does attention to gender, ethnicity, and class change the nature of story-telling or only the content of the story? Does a commitment to multiculturalism also require a commitment to multiple voices and viewpoints? Need multiculturalism therefore lead to the proliferation of Great Stories and therefore to plural pasts?

As a result of the hegemonic viewpoint grounding so many disciplines in the human sciences, she argues, women of all colors, men of color, and working people are rarely if ever subjects or agents. They appear throughout history at worst as objects, at best as victims. According to this curriculum, only people of color have race and only women have gender, only lesbians and gays have sexual orientation—everyone else is a human being. This curriculum values the work of killing and conquest over production and reproduction of life. It offers abstract, oppositional thinking as the paradigm for intellectual rigor.

These paragraphs advocate a drastic reorientation of viewpoint in constructing history, and yet Rothenberg’s own remedy for all these problems of misconception is to let students “read our Constitution, Supreme Court decisions, and other public documents so that the ‘founding fathers’ and their descendants can speak for themselves.” Such a solution does not say who provides the viewpoint(s) from which these voices from the past are contextualized and interpreted. Who becomes the Great Teacher in the multicultural classroom? Who gets to be the Great Contextualizer in the Great Story that interprets how these documents relate to one another, to their times, and to the present?

Multiculturalism challenges both the viewpoint basic to normal history and in turn its authority. Multiculturalism highlights, first, the whole question of the relation between the author’s voice and viewpoint and those supposedly represented in any given text. For whom in the end does this text speak, and from what viewpoint and by what authority? Second, multiculturalism challenges the whole idea of a single best or right Great Story, especially if told from an omniscient viewpoint. In questioning a single viewpoint as best for the Great Story and Great Past, multiculturalism undermines the foundation of historical authority used traditionally to justify the discipline. In line with...
New Viewpoints on History

Great Stories matter greatly because they establish the context of the historical context. Thus they have become the explicit focus of multiculturalist revisions of history as the Great Past. Who gets to be the Great Story-Teller and from whose viewpoint the Great Story is told are the questions on which the debates center. From the standpoint of this book, however, the questions become rather what can be remedied from within the paradigm of normal history and what must be done outside that paradigm in order to convey the complexity of multiple viewpoints. The difficulties of representing multiple viewpoints and voices in a single discourse apply also to a Great Story and the Great Past when considered as a text.

A comparison of old and new approaches to the history of the American West illustrates changing perspectives of historians on viewpoint and provides an extended example of the various kinds of viewpoints mentioned in the previous chapter. The understanding of space and time and the perspective from which they are viewed embody the author's perceptual viewpoint, while the political and ethical judgments convey the ideological viewpoint. Present judgments of past persons and actions reveal the evaluative viewpoint, and the degree of feeling for and identity with the place and the persons who lived there evince the emotive viewpoint.

One of the Great Stories—if not the greatest—of the American Past has been (is?) the frontier interpretation of American history as expounded by Frederick Jackson Turner, beginning with his classic 1893 essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." From the vantage of our own time and place, the viewpoint underlying Turner's history is painfully ethnocentric and chauvinistic, repressing the many voices and viewpoints of those peoples who lived in and contended for what he called the American West. Even though he made class conflict and sectional difference fundamental to his interpretation, his history and Great Story seem univocal and single viewpointed from a multiculturalist perspective.

Assuming that there was a difference between Americans' ideals and institutions and those of Europeans, Turner attributed the cause of America's unique social and political development to "the existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward." He elaborated his reasoning in a 1903 essay extolling the "Contributions of the West to American Democracy": "These free lands promoted individualism, economic equality, freedom to rise, democracy... Never before in the history of the world has democracy existed on so vast an area and handled things in the gross with such success, with such largeness of design, and such grasp upon the means of execution." Thus, Turner concluded, from within the "American" viewpoint: "American democracy is fundamentally the outcome of the experiences of the American people in dealing with the West. Western democracy through the whole of its earlier period tended to the production of a society of which the most distinctive fact was the freedom of the individual to rise under conditions of social mobility, and whose ambition was the liberty and well-being of the masses."4

In first propounding his theory Turner proposed a social evolutionary model of societal stages to explain how frontier settlement transformed Europeans and Easterners into the Americans he favored and represented in voice and viewpoint:

The United States lies like a huge page in the history of society. Line by line as we read this continual page from West to East we find the record of social evolution. It begins with the Indian and the hunter; it goes on to tell of the disintegration of savagery by the entrance of the trader, the pathfinder of civilization; we read the annals of the pastoral stage in ranch life; the exploitation of the soil by the raising of unrotated crops of corn and wheat in sparsely settled farming communities; the intensive culture of the denser farm settlement; and finally the manufacturing organization with city and factory system.5

Reversion to the primitive conditions and institutions of an earlier stage of society each time a new frontier was settled reinvigorated American practices of democracy and self-reliance: "This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnishes the forces dominating American character." In line with this spatial perspective on America's past, he declared, "The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West," and when the 1890 census announced that the frontier had ended for all practical purposes, Turner also proclaimed that "the first period of American history" had ended at the same time.6

Turner's ideology of Americanism was typical of his time. Democracy promoted, nay demanded, free institutions and free enterprise according to the American model. Natural resources existed to be exploited by classic capitalist methods. Though siding with debtors against their creditors and with small farmers against large landowners and speculators in the past, he nevertheless avowed the economic and political liberalism of his time. Turner hailed individualism and social mobility as the birthright of all Americans and argued that the frontier had offered all Americans the opportunity to achieve the American Dream despite the role class conflict played in his history. His
values, in short, were those of dominant white Americans, and they in turn hailed his history as the true point of view on the American past.\textsuperscript{7}

Turner's evaluations of past peoples also reflected the racism typical of elite white Americans of the day. Thus his preferred frontiersmen were of English, Scotch-Irish, and German descent. French Huguenots were approved, but not French Catholics. People lower in the era's racist hierarchy—Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans—were either excluded from his history or relegated to its periphery. "Indians," like mountains and wild animals, appeared only as "obstacles" to white frontier settlement, fated to disappear from the American Great Story. Accepting contemporary stereotypes of the inconsequential nature of native tenure, he stated that "Indian" lands were "free" for the taking by white Americans. Correspondingly, Turner asserted that, in contrast to the history of European imperialism in the Western Hemisphere, there was no American conquest of the territories in what became the United States. His viewpoint on Native Americans was epitomized in his definition of the frontier as "the meeting point between savagery and civilization."\textsuperscript{8}

Not only did Turner silence the voices of many participants in the Great Story of the frontier; he also denied or marginalized their viewpoints. Almost a century after Turner's first essay, Patricia Limerick, in *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West*, points out its limitations and attempts to incorporate the voices and viewpoints that he repressed or marginalized. As Limerick observes, "Turner's frontier rested on a single point of view": "English-speaking white men were the stars of his story; Indians, Hispanics, French Canadians, and Asians were at best supporting actors and at worst invisible. Nearly as invisible were women of all ethnicities." Limerick also points out Turner's preoccupation "with agrarian settlements and folk democracy in the comparatively well watered Midwest. Deserts, mountains, mines, towns, cities, railroads, territorial government, and the institutions of commerce and finance never found much of a home in his model."\textsuperscript{9} In the end, she sees Turner's division of the nation's history into a pre-1890 frontier and a post-1890 West as an expression of nostalgia for small-town America, a nostalgia that repressed consideration of economic and social problems persisting through both "periods."

In prose as vigorous in its own way as Turner's, Limerick presents the West instead as a place "undergoing conquest and never fully escaping its consequences," because it was "an important meeting ground, the point where Indian America, Latin America, Anglo-America, Afro-America, and Asia intersected." Competition to occupy the same territory joined these diverse groups together into the "same story," and "conquest basically involved the drawing of lines on a map, the definition and allocation of ownership (personal, tribal, corporate, state, federal, and international), and the evolution of land from matter to property." Accompanying this economic competition and physical conquest was "a contest for cultural dominance," which "in-

volved a struggle over languages, cultures, and religions; the pursuit of legitimacy in property overlapped with the pursuit of legitimacy in way of life and point of view." Although Limerick denies the social evolutionism and the racialist hierarchy underlying Turner's conception of the frontier, she too espouses both a recurring process and a social conflict model of society in her history of the West.

The process had two stages: the initial drawing of lines (which we have usually called the frontier stage) and the subsequent giving of meaning and power to those lines, which is still under way. Race relations parallel the distribution of property, the application of labor and capital to make the property productive, and the allocation of profit. Western history has been an ongoing competition for legitimacy—for the right to claim for oneself and sometimes for one's group the status of legitimate beneficiaries of Western resources. This intersection of ethnic diversity with property allocation unifies Western history.\textsuperscript{10}

Unlike in Turner's interpretation, Limerick's West becomes part of American history rather than its determinant. As she so often states, the American West is a case study of common forces in U.S. and even world history. In the process of arguing the point, she summarizes many of the chief themes of her book.

Conquest forms the historical bedrock of the whole nation, and the American West is a preeminent case study in conquest and its consequences . . . Cultural pluralism and responses to race form primary issues in American social relations, and the American West—with its diversity of Indian tribes, Hispanics, Euro-Americans of every variety, and blacks—was a crucial case study in American race relations. The involvement of the federal government in the economy and the resulting dependence, resentment, and deficit have become major issues in American history and in contemporary politics, and the American West was the arena in which the expanded role for the federal government first took hold. Cycles of prosperity and recession have long characterized the American economy, and in that long-running game of crack-the-whip, the West has been at the far end of the whip, providing the prime example of the boom/bust stability of capitalism. The encounter of innocence with complexity is a recurrent theme in American culture, and Western history may well be the most dramatic and sustained case of high expectations and naivete meeting a frustrating and intractable reality. Many American people have held to strong faith that humans can master the world—of nature and of humans—around them, and Western America put that faith to one of its most revealing tests. A belief in progress has been a driving force in the modern world; as a depository of enormous hopes for progress, the American West may well be the best place in which to observe the complex and contradictory outcome of that faith.\textsuperscript{11}

Although Limerick accuses Turner of telling the Great Story of the American frontier from a single point of view, her own interpretation of the American West seems susceptible to some of the same problems of viewpoint that she has set out to correct. Although she broadens the arena of competition, adding
industrial class conflict, racial, religious, and other ethnic cleavages to Turner's agrarian conflicts, she subscribes at bottom to the same basic materialist version of social conflict. Although she disagrees with Turner's concentration on the white conquest of the West to the exclusion of other peoples, she devotes the whole first half of her own book to those same persons. Only in the second half of the book do "The Conquerors Meet Their Match." Although in opposition to Turner she stresses the persistence of Western problems into the twentieth century and accords ethnic priority of place to Native Americans in her (hi)story, she too surveys the Western landscape from an integrative viewpoint. The character of her text implicitly agrees with Turner's starting point: white settlement in the West. Although the duties of patriotism and the demands of progress are far more ambiguous in Limerick's West than in Turner's frontier, her attachment to the image of the West as a physical place is clearly as great as Turner's was to the frontier as ideological terrain. She reflects the concerns of her time about race, class, gender, and ethnicity as he did those about class conflict, individualism, and democracy. Limerick also seems as dedicated to her ideal of what American democracy ought to be as Turner was to his. Her stance on the results of economic and political liberalism for all peoples in American history is far more ambivalent than Turner's as she explicates the persisting problems resulting from economic competition, social and cultural conflict, and racial inequality. Both subscribe to their visions of the American Dream in their versions of the Great Story of the history of the American West. Both share an emotional bond with the Western part of the United States, although they may locate the West somewhat differently.

For bringing the story up to date ideologically, Limerick's account was hailed as the New Western History. Do both old and new historians in the end share so much because of the limits imposed upon any Great Story, and therefore upon the understanding of the Great Past, by the paradigmatic presuppositions of normal history? Although, as we shall see, Limerick struggles mightily to escape Turner's ethnocentrism and monologic voice and viewpoint, she too surveys the Western landscape from an integrative viewpoint. Thus multiculturalism in the hands of many historians does not transform the presuppositions of the normal history paradigm so much as it expands their application to untraditional subject matter. Pluralism in, even of, interpretations need not result in plural pasts, because new and old historians alike insist that in the text their own voices and viewpoints must serve as the ultimate mediator between the past and the present. In the end, the historian's authority depends upon this practice.

Changing the Representation of Otherness

How do we as scholars understand and, more important, represent those who differ from us? How does "our" society mark the boundary lines both within and outside it and define otherness? Should scholars oppose or support their society's dominant viewpoint? If the other is as different as the notion of otherness claims, how is the other to be represented, and by whom? Both extreme ethnocentrism and extreme relativism make otherness unknowable. The first postulates that everyone else thinks and acts like those doing the observing or defining. What is general (that is, peculiar) to the defining group or society is considered universal to all societies. Under such a perspective history easily serves as a source of lessons for the present, because all human acts and react the same way when faced by the same problems. Extreme relativism, in contrast, presumes what it argues it cannot know: others are by definition completely different, and so nothing can be shared between observer and the defined other. With the beliefs and behaviors of others considered unknowable, the defining group encloses itself in a hermetic realm rendered solipsistic by the presumption of incommensurable worlds.

Any study of otherness must assume degrees of difference and sameness: enough difference to warrant a description of otherness and enough sameness to permit knowledge and empathy. Who establishes these degrees and how they do it are the issues in representing others. If the Other is a construction by the self of another, how can a self get outside the Self to know the Other as another? Who in the end speaks for the other in the self's representation of the other? When the other becomes the self in its own representations, does it face these same problems?

Originally, the very notion of the Other meant that the insiders spoke for the outsiders by representing them as the Other. How should historians respond to the demands today of others' posterity to reclaim their history according to their own insights? After all, those persons and societies considered as Others in the past had representations of themselves as selves. How are these self-representations (for example, "oral" histories by and about African Americans and Native Americans) to be presented and interpreted in the historical representation of their otherness today? This dialogue in the present has reinvigorated construction of "selves" and "others" in the past through history. That both selves and others, like both the present and the past, are also social and political constructions feeds the controversy and simultaneously exacerbates the perplexities.

Under alien representation the diversity of actual others became categorized collectively as "the Other" on the basis of their imputed, often stereotyped, "otherness." Fundamentally such a collective representation requires a contrastive linguistic or rhetorical strategy for persons, societies, or cultures. Thus in sociological or anthropological usage otherness separated "us" from "them," either in terms of a societal center and its margins or in terms of an observer culture and a subject or observed culture; in historical usage otherness divided "us" and "them" in terms of "then" and "now." In each
instance, to aggregate others as the Other required the selves to employ a single viewpoint in describing others as collective entities. 38

Historically—that is, both in the actual past and in its historicization through textualization—the notion of otherness had entailed the construction of dichotomous categories and then the essentialization, usually accompanied by hierarchization, of the mutually exclusive groups posited. The presumption of differences between the observer self and the other has a long history. From at least as early as the Greeks of the fifth century B.C., other peoples have been designated as alien on the basis of language (“barbarian”), religion (“infidel,” “heathen”), social organization (“native,” “tribal”), culture (“primitive,” “oriental”), nationality (various ethnic slurs), race (“Jew,” “Negro,” American “Indian”), or some other self-sanctioning criterion by the self-designating group. 19 In past centuries the poor, the criminal, the old, the young, the ethnic or racial group, the female, and the homosexual, among many others, have been declared marginal and usually inferior by and to those institutions, classes, and persons deemed central by those performing the categorization.

Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social scientists historicized similar distinctions to create social typologies based on social evolutionary assumptions—primitive or traditional versus modern, sacred versus secular, rural versus urban, gemeinschaft versus gesellschaft, community versus association—with certain self-favored Western societies or groups at the top of the social ladder and others on lower rungs. Social biology as racism only reinforced the social evolutionism of the societal typologies to subordinate the "primitive" or "traditional" to the "modern" for those peoples who presumably preferred the sacred over the secular, the communal over the associative and the urban. 10 In their own societies social scientists applied the essentialized otherness of biology to subordinate women to their "sphere," the poor to the "dangerous classes," and ethnics to their "race." 21

According to this Great (Hi)Story of Otherness, historians, like other Western scholars, served both imperial flag and scholarly canon by adopting the conventional viewpoint that race and nature explained cultures, the sexes, and the lower social classes. A direct result of this viewpoint was that supposedly inferior groups—native peoples, women, the poor, immigrants, and at times minority religionists remained "hidden from history." 22 Presumed to be captives of unchanging cultures and therefore outside history, they were "without history." 23 Even those peoples designated "oriental" (as opposed to "occidental"), who were presumed to have long histories of their own, were described only from Western, frequently imperialist, viewpoints. 24

In the decades following the Second World War, as decolonization and civil rights movements came into being and burgeoned, those previously designated as others demanded not only more and better representation in their societies or the world of nations but also better, more "authentic" representations of themselves in scholarly texts. In the earlier phases of this movement, historical discourse all too often met such demands by merely adding new names and events as subjects to supplement traditional approaches. Thus in U.S. history the names of women, African Americans, Native Americans, and others who had "contributed" to that history were added to the pantheon of Great Persons. At first the criteria for a "contribution" remained those of the hegemonic culture, but later those who resisted the dominant elite and mainstream trends in American society were added. The outline and basic overall viewpoint of American history, though supplemented and apparently broadened, remained basically unchanged. Even Eric Wolf's important pioneering attempt to incorporate all the world's peoples into one story, *Europe and the People without History*, centered on Western expansion in the Americas, Asia, and Africa to give coherence to the narrative of the native societies of those continents. 25 As one critic put it: "the book's rock-steady, univocal narrative voice elides the strangeness and polyphony of colonial encounters, and presents them as leading inexorably to a monolithic late-capitalism. In Wolf's text, cultures do not cross, they fall in line." 26

At its best, such supplemented history tried to portray peoples hitherto subordinated in history and in histories as active determiners and coshapers of their destinies, transforming them from minor characters at best to protagonists. But as scholars revised North American history to produce texts centered on the pasts of women, Native Americans, African Americans, and Chicanos, they often created or found themselves in new intellectual ghettoes. While U.S. history as a whole became more inclusive, it also became more fragmented as a Great Story or still relegated the new revisionist histories to the periphery. Women and peoples of color, though more active in the texts concerned exclusively with them, remained passive and subordinate in discourses purporting to represent the "overall" course of history. Thomas Bender, having observed that history from the bottom up did not complement history from the top down so much as fragment any effort at synthesis, tried to overcome this shortcoming in his proposed new synthetic principle of contestation over and in the public arena. 27

To overcome the increasingly apparent difficulties of representing those previously designated as Others, some scholars have turned to the idea that only those so designated could represent themselves accurately. Only through such self-representation, they argue, can groups previously hidden or treated as objects become subjects or actors in their own histories. Only they can know and represent their experience under the domination of those at the "center" of their societies, be the domination domestic or imperialist. Under this approach, experience becomes the crucial concept, for it is often presumed that only those who have shared the experience of those for whom they speak should voice any views on the topic. Accordingly, what Gregory
Ulmer christened "mystery" arose to challenge the voice and viewpoint traditional to history. The most famous conceptual and terminological challenges went under the name "herstory." In all mysteries, the voice and viewpoint of the narrator is local, particular, and embedded clearly in the narrative. If self-representation solves the problem of voice and viewpoint, does it also solve that problem in historians' more general texts? What relation, in short, do self-representations bear to historians' representations of them?

The Question of Representativeness

Textual Sources and Translations

Deconstruction of the invidious hierarchical distinctions inscribed in the Self/Other dichotomy produced its own problems for representing others. When scholars forswore the concept of the Other they lost the unity provided by that dichotomous mode of understanding: what had previously been described as a single monolithic Other according to a single viewpoint fragmented into a diversity of others, often characterized according to a multiplicity of interacting social roles. Even a single other is not just one other but many others on the social axes of, for example, race, sex, age, ethnicity, class, or religion. The greater the number of axes is, the less possible it becomes to employ a unified or totalizing viewpoint in the narrative. How, then, is the historian as writer or teacher to represent this multitude of othernesses in any single textualization?

The Golden Rule of representing others as they would themselves all too often led scholars to unite the various viewpoints into a single text by means of nothing more than the book's binding. Such a solution does not solve the basic problems of including multiple viewpoints in an individual historian's text or classroom. The fundamental issue, from the standpoint of this chapter, is not whether others can (self-)represent themselves in a text (they can of course) so much as how are they to be represented by a historian in a text or in a classroom.

Various others' voices and viewpoints enter historical practice and its discourse in at least five ways: (i) scattered throughout the sources as evidence for a textualization of the past; (2) textualizations in the sources, especially as narratives, by past others about their present(s) and past(s) as they conceived them; (3) textualizations by present-day others, including scholars, about the past or present of themselves as others; (4) present-day textualizations by scholars and historians about past others; and (5) present-day textualization by a historian (or teacher) of multiple voices and viewpoints in a history. Of each aspect, one can ask the questions posed by the dual meanings of representation. On one hand, representation means speaking or standing for someone else. How representative is the voice and viewpoint of the other claiming to speak for those others? On the other hand, representation also means the re-presentation, that is, the reimaging of the absent events, behaviors, and values. When the two meanings of representation are combined and applied to the five aspects of historical practice and discourse, they raise a series of questions and problems for synthesizing otherness in an individual historian's text.

First, if multiple viewpoints and voices are scattered throughout the sources, the problem becomes one of ascertaining or imagining whether enough past persons' voices and viewpoints are adequately represented in the evidence to depict that society. Are the archives biased in favor of or silent on one or more sectors of a society? Second, if past others have represented, that is, textualized, their experiences as a narrative, then to what degree should multiculturalist historians reproduce that narrative in its entirety in their own texts? Archival narratives can supply voice and viewpoint for historians through reproduction or quotation according to the degrees of story in the sources mentioned in Chapter 6. But the issue of representativeness or typicality poses the same basic problem here as for the third aspect of historical practice and discourse.

If present-day others textualize their pasts and in the process claim to represent a past other's voices and viewpoints more authentically than those who are not of their otherness, what is a historian to make of this claim? What relationship do these differing forms of self-representation have to a historian's own textualization of another's story and experiences? Even if one accepts the voice of the self-represented textual representations as typical of those it purports to represent, should one also accept automatically its viewpoint, or interpretation, of the persons, events, and results of its history? Should the self-representation of another be accepted as not only the voice but also the single best or right viewpoint or interpretation of a group's history because it claims to be part of that supposed voice and viewpoint? To what extent do the conflicts in a society and the differentials in power among its members shape the experience of those people, hence their viewpoints as individuals and as members of groups? What if others as individuals appear unaware of the consequences of their actions as groups or of their own larger social context? What if the personal experience of one member differs from that of another member of the same group?

If one person's truth is another person's myth, or culture, then what of conflicting truth-claims about nature, societies, or the universe itself held by others as opposed to the historian? Since, for example, Native American peoples believe that their tribes originated in the Western Hemisphere, why should one begin their histories with some migration story or myth about peoples crossing from Asia via the Bering Strait? Are all ontologies equal in historical representation, or do historians judge other ontologies by their
own? If they judge the truthfulness of an other's worldview, have they violated their goal of representing another's viewpoint?31

How can historians reconcile their own and others' worldviews and viewpoints? Historians cannot simply exchange frameworks by "going native," for they must translate back out again for their readers. In the end, translation is the name of the game in representing otherness.32 The representation of another in someone else's text is a delicate and paradoxical task, for the process involves switching from the representation of another's representation according to one's own world to the representation of another's representation according to his or her own world. As Clifford Geertz phrases the task, it is to represent "one sort of life in the categories of another."33 To know another in terms of that other's outlook and viewpoint necessitates transcending one's own categories and perceptions. What is so clear in the actual translation of concepts and meanings from one language to another becomes less certain but no less important in translating from other to self in terms of societies and cultures or as groups and subcultures. Whether the historian's imagined alterity corresponds to the other's self-knowing depends more upon subsequent political contestation than upon the degree of a historian's presumed empathy or assumed oppositeness. Ultimately the historian's text upon otherness is tested less by standard historical criteria and more by how it is read and critiqued by its subjects as politics. Even so, the subjects form their critique and interpret their experience according to the very views that result in as well as from their experiences in the first place.

What applies to the representativeness of self-interpretations also applies to those offered by others as scholars and historians of their own pasts. Why should a historian accept those versions of others' past experience as both representative and the best representation? In that sense, other scholars' and historians' interpretations or representations of their own past are just another source for the historian's textualization of the (hi)story of those others.

Any multiculturalist goal of incorporating voice and viewpoint in historical discourse must therefore acknowledge not only the diversity of voices and viewpoints in the past but also the diversity of present-day voices and viewpoints about how to make history more inclusive of past experiences and present ideals. Such a view of the dialogue about multiculturalism within the present requires distinguishing between polyvocality and multiple viewpoints in professional and political debates over the focus and nature of historical discourse today as opposed to what is aimed for and achieved in any one discourse as a text as a result of this debate. Should commitment to multiculturalist ideals therefore require that any discourse as text exemplify in explicit practice what the tensions in the present make implicit in professional discourse? Should not the diversity of views about achieving multiculturalism in historical discourse be part of the polyvocal dialogue represented in the main body of textual discourses themselves (as opposed to the notes or other paratext)? The great challenge today of such a view of multicultural dialogue and the multiculturalist ideal is to combine within any given text, whether conceived as a partial history, a Great Story, or the Great Past itself, multiple viewpoints as well as different voices (1) from within the represented world of the past, (2) from outside the represented world of the past in light of subsequent events and ideas, and (3) from the conflicting or at least diverse viewpoints existing in the present. In each case we must ask who is represented, and how.

Experience and Self-Representation

The issues of self-representation and the representation of multiple viewpoints have been explored particularly in women's history as the result of the challenge from women of color to the initial voicing and viewpoint of women's history. Feminist women's history was grounded from the outset on the principle that the experience of women differs fundamentally from that of men. That different experience required the revision of all history to show the differences between female and male experience in (and of) the past. What was claimed initially as that female version of history was in turn challenged as representative of only white, heterosexual, middle-class women by women of different color, sexual orientation, class, or disability on the grounds of their quite different experiences. The latter claimed that white, heterosexual, middle-class women stood in the same relationship to them as men and therefore could not represent their experiences and therefore their histories.

Feminist women of color in the United States therefore broadened the meaning of the word "colonization" from the economic exploitation of subordinated peoples by imperialist powers to include "the appropriation of their experiences and struggles by hegemonic white women's movements." That usage was in turn broadened further to other discourses about the Other, especially as (that is, in) the so-called Third World. As Chandra Talpade Mohanty summarizes this semantic ploy, "However sophisticated or problematical its use as an explanatory construct, colonization almost invariably implies a relation of structural domination, and a suppression—often violent—of the heterogeneity of the subject(s) in question."34 Thus a new principle of representing the variety of women as others was asserted, according to Ruth Roach Pierson:

In the triangle of experience, difference and dominance and its relation to voice, it is not inexperience or difference in experience alone but different experience combined with "power over" that disqualifies: the dominant group's power systemically and systematically to negate or disfigure the experience of others separates it from the oppressed group's lived experience of that negation or disfigurement. What [the oppressed] is asking for is recognition of the "epistemic privilege of the oppressed." There does seem to be a compelling reason to accept
as "true" an oppressed person's account of the lived experience of the oppression. There seems to be an equally compelling moral argument against the right of a member of the dominant group to appropriate the oppressed person's story.35

As she concludes, "Dominance needs to be seen, in other words, as integral to the experience of difference and as capable of rendering the dominant insensible to the 'lived experience' of the oppressed."36 In the more graphic words of Bell Hooks about such appropriation of another's experience:

No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become my own. Re-writing you I rewrite myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer, the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk.37

Alert to this abuse of cross-otherness, Pierson warns that those who would write about the experience of others must proceed with both "epistemic humility" and "methodological caution."38 Does such epistemic humility demand any less than full quotation of the other's experiences in order to avoid the intellectual imperialism grounding normal historical practice on viewpoint? Is paraphrase in this instance just another discursive aggression colonizing the other in the name of multicultural representation?

At the same time that Pierson warns about the expropriation and colonizing of others' experiences, she also points out that autobiography and oral history cannot be accepted solely as the other's history, for the job of the historian is not only "to reclaim voices" but also to "contextualize" them, "to reconstitute the 'discursive' world which the subjects inhabited and were shaped by."39 To what extent does this second conclusion about the historian's standard task of contextualization undermine that of reclamation when considering, and representing, voices and viewpoints in a history?

Joan Wallach Scott expands upon what the contextualization of experience involves in her oft-reprinted article "The Evidence of Experience."40 She pursues a poststructuralist strategy of denying individual experience for the socially based discursive practices that produce the sources: to accept experience as transparent to its own viewpoint and to judge its validity by that viewpoint is to fall prone to the liberal humanist delusion of the individual as autonomous subject. To credit experience as "uncontestable evidence and as an originary point of explanation—as a foundation upon which analysis is based," she argues, is to essentialize an individual's identity as if it were timeless rather than created through historical forces like all other subjects. "Making visible the experience of a different group exposes the existence of repressive mechanisms, but not their inner workings or logics; we know that difference exists, but we don't understand it as relationally constituted. For that we need to attend to the historical processes that, through discourse, position subjects and produce their experiences." As a result, the acceptance of others' experiences as history reproduces the categories and ideological systems that formed and informed those experiences in the first place rather than showing how the interplay of the actors' voices resulted from their social location(s) as subjects. Thus, she argues, "It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience. Experience in this definition then becomes not the origin of our explanation, not the authoritative (because seen or felt) evidence that grounds what is known, but rather that which we seek to explain, that about which knowledge is produced." To locate experiences in their specific social contexts becomes the historian's job. "To think about experience in this way is to historicize it as well as to historicize the identities it produces. This kind of historicizing represents a reply to the many contemporary historians who have argued that unproblematized 'experience' is the foundation of their practice; it is historicizing that implies critical scrutiny of all explanatory categories usually taken for granted, including the category of 'experience.'"41

For Scott, "experience is at once already an interpretation and something that needs to be interpreted. What counts as experience is neither self-evident nor straightforward; it is always contested, and therefore political." Thus she argues for a new history of concept and category formation as clues to the history that produces experience and the historical sediment that is said to be experience. "Subjects are constituted discursively and experience is a linguistic event... Experience is a subject's history. Language is the site of history's enactment. Historical explanation cannot, therefore, separate the two."42 As these quotations suggest, Scott resolves the conceptualization of another's experience into the discursive practices, which in turn presume a society of structured differences, always(?) embodied in inequalities of power, that the historian can employ in the representation of the voices and viewpoints. In Scott's appropriation of poststructuralist theory, the notion of a socially based discursive practice solves the problems of multiple viewpoints in historical practice by connecting the various viewpoints of evidentiary sources, others' stories, other scholars' texts, and the historian's own text into one interpretive system.43

Does this poststructuralist strategy solve the problem of representing multiple viewpoints in a historian's text? Although the strategy constructs the interplay of voices and viewpoints so as to offer the reader a dialogue that is polyvocal in one sense of that term, in another sense that polyvocality is still ultimately constructed according to a single best viewpoint. So long as the historian contextualizes the social formations that produced the categories of others' experiences, then so long does the historian's viewpoint ground that contextualization as in traditional history. Thus, from the ideal of a truly multiviewpointed multiculturalism, what many multiculturalists kick so osten-

tatiously out the front door Scott allows to sneak in through the back door.
Multiculturalism and Normal History

That multicultural, polyvalent history is more easily preached than achieved indicates that conceptual as well as ethical and political problems plague the enterprise. How much of this problem stems from the nature of the normal history paradigm as opposed to political or other societal inertia? Must the efforts of historians to reclaim the story of history in the name of gender, race, ethnicity, or class also lead to plural viewpoints in history-telling? Or will such efforts merely produce a history that is counterhegemonic in story and argument but still based ultimately on a single viewpoint? To what extent is the proliferation of voices and viewpoints in a history limited to—as well as by—the normal paradigm of historical discourse?

An example of an explicit attempt to represent multiple viewpoints within a single text offers lessons on both its potential and its limits for normal historical practice. Patricia Limerick in The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West defines the United States West as the meeting ground for several societies and their contest for political, economic, and cultural control of the land and one another; so she tries to be especially sensitive to the multiple viewpoints represented in the many conflicts. One of her favorite methods of representing different viewpoints is through quotation and summary of opposing positions, as in the following discussion of the Texas Rangers from Anglo and Hispanic American perspectives:

In Hispanic history, as in every Western history, one never has the luxury of taking point of view for granted. Hispanics—like Indians, Anglos, and every other group—could be victims as well as victimizers, and the meanings of the past could seem, at times, to be riding a seesaw. Consider, for instance, the dramatically different images of the Texas Rangers. Early in the Anglo colonization of Texas, the Rangers began "as something of a paramilitary force" for fighting Indians. As the threat from the Indians diminished, the Rangers became a force for protecting the property of Anglo-Texans and for keeping Mexicans and Mexican-Americans subordinated. Surviving into the twentieth century as a kind of state police, the Texas Ranger had acquired a strong and positive standing in myth, "eulogized, idolized, and elevated to the status of one of the truly heroic figures in American history." In

representing multiple viewpoints and voices

1935, the historian Walter Prescott Webb published an influential study that reinforced the image of the Texas Ranger as "a man standing alone between society and its enemies," a law officer who was also "a very quiet, deliberate, gentle person who could gaze calmly into the eye of a murderer, divine his thoughts, and anticipate his actions, a man who could ride straight up to death." In opposition to this view, she quotes scholars of borderland folklore and history to establish the quite different Hispanic perspective on the Rangers:

"The word rinche from 'ranger' is an important one in Border folklore," wrote [Americo] Paredes. "It has been extended to cover not only the Rangers but any other Americans armed and mounted and looking for Mexicans to kill." Adopting the Mexican point of view, scholars who came after Webb drew a different moral and political portrait of the Rangers. "The Anglo community," Julian Samore, Joe Bernal, and Albert Pefia have written, "took it for granted that the Rangers were there to protect Anglo interests; no one ever accused the Rangers operating in South Texas of either upholding or enforcing the law impartially." The Rangers, moreover, kept up their traditional role in the twentieth century, lending a hand in strikebreaking and in cracking down on "Mexican-American activism in politics and education . . ." In this instance she achieves a multicultural view by relegating the historically dominant Anglo viewpoint to the status of myth and by presenting the Mexican viewpoint as the ultimate reality.

Limerick’s discussion of a Native American point of view and voice illustrates the problems involved in achieving a multiperspectival history. Should a new Indian history merely reverse the old stereotypes of who is savage and who is civilized? Limerick argues that such a history would remain a flattened one because it would still homogenize Native Americans, with all their diverse languages, customs, religions, tribal governments, economies, localities, and experiences with Euro-Americans, into a "unitary thing." Concerns about intertribal rivalries and other native matters, for example, often loom larger in their own histories than the impact and implications of Euro-American contact. To speak of an "Indian side" therefore oversimplifies both the voices and viewpoints of Native Americans past and present. Limerick goes on to ask whether a changed perspective provides "a sufficient corrective to the ethnocentric conventions of the past." Is the traditional historian’s "leap to the high ground of objectivity and neutrality" enough? "What if Indian people are now so certain of their injuries that they want condemnation and blame explicit in the writing of their history? How were white historians to respond when articulate and angry Indian people protested the fact that their history had been too long in the keeping of outsiders and invaders?" At first Limerick seems sympathetic to this point of view: "Much of what passed for objective frontier history was in fact nationalistic history, celebrating the winners and downgrading or ignoring the losers . . . The nationalism of conventional frontier history carried an as-
sumption that history was itself a kind of property in which Americans deserved to take pride. In reaction to such white-centered history, "Indians have put forth a counterclaim: Indian history is not solely about Indians; it is history belonging to Indians, in which the owners should take pride and which should make them feel better about their inherited identity." Such a claim, however, bothers her because corporations, governments, religions, and even individuals in the dominant society have asserted the same right to control and construct their own histories, and professional historians oppose such "authorized histories" as flagrantly partial and partisan.

Faced with the dilemma of whether each minority should write its own history in its own way, Limerick voices sympathy for both sides of the proposition. On one hand, each partial perspective cannot be taken for the whole by the professional historian. In arguing that all the various versions of Western history ought to be read, she writes:

Of course, Indian people can and should write their own histories according to their traditions, just as pioneers and their descendants have every right to publish books enshrining their own version of the past. For the sake of national and regional self-understanding, however, there should be a group of people reading all these books and paying attention to all these points of view. In that process, Western historians will not reach a neutral, omniscient objectivity. On the contrary, the clashes and conflicts of Western history will always leave the serious individual emotionally and intellectually unsettled. In the nineteenth-century West, speaking out for the human dignity of all parties to the conflicts took considerable nerve. It still does.9

On the other hand, "historians of the American mainstream" can learn much from the "Indian perspective on the peculiar ways of white people," which frees one from "the intellectually crippling temptation to take white people's ways for granted." She proceeds to laud ethnohistory for resolving the dilemma she sees, because it "places actions and events in a carefully explored context of culture and worldview." Thus "ethnohistory reaches its peak when its techniques are applied across the board, when white people as well as Indians are cast as actors in complex cultural worlds, and when no point of view is taken for granted."30

As Limerick's discussion of the dilemmas of multiple viewpoints shows, she hopes to escape its relativistic implications for the Great Story as well as for a single historical text by incorporating both the actors' viewpoints and their context into the historian's own "larger" multiculturalist viewpoint. Such a solution may be an improvement over texts denying actors' viewpoints, but it does not answer all the challenges of multiculturalism to viewpoint in historical practice. In the end, she solves the multicultural challenge to hegemonic viewpoint in history safely from within the synoptic viewpoint customary to the paradigm of normal history even as she expands the number of viewpoints that normal history should embrace.

The paradigmatic limits as well as the moral implications of Limerick's approach are apparent in her discussion of the general problems of incorporating histories of minorities into the general history of the American West. Her ponderings illustrate the perplexities of combining multiple viewpoints with the historian's voice and viewpoint into a text and into history. First, the problems as she sees them:

When the advance of white male pioneers across the continent was the principal concern of Western historians, the field had coherence to spare. But two or three decades of "affirmative action history" have made a hash of that coherence. Ethnocentricity is out, but what alternative center is in?

When it comes to centers, Western history now has an embarrassment of riches—Indian-centered history, Hispanic-centered history, Asian-centered history, black-centered history, Mormon-centered history, and (discredited as it may be) white-American-main-stream history.31 If historians were forced to choose one of these centers, hold to it, and reject all others, we would be in deep professional trouble. But that is by no means the only choice available.33

Her solution to the integration of multiple viewpoints into a history rests upon an analogy:

Take, for instance, a thoroughly un-Western metaphor for a complicated phenomenon—a subway system. Every station in the system is a center of sorts—trains and passengers converge on it; in both departure and arrival, the station is the pivot. But get on a train, and you are soon (with any luck) at another station, equally a center and a pivot. Every station is at the center of a particular world, yet that does not leave the observer of the system conceptually muddled, unable to decide which station represents the true point of view from which the entire system should be viewed. On the contrary, the idea of the system as a whole makes it possible to think of all the systems at once—to pay attention to the differences while still recognizing their relatedness, and to imagine how the system looks from its different points of view.53

In applying this subway metaphor, she argues:

What "system" united Western history? Minorities and majority in the American West occupied common ground—literally. A contest for control of the land, for the labor applied to the land, and the resulting profit set the terms of their meeting. Sharing turf, contesting turf, surrendering turf, Western groups, for all their differences, took part in the same story. Each group may well have its own, self-defined story, but in the contest for property and profit, these stories met. Each group might have preferred to keep its story private and separate, but life on the common ground of the American West made such purity impossible.54

Her solution resembles the effort by Thomas Bender to find a synthetic principle for U.S. history in the protracted conflicts over defining the public arena in American life. To explicate this analogy, she switches metaphors:
Everyone became an actor in everyone else's play; understanding any part of the play now requires us to take account of the whole. It is perfectly possible to watch a play and keep track of, even identify with, several characters at once, even when those characters are in direct conflict with each other and within themselves. The ethic diversity of Western history asks only that: pay attention to the parts, and pay attention to the whole. It is a difficult task, but to bemoan and lament the necessity to include minorities is to engage, finally, in intellectual laziness. The American West was a complicated place for historical participants; and it is no exercise in "white guilt" to say that it is—and should be—just as complicated for us today.  

These are attractive metaphors, but do they provide the solution multiculturalism seeks and needs to transform historical practice? Do they solve the problems of incorporating multiple viewpoints into a history text? How does Limerick know that the stations are all on the same subway system? Does someone still see the system as a whole? And if so, from what and whose viewpoint is that system to be ultimately organized and described? How can anyone know if it is a single system, let alone speak for it? Who is the System-Maker, let alone the Great Story-Teller? Her resolution resembles that of Joan Scott's poststructuralist strategy. Both presume a (social) structure that permits their historical discourses to put multiple voices and viewpoints into their appropriate(d) places according to the underlying model and its Great Story.

In the end Limerick's advice on how to combine actors' and historians' viewpoints into a single text still privileges the historian's viewpoint over those of the actors through scripting the play, to use her analogy. Her method, laudable as some of its results may be, is frequently drawn as an overall conclusion about the relationship among the multiple viewpoints apart from any one of them. Such a solution offers the historian's stance as the ultimate integrative viewpoint regardless of the actors' viewpoints. Both presume a (social) structure that permits their historical discourses to put multiple voices and viewpoints into their appropriate(d) places according to the underlying model and its Great Story.

The Reorientation of Anthropology

Recent efforts by some anthropologists to pluralize and historicize their disciplinary perspective offer an example of another approach to multiculturalism and multiple viewpoints. The discipline of anthropology had traditionally relied upon the Self/Other distinction translated as the Here and the There, with the consequent suppression of the Now and the Then. The so-called ethnographic present of a culture was substituted for the history of the people said to enact that culture. A crisis arose in the discipline because the Here and There was erased or blurred in a (post)modern world. The collapse of empires and the resultant loss of control by Western societies over other portions of the globe erased the previous scholarly as well as hegemonic divisions between the First and Third worlds. Others as scholars challenged in recent decades the ethnographic expertise of Western specialists. Whereas previous anthropological scholarship had rested upon the scholarly monopoly provided by asymmetrical power relationships, the self-proclaimed New Anthropology of the 1980s renounced sole control of the knowledge of the Other as the West's power decreased. No longer was scholarly expertise to be divided between the West and the Rest; all scholars now existed on spaceship Earth together. Thus, according to those anthropologists leading the movement, Self and Other needed to be renegotiated as selves and others and, in the process, reinvented. To achieve such a reinvention of Self and Other as merely selves and others interacting together, they argued for a fundamental change both in the Great Story and in the locus of ethnographic authority.

To acknowledge the changed idea of power relationships in the discipline demands first a new Great Story that reinterprets Western history according to the present and the presumed (near) future. In the brief formulation of two scholars, the recent history of what was once hailed as the rise of the West must now be seen as a decline:

Self-doubts within European liberalism, the outbreak of barbarism within the heartlands of "civilization," and the decline of the European states to the status of second-rate powers, all rendered out-of-date Victorian versions of historical teleology and racial anthropology. More recently, the economic decline of England, East Asia's high-tech prosperity, and the puncturing of boundaries between Europe East and West have further reshaped the familiar outline of (Western) "Civilization." As we approach the quincentenary of Columbus's collision with Asia/America, the conventions of "Western Civilization" circa 1900 have the quaint and odd look of a British Empire map of the World.  

In this version of the Great Story of the West, the West is displaced and decentered as the chief, let alone sole, actor of history. The Great Story that interpreted Western imperial expansion as one of progress and reason for its spread of the ideal of universal liberal individualism is thrown over for a
Great Story that depicts not only the evils of capitalism on a worldwide scale but also the not-so-humane problems resulting from the ideal of liberal individualism. More important, the unidirectional thrust of cultural and social change in the earlier Great Story is exchanged for one that stresses the reciprocity and exchange among societies and cultures in terms of persons who interact as they encounter one another. Whereas the older Great Story viewed the West as the active source of change and the Rest as the passive recipients of those supposedly enlightened, if not necessarily benign, changes, the New Anthropology emphasizes the historically emergent and culturally creative qualities of the social and personal interaction. As Edward Said points out, "Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic."

According to this new Great Story, what is the case today was also the case in past times; the global intermixing and exchange of persons, ideas, and identities so prevalent today also occurred in previous centuries. The strict separation of the Here and the There, the Self and the Other, was an ideology supporting the hegemony of Western scholars rather than an accurate description of what was happening in the history of actual encounters among peoples. To overcome that ideology requires a repudiation of the previous intellectual isolationism inherent in the old view of essentialized, autonomous cultures in favor of a long history of cultural exchange and invention, of global economic and social inter-, but unequal, dependence.

Such a transactional impression of ethnic identity demands a renunciation of the holism long considered fundamental to the definition of culture in the discipline. Just as cultures do not meet each other as autonomous wholes in the present, so they did not in the past. As the holism of an ethnographic present gave way to the innumerable transactions of an ethnographic past, anthropologists needed to portray ethnicity as "mixed, relational, and inventive," and culture as a "hybrid, often discontinuous inventive process" with (and in) a history. As George Marcus and Michael Fischer argue in one manifesto of the New Anthropology:

Most local cultures worldwide are products of a history of appropriations, resistances, and accommodations. The task for this subtrend in the current experimental moment is thus to revise conventions of ethnographic description away from a measuring of change against some largely ahistoric framing of the cultural unit toward a view of cultural situations as always in flux, in a perpetually historically sensitive state of resistance and accommodation to broader processes of influence that are as much inside as outside the local context.

Therefore, anthropologists should renounce the essentialism and presumed universalism of the categories by which they previously measured change and continuity. As James Clifford argues: "All attempts to posit such abstract unities are constructs of monological power. A 'culture' is, concretely, an open-ended, creative dialogue of subcultures, of insiders and outsiders, of diverse factions," just as "a 'language' is the interplay and struggle of regional dialects, professional jargons, generic commonplaces, the speech of different age groups, individuals, and so forth."

To produce a new ethnography according to new criteria, anthropologists must surrender their viewpoint on point of view in their discipline. They should repudiate, first, the whole totalizing, self-privileging ideology of the visualist or ocular representation of a point of view as the point of view. In the metaphors of Clifford, they should dislodge the ground from which persons and groups securely represent others. A conceptual shift, "tectonic" in its implications, has taken place. We ground things, now, on a moving earth. There is no longer any place of overview (mountaintop) from which to map human ways of life, no Archimedean point from which to represent the world. Mountains are in constant motion. So are islands: for one cannot occupy, unambiguously, a bounded cultural world from which to journey out and analyze other cultures. Human ways of life increasingly influence, dominate, parody, translate, and subvert each other. Cultural analysis is always enmeshed in global movements of difference and power. However one defines it, and the phrase here is used loosely, a "world system" now links the planet's societies in a common historical process.

Does the evocation of place and time through those others' voices achieve this denial of any overall, synoptic viewpoint?

The introduction of new viewpoints into ethnography has challenged traditional notions of authorship, and therefore ethnographic authority, in anthropology. Anthropologists have long relied upon significant informants as their sources, but until recently they rarely acknowledged these persons as individuals with names, let alone as, what they were in effect, coauthors. Should the viewpoint and voices in a new ethnographic text be represented on the title page as well as in the acknowledgments? Should its viewpoint(s) be the cooperative outcome of a committee of native experts and outside anthropologists? In this case "native" informants would move from being objects of study to being coequal subjects in the construction of their "culture," just as their ancestors have moved from being passive objects to being active agents in their histories. Any self-privileging of the ethnographer's viewpoint over that (those) of her co-creative subjects in an ethnography would suggest that the author has not renounced the vestiges of power and cultural imperialism inherent in monological studies. Postcolonial anthropology has changed the power relationship in scholarship just as decolonization supposedly changed the power relationships in the former colonies. Any attempt to establish a normative or conceptual referent by which to represent the others appears as a measure set up to enforce discursive power over the others. Thus the original dialogue of the fieldwork should remain a dialogue...
conceptually in its final textualization, although its literary form need not be literally that of a dialogue.  

Changed viewpoints and voicing have necessitated a changed discursive or narrative site for the ethnographic analysis and story. The focus of the study and story must move from a Western to a multicultural viewpoint, one of transaction and negotiation among the participants as actors in an emerging, evolving (hi)story (but with no social evolutionary overtones). Even if the asymmetrical power relationships and politics favor the colonizers, the subordinated still have some control over their fate. They are agents as well as subjects in the developing story. The story tells not so much of super- and subordination in the power relationship as of the reciprocity and exchange that co-creates and reproduces the new social roles and cultural meanings in the continuing interaction. The constantly changing transcultural or transacculturative situation provides the new narrative site for the study and story—preferably on the aptly named "Middle Ground" of Richard White.  

Since a historicized cultural history posits a world of contestation, then what is European and Western happens as much on its margins as at its supposed center, and the actors at the so-called margins figure prominently in what happens at the center as well as in their homelands. Thus the New Anthropology postulates at base a dual (hi)story of macro- and microprocesses in interaction. Whereas the macroprocesses shaped the entire world during the past centuries, the microprocesses altered and individualized those processes in specific locales at specific times. A new ethnicographic account must combine the dual processes by conveying the others' experience according to and in terms of their culture and yet take into account "world historical political economy" and thereby locate "knowable communities in larger systems."  

Whether such a historicization of cultures escapes the Eurocentrism inherent in the Great Story of the Capitalist World System depends upon the skill with which the voices of those in the microprocesses are incorporated in the ethnographic discourse or how many of the larger determinants of the Great Story are omitted.  

If there is to be no self-privileging of the author as authority through monological viewpoint or through traditional disciplinary modes, then what roles do the scholar's ontology, politics, and morality perform in and upon the text? Does the New Ethnography change the conception of and criteria for truth? These questions pose severe problems for those New Ethnographers who acknowledge with Derrida that (Western) epistemology is the white man's mythology and with Foucault that power hierarchies structure what is accepted as the "truth." In response to this criticism, Paul Rabinow declares that "epistemology must be seen as a historical event—a distinctive social practice, one among many others, articulated in new ways in seventeenth-century Europe." By being aware of "our historical practice of projecting our cultural practices upon the other," anthropologists can explore "how and when and through what cultural and institutional means other people started claiming epistemology for their own." To avoid "either economic or philosophic hegemony," anthropologists should "diversify centers of resistance: avoid the error of reverse essentializing; Occidentalism is not a remedy for Orientalism." To achieve such an outlook, (Western) scholars need "to anthropologize the West: show how exotic its constitution of reality has been; emphasize those domains most taken for granted as universal (this includes epistemology and economics); make them seem as historically peculiar as possible; show how their claims to truth are linked to social practices and have hence become effective forces in the social world." These epistemological rules still privilege the Western conception of the problem of the other as central to understanding, to textualizing the other; reflexivity appropriates the other in the name of cross-cultural understanding.  

What if the others' viewpoints and moralities deny the basic postulates of the New Great Story? Or has the New Great Story become its own transculturative narrative site for Western and non-Western scholars alike? Postorientalist scholarship and postmodernist anthropology suggest as much. Should plural Great Stories and Pasts become standard textual treatments for contradictory or contested ontologies? If not, who is to determine whether one Great Story or Past is better or more right than another?  

All too often the New Anthropology seems to resort to an all-purpose call for historicization as a solution to all these many problems. To redefine culture from essentialist holism to historicist emergence only takes us back to square one, because history itself is not an essentialist given but an all-too-evident changing social and cultural construction, with its own history. "If culture is mediated by history, history is also mediated by culture," as the editor of a recent effort by symbolic anthropologists to bring their field into the current conceptual fashion reminds her readers.  

If anthropologists need to historicize culture, they also need to culturalize history.  

Is the Great Story that authorizes the historicization of culture in the New Anthropology constructed any differently from more traditional histories? Neither its ultimately singular viewpoint nor its predominantly single authorial voice marks a departure from the old Great Story, although its scholarly politics and multicultural message are quite different. Even the outline of the Great Story of anthropology is treated too unproblematically as it traces the Western conception of culture from, first, the evolutionary whole of nineteenth-century social biology to the cultural wholes of the earlier twentieth-century relativists to controvert the previous view. That approach is in turn repudiated for the nonevolutionary, systemic, one-world whole of those today who would historicize cultural contestations and ethnographic authority. Does not the New Ethnography still put a Eurocentric master narrative at the center of its drive to historicization?
Not until postcolonial, postmodern anthropologists accept the others' thinking and worldviews as equal or superior to their own will their practice meet their dialogical, multicultural ideals, according to R. S. Khare. He accuses most New Anthropology works of still resisting a more open, co-creative approach to reforming the discipline. Unless the anthropologist surrenders the position (and viewpoint) of the "transcendental observer," no true reciprocity of knowledge and voice can occur between observer and observed. Otherwise, the other exists at the anthropologist's sufferance. If sharing of epistemologies and ontologies between selves and others is the goal, then the anthropologist-textualizer must no longer author-ize the other through the text, even through a dialogue, for such a text still allows the subject to speak only in terms of the intellectual interests and discursive practices of the author's paradigm. Such a paradigm, even a new ethnography, disassembles what the others consider whole about themselves in favor of its redistribution and disposition in the authorizing anthropologist's text. "It is as if the anthropologist's self requires the Other to 'sacrifice' itself, to let the anthropologist become a distinct 'text-maker.'" In this view the anthropologist's context must inevitably distort the other's context.

For the New Anthropologists to allow the other to exist "side by side," as coequal in their representations, Khare argues that they must sustain "an earnest dialogue." Such a dialogue not only recognizes the Other's voice; it also accords intrinsically equal authenticity to the Other's existence and epistemology. A genuine dialogue consciously maintains a sense of reciprocating advantage on all levels of representation and communication (whether oral, descriptive, analytical, critical, or synthetic). A reciprocating "text" cannot consciously retain hidden—protected, unexamined, and unapproachable—concepts of exclusivity, advantage, immunity, and superior rights when engaged in dialogue with the Other."

Coequal contextualization of the other through "reciprocal knowledge" does not have "to achieve an absence of difference, but only its more complete, equipolar understanding and communication so as to avoid one-sided privileges, advantages, and immunities." As Khare explains in his final note: "Such a relationship involves reciprocal representation, persuasion, and evaluation, but it originates from both sides, without resulting in any built-in, long-term advantage of favor on either side." Genuine reciprocity, in short, demands negotiated dialogues about what is known and how it is known, about how it is to be represented and then textualized as a discourse.

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Culturalization of history would seem to demand, if the New Anthropology offers lessons, the renunciation of any essentialist notion of the past as history or of history as the past. The nature of both narration and historical authority come under question. Should a history be acknowledged as a cooperative effort between present author and past sources? Should viewpoints, like voices, multiply in proportion to the number of actors or social groups in the past? Such a cooperative effort diminishes the distinction between formal or professional history and oral or folk history. A less than cooperative effort becomes an arbitrary power ploy to boost the authority of the professional historian. Who, in the end, determines what Great Story serves as "middle ground" for the narrative site? Or should all Great Stories receive equal treatment and validity?

From this viewpoint, the greatest power grab of all in professional history is to draw the line between what is true and what is fiction (or myth or ideology). Drawing a line between truth and fiction in the past is even more important to historical construction and professional authority than the determination of who or what is part of history, for the former characterizes the latter. To deny, for example, the validity of witchcraft or prayer in one's own ontology shapes one's characterization of others' behavior and belief in one's own historical constructions. Who in the end defines what constitutes history is as much a question of politics and power as who appears in a history and how. What constitutes explanation or causation constrains historical construction as much as monological viewpoint, for in the end they are one and the same. "Worldview and viewpoint overlap, as their shared component word suggests and as the debates over multiculturalism in the curriculum attest.

Towards a Dialogic Ideal

The challenge of dialogism in historical discourses lies less in introducing additional voices into a text or even into a Great Story than in representing viewpoints beyond that of the historian. That polyvocality need not produce a pluralistic let alone a multicultural history seems plain from actual practice. Introducing multiple viewpoints into historical discourse requires both a revision of the normal history paradigm and a new vision of historical authority. A multicultural, dialogic ideal transforms not only the subject of histories but also the postulates of what a good history does and is. Ultimately, must multiple viewpoints issue forth in plural pasts and new approaches to textualizing histories?

Since any single viewpoint seems hopelessly partial by contemporary multicultural standards, the solution would appear to be the representation of the past and present from multiple viewpoints in a single text as well as in the Great Story and Great Past. At minimum, an ideal multicultural history should, as stated earlier, integrate multiple viewpoints as well as different voices (1) from within the represented world of the past, (2) from outside the represented world of the past in light of subsequent events, beliefs, and mores, and (3) from the conflicting or at least diverse viewpoints existing in the
present. Nothing less seems sufficient in a multicultural history, if the author(s) seek(s) the fullest polyvocality and dialogy within the text. How does a historian or even a group of historians integrate the tensions of past and present societies into a single text? To what extent must such a text embody these tensions as well as represent them? Can a single text in the end be both multicultural and multiple viewpointed and still be understood by its readers as a "history"?  

This multicultural ideal suggests a rough scale by which to measure polyvocality and multiple viewpoints in a given historical discourse. Such a range also allows classification of kinds of histories according to their treatment of the self/other problem. At one end lie those historical texts with only one voice and one viewpoint. At this end are also those that advocate the representation of multiple voices but do not employ multiple viewpoints in their own textualization. Although such works include others' voices, these are orchestrated to present the message for a transformed conception of the self/other relationship. A notable example is Edward Said's *Orientalism,* which objects to the stereotypes embodied in Western representations of Middle Eastern peoples. He uses many voices to exemplify the stereotyped view, but he makes no attempt to show how the new self/other relationship ought to be represented. Said's book does not practice what it preaches. At the same end of the range are the more general but similar texts for the reconception of the self/other relationship by Johannes Fabian, *TzvaZ and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object;* Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West;* and Marianna Torgovnick, *Gone Primitive: Savage IntellecLs, Modern Lives—all of whose titles express or suggest their purpose.* These books utilize history in the form of past representations to make their point about today's desired understanding of otherness. They quote past persons and paraphrase them to reveal their viewpoints as stereotyped and hegemonic. Regardless of their explicit message about multiculturalism, their point of view is single and univocal. Also located at this end of the spectrum are histories of anthropology or of the other social sciences that treat the self/other dichotomy as deficient ways of understanding or stereotypes in the past, and unproblematized versions of the changing Great Story of Western power in the world that adopt a traditional unified, overall viewpoint on the history of the World System.  

Existing in the middle of the range spanning the multicultural ideal are contemporary efforts like those of Patricia Limerick to introduce and to varnish various others' viewpoints into an inclusive but ultimately predominant conceptual and political viewpoint. Even the extraordinary efforts of Carlo Ginzburg in *The Cheese and the Worms* or of Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie in *Montaillou* to evoke the worlds of the past belong here, as do the multiple reader-response efforts of Judith Walkowitz in *City of Dreadful Delight.* Also belonging in this middle range are Tzvetan Todorov's *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* and Sabine MacCormack's *Religion in the Andes: Vision and Imagination in Early Colonial Peru.* Different as these two books are in terms of disciplinary method and discursive organization, both attempt to give voice to the other. Both authors derive images of the American natives as selves primarily from European descriptions of their otherness. MacCormack applies traditional intellectual history techniques to untraditional texts (and peoples). As a result she accepts the spiritual framework of her Spanish sources to derive the mutually interacting religious images of the Spanish and Andean peoples and how native religions changed over time as a result of the Spanish program of missionization. Through the literary analysis of certain Spanish texts, Todorov constructs a spectrum of Spanish perceptions of Meso-American peoples ranging from Columbus' monologic, ethnocentric view to the appreciation of them as others by the Dominicans Diego Duran and Bernardino de Sahagun through the dialogy of their texts. Ultimately Todorov seems more interested in making his presumably Eurocentric readers aware of their inherited provincial biases than in embodying in his text the cosmopolitan egalitarianism he avows. While MacCormack would not eschew such an aim, she states she searches for what really transpired so long ago in the Andes. Notable as their achievements are, both authors ultimately give voice to the others according to their own purposes and perspectives. Polyvocality is contained within their own texts by their own voices and viewpoints.  

What truly might exist at the other end of the spectrum has apparently not yet been textualized. For the moment it seems to be occupied by texts that are pure pastiches of quotations, pure evocations of others without an apparent privileging of the historian's voice or viewpoint over those of others—perhaps even without any apparent interjection of the historian's viewpoint. Can such discourses qualify as proper histories according to the standards of the profession? Even if the writer-compiler of such a text were not to impose an overall viewpoint, would not the reader project one onto it? Readers' responses to a text demand the security of expectations about genre. Anthologies of sources and textbooks of multiple interpretations correspond to postmodern fragmentation of the subject, of the author, and of viewpoint, but many historians and probably their readers would deny these texts status as proper histories. Postmodern books on multiculturalism all too often (re)solve the problem of multiple viewpoints and voices by collecting a group of symposiasts' supposedly different outlooks into a single volume. True experiments in multivocality are rare because they challenge the normal historical paradigm of an ultimately single authorial viewpoint. If the text is not to be a pastiche of quotations, a book of sources, what can it be? Ronald Fraser in
his history of his childhood family home employs a collage of oral testimony from the manor's servants and his brother, his own journal entries about those persons in the past, and recollections of exchanges with his psychoanalyst about his upbringing among these people. The ambiguity of the main title, *In Search of a Past: The Manor House, Amnersfield, 1933-1945*, suggests the author's dual motivation to come to terms with his own past as he reconstructs a bygone era. Through skillful juxtaposition of carefully edited materials, Fraser conveys the many voices and viewpoints of those persons who for a dozen years surrounded him while he recreates the history of class privilege and interwoven public and private lifestyles at the manor house during the 1930s and the Second World War. Although the purpose of the collage is to exorcise the psychological warping of the author's youth, it also provides a skillfully composed portrayal of insight and blindness among the privileged and subordinated alike in the English countryside during the final halcyon days of the aristocracy. This unusual combination of oral history and journal entry occupies a point far along the multicultural scale because of its attempt to present multiple perspectives of class and gender, the public and the private, as constituted and changed in those dozen years.

David Farber's history of the events surrounding the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968 occupies a similar position on the multicultural scale. In an experiment combining the multiple viewpoints of diverse historical actors and his own analysis, Farber first tells three separate stories of the events leading up to, culminating in, and resulting from the protest, from the perspectives of the Yippies, who created themselves to confront the old Democratic way of doing things at the convention; of the multiconstituent coalition under the name of the National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam; and of Mayor Richard Daly and the police of Chicago. To convey these narratives how each group perceived and represented matters in its own voice and viewpoint, he sometimes uses different typefaces for each. His three final chapters analyze from his viewpoint each of the three collective actors, focusing on the linkages between the politics of protest outside the American political system and the politics of information and media, between the politics of American radicalism and the politics of locality and social order.

Another important attempt to embody multiple viewpoints as well as voices is the historical anthropologist Richard Price's *Alabi's World*. To convey the eighteenth-century history of the Saramaka maroons of Suriname, Price uses four voices, those of the German Moravians, the Dutch planters, the Saramakas, and his own as historian and anthropologist. He translates into English the various languages of the primary sources he reproduces, and he treats Saramaka oral history on a par with his documentary evidence. Throughout the book, including the notes, he accords each group, as well as himself, a different weight and face of type. But although all voices and viewpoints are supposedly equal, his own prevails in the end, as one reviewer noted. Even though Price argues that the Saramaka possess a strong sense of linear history, ultimately it is his own views of history that organize the book, certify the authenticity of the various voices, and plot the dialogue of voices as diachronic and dialectic. Regardless of the problems of translation or of authorial viewpoint, Price's book more than almost any other suggests the full potential of polyvocality and multiple viewpoints on the multicultural scale.

Although the ideal grounding this multiculturalist spectrum presumes equal representation of diverse voices and viewpoints, it does not specify how to construe the relationships that exist among the multiple voices and viewpoints or how to assemble them into a coherent, interrelated structure. This remains the issue that divides both theorists and practitioners of multiculturalism and pluralism. For those who stress the power relationships that prevail in all social networks, these inequalities provide the key to organizing the dialogue of the voices and viewpoints. For these scholars the pluralism of polyvocality and multiple viewpoints must never imply equal explanatory weight of all interests or conceal the hierarchy of power in human affairs that in their opinion constitutes the delusion of liberal politics. Plural textual representation should not lead the reader to assume plural political representation.

But for those scholars who feel that only the full representation of all voices and viewpoints fulfills the goal of multiculturalism, such structured contextualization still represents the politics of the scholar as the univocal viewpoint of and on history. Like other aspects of historical methodology, multiple voices and viewpoints need contextualization, and that contextualization is constructed by the historian through and as an appropriate Great Story. From this perspective even a historical montage implies an omniscient narrator as the Great Organizer. For this position, to be polyvocal and multiple viewpoint in a historical text means to be plural in perspective and pluralized throughout the representation. How therefore to conceive and contextualize past voices depends as much upon the politics of the scholar as upon the nature of the evidence. In the end the politics of historical viewpoint determines the politics of multivocality and multiple viewpoints.
the escape from money: metals never did become money; they always were; hence they never are; a picture is just paper pretending to be something else. The logic of these answers is the logic of the goldbugs and Bryanites, trompe l'oeil, and a certain strand of modernism. The attraction of writing is that it escapes this logic. Neither a formal entity in itself nor an illusionistic image of something else, it marks the potential discrepancy between material and identity, the discrepancy that makes money, painting, and, ultimately, persons possible. But how are persons possible? Or, to put the question in its most general form, how is representation possible?

The doubleness of past contradictory identities is replicated in the doubleness of their representation. Deconstruction of past doubleness goes hand in hand with the duality inherent in any historical reconstruction in the present as representation.

The issue dividing the two authors appears to be less politics than problematics, less disciplinary affiliation than the degree of commitment to realism as the basis for contextual construction. Whereas Agnew constructs too unproblematically a context from the viewpoint of postmodernist theorists, Michaels construes his texts too problematically from the standpoint of traditional or modernist historians. Whereas Michaels fuses his interpretations with those in his sources in such a way that traditional historians cannot tell which text is whose, Agnew, to the consternation of postmodernists, implies that the interpretations in, as well as of, his sources exist outside his textualization of their context.

Thus the search for a new historicized cultural studies still leads all too often to the old dilemmas even as the field tries to cope with the implications of the new trends in the human sciences. Even from a supposedly new contextualist position, historians' own texts continue to describe the relation of power to changing past times and to their own present-day professional conflicts according to old unproblematic contextualist premises. The conflictual model of society and politics that grounds the supposed mediation of the various versions of context in the new contextualism basic to so much of the new cultural studies in history frequently rests upon a very traditional form of historical textualization while propounding a radical message politically. From the textualist position the forms of these supposedly new textualizations seem as familiar as the forms of those produced by the old historical practice. Must all who would mediate between the polar positions in historicization therefore remystify as they demystify, reconstruct as they deconstruct, reify as they rematerialize, politicize as they poeticize according to traditional historical methodology? Or can—will—the new cultural studies create new varieties of historicization to match its efforts to resolve the seeming contradictions of the poetics of context?

CHAPTER NINE

Reflexive
(Con)Textualization

JUST as voice and viewpoint in histories ought to be multiple, so the practice of history as discourse ought to be reflexive. Any version of historical discourse should apply to itself at least as well as it does to those sources resulting in historical textualizations in the first place. Any theorization of historical practice ought to explain itself as well as it does its oppositional discourses. Under a reflexive approach to the problems of historicization, the New Historicist motto "a reciprocal concern with the historicity of texts and the textuality of history" or the anthropological advice about the historicization of culture and the culturalization of history take on a double meaning, and, more important, a double application. But the more reflexive historical textualization becomes, the more interesting and challenging it is to practice, whether as reading and reviewing or as writing and teaching. What reflexive (con)textualization entails as a discursive practice is easy enough to conceive. How to embody it in a new kind of textualization is far more difficult to envision. My use of parentheses around the first syllable is intended to indicate the double goal embraced by a reflexive representation of history.

A Basic Guide

A useful starting point in considering how reflexivity might apply to historical discourse is a list devised by James Clifford on the ways in which ethnographic writing is "determined." Each element in the list at once complements and uses the others; all are implicated with one another. Each also has implications for both writing and teaching, reading and reviewing history. Context. Since context refers to both the context within constructed histories as they represent the past as history and the context of historians within
their own time as they write these histories, should not historians in their works and teachers in their classrooms construct their textualizations so as to show their audience how these dual contexts constrain, maybe determine, or at least co-create each other through and in what is textualized? Even though in each case the context is author constructed in terms of both method and discourse, such textual decisions ought to be made manifest by how the various constitutions of context(ualization) relate to one another in a text. Reflexive contextualization requires multiple and explicit contexts in a history to represent the interaction between present-day intertextual ways of (con)textualizing and presenting the past contextualized as a history text. To what extent can this multiple contextualization be resolved through the inclusion of multiple viewpoints? Since contextualization denotes different methodologies depending upon choices about rhetorical and social construction of reality, poetics and politics, and the other reflexive dilemmas confronting, and confounding, the human sciences, should not historians and teachers discuss their choices explicitly as they constitute them in their textualizations? Any new forms of contextualization and narrativization demand that the Great Story and the subtext become a more explicit part of the actual textualization in practice.

Since a historical textualization both "draws from and creates meaningful social milieux," then the reader and reviewer must examine not only how the context is constructed within a history as explicit or subtextual past story or Great Story but also the degree to which and how the context of the historian’s own time of writing is inscribed in the discursive practice(s) of the text. If context is constructed and (con)textualization is methodologically arbitrary, then how does an author or teacher go about it in each instance? Just as past histories serve as contextual sources for today’s histories, present histories serve as intertextual sources as well as contextual dialogue for each other. What assumptions about the intra-, inter-, and extratextual as context does any given history make? Does the text image its own context(ualization) from a reflexive dual perspective?

Rhetoric. Rhetorical reflexivity would seem to demand more than the self-conscious self-revelation of choices of, and among, stylistic and persuasive possibilities in a text, important as that may be. The reflexive application of poetics and rhetoric to textualization requires their self-criticism at the same time as they shape the text(ualization). Historical textualization therefore requires the deconstruction of its story and argument by and through its (re)construction. New historicizations need to decompose their structures of expression for their readers at the same time as they compose a history as content. A reflexive textualization should incorporate its countertext as part of the created text.

If a textualization both "uses and is used by expressive conventions," then readers and reviewers must look to how the structures of expression shape as well as express the structures of argument and narrative in a text. Investigation of explicit expression employs such rhetorical categories as style, figuration, and order of the presentation, or what I have called the psychologic of presentation (in contradistinction to its logic). To read and review the role of narrative is to examine content and expression as narratology, rhetoric, and poetics. In the surface content of the narrative, the appropriate categories include analysis of plot, use and depiction of time, story line, event, actor, voice, viewpoint, and reader reception. Such analysis can combine formalist, more processual, and reader-oriented approaches. To examine the expression of the narrative in histories is to review how the story is presented or history is represented, not only through motifs, metaphors, choice of language and tenses, and other explicit aspects but also through more implicit prefigurative structures.

Since the deeper structure of the nonnarrative and narrative sides of history come together, because plots, stories, and metastories ground them either textually or subtextually, certain questions can be asked of both kinds of history. From whose viewpoint does the author tell the story or make the argument? How does the author emplot (or organize) the underlying narrative (conceived broadly)? What story or logic does the author employ to move the argument or narrative forward? Of what larger Great Story does the text or interpretation presume its story to be a part? Do the beginning and end points build in certain biases in the making of the argument?

At bottom, how does the author view the nature of history as a way or means of representing the past? The reader and reviewer cannot accept at face value what historians themselves announce is their degree of intervention between their own textual constructions and the texts they postulate and construct. Both the extent and the theory of that intervention ought to be examined. Authors’ full disclosure statements need to be compared with what their texts conceal as they construct arguments and stories. What foundational dilemmas show as tensions in a text? Is the subtext consistent with the text? Are Great Stories assumed but not avowed or explicated, let alone "proved"?

Genre. Since historians present their textualizations in such a way as to distinguish them from those of other genres, how does a text embody the conventions of the history genre? Genre conventions apply in two ways: first, among kinds of histories in the profession itself (such as economic, religious, and political or local, national, or other); and, second, between history and other kinds of textualizations in other disciplines or in the larger world. In the first case, does genre affect how discourses are represented as history? In the second instance, ought historical discourses to maintain strict separation between professional histories and other kinds of historicizations, including historical fiction and films as well as lay and oral histories? Or have teachers, students, and readers moved beyond such distinctions as artificial? Ought
therefore every history to reveal how it constituted itself as a genre or specific subgenre? Does reflexive (con)textualization, like the incorporation of multiple voices and viewpoints, demand a new approach to historicization best served by a new narrative model? To what extent should narrativization of history draw inspiration from postmodern and metafictional novels and other genres and media?²

Readers and reviewers must inquire how a history constitutes itself as a genre. To what extent does a historical textualization draw on other genres as sources, and how are these other genres used? How is that history distinguished from those other genres? Does the history hierarchize these other genres in its own construction to enhance its own authority? How does any given history differentiate itself, say, from a historical novel or a diary or from the philosophy of history or historical sociology? Does the fact that major scholarly journals in history now review films, oral histories, and museum exhibitions in addition to books as historical representations mean that traditional distinctions among textualizations have been eroded or abandoned entirely? More important, in examining historical representations how far do these reviews depart from the traditional emphasis on referentiality?⁶

Institutions. If one writes, teaches, reads, and reviews "within, and against, specific traditions, disciplines, audiences," then what obligation does a text(ualization) have to reveal explicitly, in addition to incorporating implicitly, these social arrangements and cultural conventions in the text(ualization) itself? To what degree ought historians and teachers to make explicit the metahistorical foundations of their disciplinary practices and premises? Should writers and teachers confess their professional allegiances and their interpretive communities as part of their textualization? If historians seek to create a critical, that is, active, audience, what mechanisms must be invented for writer and reader/reviewer, teacher and student to collaborate through the text itself? Can such cooperation provide the basis for new kinds of historical textualizations?⁷

Since "one writes within, and against, specific traditions, disciplines, audiences," then readers and reviewers should examine not only the interpretation of the text but also the interpretive community that makes "sense" of that way of interpreting matters. How do that interpretation and interpretive community relate to other interpretive communities in academia and in society? How, in short, is a history as a text determined by, and by what and whose, institutionally organized discursive practices? To what extent and how does a text reveal its author's multiple social locations? What textual forms and professional interpretations are resisted by argument, by example, or by silence?

Politics. If "the authority to represent cultural [and historical] realities is unequally shared and at times contested" within a profession, within a nation, and within the larger world, then how does a historical textualization handle these problems reflexively? Ought not the inequalities that ground that authority to become an explicit part of any historical representation? If politics pervades all aspects of historical textualization, then should not the full disclosure statement include the politics of historicization itself in addition to any customary confession of political choices according to the conventions of "real world" politics? Writers and teachers (and reviewers) should reveal their multiple social locations in addition to their political affiliation as pertinent to an understanding of their textualizations. Such statements include the roles of gender, generation, religion, ethnicity, and profession in the making of a text. Is such full disclosure possible, and what form ought it to take? At a minimum, the customarily perfunctory full disclosure statements in the prefaces of normal histories ought to be transformed into a major integral, dialectical, and explicit framework of the entire textualized enterprise of any new reflexive historicization. Should not the politics of historicization be the subject as much as the politics of the real world are the object of historical text(ualization)?

With the distinctions drawn earlier between critical history and historical criticism, between the political uses of the medium and the politics of the message in the medium, we can begin to see what the job of the critical reader and reviewer entails. From this standpoint, the chief goal is to demystify normal historical authority as it is embodied in customary methods of textualization. To that end, critical reading and reviewing must explore a text's foundational premises and politics of disciplinary discursive practice in addition to its explicit or subtextual stories and arguments. Thus historians must consider the premises and politics of interpretation as an intellectual process as well as what politics and premises show up in those interpretations, the premises and politics behind certain methods as well as what politics and premises are explicit in the results of those methods, the premises and politics of historical methodology in general as well as what premises and politics are fostered by that methodology. They must explore how the premises and politics of a Great Story ground a history as well as what is told in the Great Story, and whether the premises and politics of the ideal of a Great Past pervade a text. To accomplish these aims, historians must be alert to the philosophy and politics grounding professional authority as well as skirmishes over philosophy and politics in the profession. To be aware of the politics of approaches that historians share with other modern human science disciplines requires interest in the political and philosophical debates in and among the disciplines.

History. Both multiculturalism and reflexivity remind us that the notion of history itself, particularly as professional history, is culturally provincial. To what extent should the debates I discuss in this book, and even this book itself, be labeled disciplinary, North American, anglophone, or Eurocentric? To enclose the word history in quotation marks to indicate its parochial
provenience does not resolve the many problems of constructing a historical representation. Any historical textualization ought to situate itself historically as well as it does other histories or the past as history.

If "all of the above conventions and constraints are changing" and all historical practices and texts are specific to particular places and times, then must any reflexive historicization lead to an overt discussion of how a topic is contextualized, rhetoricized, and politicized as it is historicized in light of its own time in history? Does reflexivization of historical discourses lead to radical historicization as self-confessed, self-revealing text(ualization)s?

Because historical practices and texts are specific to particular places and times, reviews should situate a text in the context(s) of the many social sites that generated it. The reading and reviewing of histories must be as reflexive to their own times as they are alert to the reflexive problems of historicizing the past in general.

To Clifford's list let me add:

Ethics. Whereas politics emphasizes as it embraces the "is" of power and social relations, ethics stresses as it envisages the "ought" of those relationships. Systems of ethics deal with criteria for good and bad conduct of individuals and their institutions. Such individual and institutional ethical levels may be translated into the effects of micro and macro systems of power according to postmodernist theory, but the ethical question remains: what ought to be the role of power in the lives of people? As a result of concerns about macropower, ethics also embraces theories of what the state ought to be. In answering how one ought to live and what are the desirable modes of conduct for individuals and relations among individuals, should the historian promote oppositional efforts to hegemonic power and discourse and valorize multiplicity and otherness? To what degree are these ethical problems as well as political premises?

Historians particularly confront the dilemma of contextual versus absolute ethics. Should their texts espouse a transcultural, transhistorical ethics regardless of what their historical actors believed or practiced, or should they relativize ethical choices in texts to the times they represent? Whose system of ethics, then or now, should judge the horrors of slavery or the Holocaust? Ought not a commitment to freedom, equality, and diversity supersede any concern about present-mindedness in a history? Can historians espouse the social and cultural relativization of all knowledge through social location(s) and all institutions through social construction(s) and at the same time disavow ethical relativism?

If multiculturalist ideals are to be realized, then ethics must embrace a set of questions about how justice and equity will be achieved in a new pluralistic or multiculturalist society. For communities to be based upon the acceptance as well as the recognition of diversity, how and what kinds of differences should be sanctioned? If, as Joan W. Scott argues, conflict need not be re-
solved and consensus need not be achieved in an ideal multicultural society, then what rules must be accepted by the members of a community to achieve that society? Should there be no limits to efforts to achieve subgroup unity and representation in the name of the ideals of decentralization and self-determination? To what degree must a multicultural society depend upon a consensual etiquette of proper behavior to achieve its goals? As Jane Flax raises the issue of justice and power in terms of postmodernist theorizing, how can intergroup and intrasocietal let alone cross-societal conversations escape totalizing discourses? In discussing this problem, she raises questions about how to resolve conflicts among competing voices, how to give everyone a chance to speak, how to ensure that every voice counts equally, how to guarantee preference for speaking over force, and how to compensate for the unequal distribution and control of power.

How, in other words, can a middle ground be found between the center(s) and the margin(s) in a society? To what extent must historians erect their histories on such a middle ground between past practices and future hopes, if they are committed to multicultural ideals?

Reviewers and readers use their own ethics to evaluate those of others. What are the ethics of the text, and from whose perspective and interests do they proceed? Are ethical positions espoused from the center or the margins of a society? Do the ethics follow from the politics of the topic or from the social location of the author? Are the judgments explicit in the discourse or implicit in its textualization? Are the ethics absolute to all times or relative to those of past actors? Does the text criticize past actors and actions for their unethical practices or use past ideals to impugn present practices? Are there any connections among conceptual, cultural, and moral relativisms in the text? Is the text self-reflexive, hence self-revelatory of its ethical choices? Are the reader and reviewer aware and self-revelatory of their own ethical choices in exploring those of the text? Must readings and reviews of histories therefore be constructed upon the same middle ground of past politics and future hopes as those histories that would be multicultural?

Theories, Models, Images

Parallel to and implicated in the preceding list of ways in which reflectivity applies in and to a historical textualization is another one of what and how theory applies to and is applied in historical discourses. Theory, discursive practice, and historical representation are all intertwined, of course, and so their relationship(s) ought to be shown in a text.

The word "theory," however, conceals many kinds of theories in historical and other disciplinary practices. Theory therefore is not only divided by theory against theory but also by disciplinary genre. What literary critics call
theory does not figure prominently in much of social science theory or vice versa, even when they at times carry the same general names. Literary theories are categorized under such rubrics as Russian formalism, reader reception or audience orientation, feminism, deconstruction, Freudianism, New Historicism, and genre theory. Social theory, if we take those in sociology as an example, has such designations as conflict, exchange, functionalist, neofunctionalist, structurationist, evolutionary, symbolic interactionist, behavioral, human ecology, and ethnomethodology. Even when various disciplinary schools of theory carry the same general designation and seem inspired by the same general outlook and assumptions, they differ greatly in content and application. Although critical theory, Marxist, post- and neo-Marxist, phenomenological, structuralist and poststructuralist, and even postmodernist schools exist in both literary and social theory, the resemblance between what is argued and how it is applied often extends little beyond the name. Likewise, what we might call philosophical theories embrace still another disciplinary genre and show quite other concerns, content, and application. Because of this variety, theories ought always to be reflexive in how and why they originated and are applied.

Late or high modernists and postmodernists dispute the very role and nature of theory. Thus debate over the nature of theory generates its own theories. What is the status of the language in which a theory is expressed vis-à-vis the rest of language? Is it a superior metalanguage or on the same level as any other kind of language usage? Modernists enshrine scientific methods and explanatory models as the best way to produce knowledge. Postmodernists, in contrast, prefer story-telling and demystification as major ways of approaching knowledge; they deny that either Science or Literature is a privileged linguistic realm. High modernists idealize context-free theory and knowledge; postmodernists believe that all theory, like all knowledge, applies to, just as it is generated from, specific social and temporal locations. As a result of these differences, whether theory can exist is as much debated as it is generated from, specific social and temporal locations. Is anything not socially generated in today's theories, be they literary or social scientific? Some notion of the social matrix is employed in both modernist and postmodernist theorizing. But what is the social according to each? Is society a product, or is sociality a process? Is a society composed of social nexuses or networks, or is it cultural and discursive practices, or what? Are some parts of a society more determining than others of what happens in it? Can a society be viewed as whole or a totality? How does a society reproduce itself, and how was that arrangement produced in the first place? Should the history of a society be represented as stages, or can it only be compiled as a sum of what happened? Does the notion of a society have its own history just like the society itself? What relation exists between the social construction of what is social and cultural in the past and in the present of the historian in characterizing that society?

Contextualization according to some theory or model of social matrix always presents the problem of aggregating individual actions, experiences, and the like into some grouping or subject position. Just who and what determines the membership of groupings or subject positions assumed along the social fissures of sex, class, generation, race, politics, and so on? How can the historian know of a grouping if it is truly repressed? Should counter-hegemonic statements be accepted at face value and as representative of a grouping or subject position? What relationship exists between past and present experience(s) and discourse(s)? How should historians organize their representations of the organization of society? These are more than problems of historical nominalism and methodological individualism or collectivism, relevant as they are to any social theorizing. Rather the problems arise from commitment to multiculturalism and multiple viewpoints.

Where modernism and postmodernism diverge most dramatically is in the application of viewpoint: from whose viewpoint is the social matrix, past as well as present, to be constructed in a textualization? Modernism generally seeks some (single) overview of the social field, whether it is conceived as
contested terrain or otherwise. For postmodernism, such overviews ultimately proceed from someone's partial perspective. Multiculturalists prefer either the views from the margin or the juxtaposition of multiple views. Views from the margins, like those from the center, still are constructed as single, univocal models, no matter what their ostensible goal. How well any textualization of the social matrix can achieve multiplicity of voices and viewpoints in its representation of others as it represents the interplay of those voices and viewpoints remains to be seen. From whose viewpoint can a society be seen as a field of conflicting, usually unequal, forces, interests, ideologies, always volatile and contingent? Even if the notion of a social matrix is historicized, the problem remains. Is not the very notion of society as contested terrain ultimately only a construction of, and according to, a monological viewpoint? Such a monological viewpoint produces, as it lies at the heart of, totalization, a vision of a society as a total whole, even if represented as interrelated parts.

In exploring and critiquing a historical text for its models of society as groupings and institutional nexuses, the reader and reviewer might ask some of the following questions: What does the author presume about the nature of social, economic, political, religious, educational, familial, or other arrangements in the society being examined? How are social groupings and the subject positions and the relationships among them determined? Are social and economic or political and cultural arrangements considered more basic and determining in what happens historically? Does the historian presume a society completely homogeneous or heterogeneous, composed of interconnected or unrelated parts? Does the society have few or many sites of contestation? If multiple sites of contestation, does the text presume consensus or conflict within the subgroups? Does the society have classes as well as groups or subject positions? How does the author see the particular society, culture, or time as coming into being, and how does that society, culture, or time reproduce itself according to the author's arguments? Are the answers to these questions provided by representations of social and cultural arrangements as persons, practices, processes, or structures through time? Is social construction of the context in a text historically dynamic and yet reflexive at the same time?

Readers and reviewers should explore to what extent a theory or model of society is used as explanation for what happened in the text. How complex and explicit is the model? Does an author (or teacher) present supporting evidence or only theory in her or his exposition of these explanatory social arrangements? To ask what is presumed about the state, the economy, or the social organization in a text exposes political and moral uses as well as models, for they are often inextricably connected in an argument or a story.  

Theories of self/body/person. Not long ago these theories would have been designated theories of human nature and behavior. That the notion of human nature today is attributed to the Enlightenment project does not end a basic theoretical concern for how human beings operate as individual persons. Even those who repudiate any universalist or essentialist character to all humans alike, especially according to male-centered models, must still base their arguments on some theory of persons as individuals. These kinds of theories inquire into the psychology rather than the sociology of humans, the role of desire and will and agency in human behavior and affairs. To proclaim the death of the subject as author or originator of actions and thoughts denies bourgeois conceptions of the individual as the basic unit of political and ethical analysis. But does such a proclamation take adequate account of persons as self-constituted subjects, as agents critical of their own societies, or as actors seeking social change? Is there a prelinguistic or presocietal self that shapes human destinies and preserves some vestige of autonomy for persons as selves? Do the body and the heart have their own cunning, or is that an essentialist view? If individuals cannot make themselves, can they remake their society?  

Today it seems artificial to separate human beings as individuals from collections of them as groups, societies, and cultures. That individuals are considered projections of their society and its culture(s) problematizes such standard categories in historical discourse as experience, intention, motivation, and even memory and desire. This is true of individuals in and as subcultures or subgroups no matter how categorized along the social fissures of gender, race, class, and the like. Do scholars from both within or outside a given subgroup attribute experiences and motivations too common to the grouping as a social collectivity, making too little allowance for persons as individuals? If so, must some multiculturalist textualizations of groupings be revised? Is this a problem of vestigial humanism, as some argue, or is it a fundamental problem of methodological and theoretical choice, as others maintain?

Do multiple and conflicting locations of persons mitigate or problematize enough or too much the oversocialized model of human beings? The problem becomes one of specifying the tightness of fit between individual persons multiply located in a society or culture, in a subgroup or subculture and what remains analytically after the socialization or enculturation—the social and cultural construction—of persons in the use of their bodies and any self-creation as individuals. Thus the (over)socialized image of humans not only questions the sources of individual persons' motivations but the efficacy of the resulting behavior and the ability to make themselves. Creative or outstanding individuals are reduced to the context that explains them. By reducing the Great Man or Hero in History to social explanation, the (over)socialized model challenges all who would seek the uniqueness of ideas, artifacts, and actions. The limitations of the oversocialized model concern not only those who investigate the creators of texts and other cultural artifacts as authors, artists, and scholars but even-those who write political and other
kinds of biographies. In the end, the issues seem not to be whether human beings are plastic or autonomous, socialized or self-created, diverse or common, but how much of each under what circumstances and according to whose theory. Arguing about such theories requires employing the very same theories as the basis of the argument or narrative.

For those scholars who impugn the humanist model of the autonomous individual as a bourgeois social invention, what is their conception of the moral agency of their readers and students? To what extent can the persons they appeal to in their demystification and deconstruction of traditional theory read and, more important, act on their messages if they do not possess some individuality? Do not those antihumanist scholars who write of the social and discursive construction of individual motivation, intention, and experience direct their moral lessons to the very kind of individuals they deny can exist in their theory and politics? Are they not appealing to reason, feeling, imagination, or morals of individuals apart from those common to their groupings? Must not scholars seeking social transformation postulate an individual or group of individuals who can reason, make moral decisions, and act somewhat independently of their society in order for emancipatory politics to work?

For readers and reviewers theories of self/body/person still sometimes show up in histories as attributions of human nature and behavior as opposed to social explanation. To what extent does a text assume that all human beings are alike over time in their interests, outlooks, and capacities or that they vary by gender, class, times, and cultures? Does the author, in other words, presume a human nature that is universal or one that is a cultural and temporal creation? Are certain desires, drives, and interests considered common to all or even to a group of human beings, or do these vary by individual, by culture, by time? Does, for example, a text assume that (most, all) human beings prefer to maximize happiness, minimize pain? Are subgroupings essentialized by gender, race, class, generation, or otherness? To what extent are humans constrained by their culture or society or times, and to what extent are they or at least some of them free to create what they will and desire? Does society, in the author's opinion, create human beings and their actions, or vice versa? What theories, models, or images ground the creation of individual selves or the control of their bodies in a text?

Theories of power/domination and the state. Theories of power, domination, and the state, as applied both to social theory in general and to politics and ethics in particular, emphasize political science and political theory, broadly conceived, as opposed to social and psychological theory. These themes focus on what is the political. Is it only the public realm, or is the personal also political, as early feminist theorists argued? Given the patriarchally imposed divisions between the male and female spheres, power and politics, like production and reason, were allocated solely to the male realm, and (male) historians sanctioned these dichotomies in their texts. That is why Foucault's notion of micro levels of power as opposed to the macrostructure of the state was so liberating to so many previously untheorized social groupings excluded under the old hegemonic dichotomies in human science theorization and historical textualization.

On the macro level, what is the polity or state? The relationship between micro and macro levels remains controversial, as Foucault's critics so often point out. To posit a connection among policy, police, knowledge, discipline, and disciplines in a society also presumes awareness and knowledge of the several levels of connections. All too many discussions of domination and hegemony fail to specify precisely how what they examine fits into any larger system, just as those who so often explicate macrostructures omit the micro levels that would lend their exposition complexity and credence. Disciplinary and other kinds of politics pervade political models of the state and the choice of macro versus micro systems of power. The most obvious models concern the various ways of picturing the state. For example, should capitalist states be depicted according to pluralist, managerial, or power elite models in the distribution of power among citizens/subjects?

How to view the political remains in contention between modernist and postmodernist theorists. From what and whose perspective is politics or a political matrix to be represented? As with the notion of a social matrix in general, whether the view should come from center, margins, or outside divides the two camps. Postmodernists deny the possibility of any outside, Archimedean view of the system as a whole, while the modernists accuse the postmodernists of assuming what they ought to prove about the linkages they assert. To historicize the political does not specify the viewpoint from which to construct the (hi)story of a political matrix. Historical contextualization of politics and political systems ought to be reflexive in that not only does the present result from the past but also the theoreticizations of the past and present create each other as and through the political matrix and its levels.

Once again readers and reviewers must ascertain what an author or teacher argues explicitly or implicitly about the structures of power and the means of social control, domination, and cultural hegemony. What choices were made among models of micro and macro structures of power, and how do they affect or shape the argument and story? Does the author presume that consensual agreement or conflict is natural within social groups, among them, or in the overall workings of a society? Is the author a pluralist, viewing power as widely distributed throughout the society, or a power elitist, who sees a small, integrated group as dominating the society? Do theories or ethics ground an author's choice of pluralism or diversity in textualizing politics? What in a text's representation of these matters is univocal and political in discussing the political?
Theories of explanation/causation/motivation. Why something happened when it did and where it did is frequently explained by the what and how of social arrangements and the who of subgroups and individuals. In other words, explanation occurs through social causation or individual motivation. In the end, what kinds of explanation ought to be used in historical textualizations are also a matter of what constitutes proper forms and kinds of explanation. Although social and individual explanations depend upon the social sciences and psychology, what constitutes proper explanation is claimed as the province of philosophy. Is the only proper kind of explanation derived from universal generalizations issuing forth in lawlike statements, as was once argued, or do interpretation and narration also explain, as the opponents of the scientific model argue? High modernist theorists debated these issues, and older philosophy of history books framed their arguments accordingly. In line with the criteria for scientific explanation, quantitative and social science historians foregrounded their explicit models and methodologies in their texts. With the increasing return to narrative in history writing, explicit explanatory models of all kinds are all too often suppressed as they were earlier, woven into the story as foundational or as background without explicit discussion.

Some argue that the concept of causation is being lost in modern scholarship. The more societies are represented as multiple sites of contestation and the more knowledges are situated, the more difficult it is to aggregate historical agency and to explain connectedness. The more pluralized a society and the more fragmentary its groupings, the more difficult it is to characterize and explain connections. The more historically and spatially specific the description, the less general the explanation and the harder to provide a broader context. Indeterminacy results from conceiving diversity as pluralism because equal structural weights are given to multiple factors. To affirm or deny such explanatory equality is a political as well as a methodological decision. Determinacy, on the other hand, frequently presumes what it often fails to examine let alone prove.

Nevertheless connections, even if conceived only as chance and contingency, are as necessary in constituting emplotment by narrative as they are in providing explanation by argument. To value diversity without privileging a viewpoint among those in competition is to fall into narrative as well as explanatory and political relativism. Hence both multiple time series and micro/macro structures/processes pose narrative as well as conceptual and political problems, because they erode traditional approaches to causation. Both assert connections within a series but not across series. Accordingly, as I discuss below under new approaches to time, they challenge traditional narrative and explanation in historical discourses.

When readers and reviewers turn to matters of social and individual explanation in historical textualization, they investigate a series of basic questions.

One set concerns to what extent changes stemmed from willed human agency, that is, from goal-oriented human action individually or collectively. Such explanations center upon reason and rational actions, intention, motivation, or other explanations connected to persons acting as individuals and in groups. A second set looks to change coming from unanticipated consequences of deliberate actions or from larger forces or structures working upon or through human beings. Whether structures work through or upon humans collectively divides theorists even when they try to reconcile the two extremes. This second set uses explanations generated by the preceding models of society, culture, and politics. A third set centers upon images or models of human nature and causation. Does the author presume that human beings change their ways and outlooks easily or that they are fundamentally hostile to change? Can humans change their circumstances easily or only with difficulty? Philosophy of history books treat the theories of historical explanation in general, but those books discussing various models of explanation, causation, and motivation in the social sciences might prove the more useful guides if read with this larger purpose in mind. Does a text present some sort of big picture of what caused what, or does the author eschew such grand causation and explanation in favor of “description”? Whichever the option, how does the author know what is claimed or asserted?

Theories of epistemology and ontology. Whether modernism stressed how we can know and postmodernism examines what we can know as one scholar claims, both epistemology and ontology continue to pose problems for historical discourse in general and in particular. Are the kinds and conditions of knowing any more difficult in historical methodology than in other fields of knowledge because of the peculiar combination of an absent past and the intent to (re)construct it? To what degree can historical method obviate the well-known problems of adducing historical knowledge? In general, what theories of knowledge do historians share with other scholars as their approach to social reality? In this latter question epistemology and ontology concern not so much matters of evidence and proof or even of “facts” as what is accepted as given or needing no proof in a discourse and why. From this standpoint, then, it is epistemological and ontological concerns that ground the debates in the profession over rhetorical and social construction of reality and over the politics of poetics and vice versa. In both debates, postmodernists and modernists agree that it is difficult to practice history, but they invoke different reasons for the difficulty.

In the end, any textualization, any discourse, any scholar must make some commitment about what is real, what is fictional, and what is hypothetical in a represented world. Such a commitment is never more obvious than in what is allowed and considered acceptable or proper as explanation—especially as seen in choices between secular or sacred causes, idealist or materialist models. Even those who deconstruct or deny traditional Western epistemologies
and ontologies ground their cases upon some theory of how and what they can know or assert as the basis of their textualization.

Why privilege one’s own explanation as the correct or best one over others in the competition of belief systems? What are the politics of a theory of knowledge from the perspective of social explanation? Social "facts" are not "out there" in the same sense as tables and chairs, even if one subscribes to a material basis for language. Rather, they are socially and culturally constructed, and it is this circumstance that produces the epistemological and ontological problems of historical discourse. Does social and cultural knowing in human societies manifest itself in performance, and is it therefore best studied as praxis? What implications does such a theory of practice have for historical textualization(s)? Even if the dialectical interplay between social subject and social object co-creates the knowledge, not all subjects are equal in the construction of societal knowledge, as the notion of hegemony implies. Controlling the construal of knowledge as "reality" or at least "common sense" grounds the conflict between hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses. The idea of ideology once postulated a clear distinction between truth and those beliefs fostering the interests of the elite. That distinction presumed a more definite knowledge of a real world apart from social and cultural construction(s) of it than social explanation can now claim. Should scholars nevertheless privilege oppositional discourses and marginal groupings' knowledges as better epistemic guides to social reality? Such a viewpoint on the epistemology of social knowledge transforms social ontology into politics and discursive theory into ethics.

Once again, the basic divisions between modernist and postmodernist focus on viewpoint. Feminist theorists complained that traditional (male dominated) epistemology postulated a single godlike viewpoint as the consciousness proper to all knowers as perceivers and conceivers. They countered that a situated epistemology acknowledged multiple not single sites of knowledge, local not universal applications, fragmented not unified viewpoints, specific not general criteria of what constitutes knowledge. Postmodernist theorists deny the superiority of abstraction over concrete experience and of universality over historically and socially situated knowledges. In other words, the postmodernist view postulates diverse epistemic communities as various interpretative communities. These epistemic communities set the conflicting paradigmatic criteria of how to know and what to know.

Are standard approaches to epistemology peculiar to Western philosophy and history, part of the logoscentrism that Derrida historicized and relativized by deconstructing its premises? If so, then does reflexive historicization investigate how past and present epistemologies and ontologies created each other as Western thinkers invented them? As part of the process, according to many feminist epistemologists, they divided fact from theory and value in the name of objectivity, defined abstraction as superior to the concrete, and valued the rational over the emotional—all in the name of advancing male-defined knowledge through male-dominated philosophy. Who writes this history, like who decides these questions, is a matter of hegemony. Must it only be a matter of politics, or can it also be a matter of ethics? Should the Great Story of this history of philosophy be told as philosophy or as history, as epistemology or as the history of ideas and concepts?

If what one knows results from how one knows, then do multiple epistemic communities result in multiple realities? One of the dilemmas of multicultural textualizations stems from the relation of the ontological claims of others to those of the textualizer. In what one might call the Golden Rule of cross-cultural ontology, R. S. Khare argues that one must privilege others' truths as one would have others privilege one's own. Such a rule demands respect for the authenticity, the validity, and the authority of others' knowledges, truths, and worldviews. Does such a principle also demand new forms of textualization as it denies the usual efforts to relativize others' beliefs to one's own in the textualization through overall viewpoint? Applied to history, does such a rule presume plural pasts?

Readers and reviewers of histories in the end juxtapose their theories of epistemology and ontology with those of the texts they explore. To what extent are past actors' truths accepted as true by the historian and by the reader and reviewer in turn? Are there universal ways of perceiving and knowing or only local and temporally specific ways of knowing? Whose way or what epistemic community is accepted as the basis for such judgments? Do all intellectual categories have their own histories and therefore pose reflexive problems in their use by historians? What does the text accept as given and needing no proof or argument in relation to reality, and how is historical reality divided from fictional history, ideology, and propaganda according to the author? What does the text assert explicitly in these matters, and what is implicit and silent but necessary to its representation of matters in the past? Is knowledge socially or rhetorically constructed and construed by the text, by the reader and reviewer? Must readers and reviewers accept multiple realities and conflicting perspectives as foundational to historicization if they would be multicultural? In the end, readers and reviewers must ask themselves the same question they put to the authors they read: how do they know what they assert and assume in their texts?

Theories of language. Historians use or presume a theory of language in all phases of their practice: in deriving facts from evidence, in combining facts into a synthesis, and in reading history as a Great Story. To what extent should the language of documents be read as directly representative, symbolically analogous, arbitrarily self-contained, or otherwise in constructing the context of the documents? What theory or theories of language prevailed in past worlds, and how does knowledge of those theories both aid and problematize the reading of evidence? What semiotic stand should historians take?
in their textualizations of histories and of history itself as a Great Story? How reflexive should such theories of language be in the presentation of the past as history? History as text signifies itself through its own constitution, as it is constructed as and through a discourse.

If the working fiction of (a) history is that it is true and factual, then the working fiction of (a) language is that all its categories are universal and timeless in application. If history is a construction about a past reality through language, then language is a construction about a present reality according to current usage in some group. Such paradoxes exacerbate the problems of reflexive historical discourse and textualization. If language cannot be a neutral medium, can historical reflexivity get beyond word games? Is the ultimate limit of reflexivity language itself? What are the reflexive implications of such a view for historical textualizations?

Should the nature of language be considered the proper or best model for theorizing the social world, a world that the proponents of such an approach say language cannot represent well or at all? Should linguistic models image systems of human knowledge and behavior as language loses its ability to refer? Throughout most of the twentieth century, epistemological and ontological questions have been transmuted into problems about language and meaning. For example, F. R. Ankersmit in establishing the nature of the historical representation denies that any of the normal theories of truth—correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, or performative—apply in determining the "truth" of a historical narrative. These theories rest on what philosophers assume about the ability of language to convey knowledge and represent reality. Thus modernists and postmodernists alike debate whether the nature of facts, structures of interpretations, and Great Stories in historical discourse should or can be modeled on systems of language as they differ over the relations among signifiers, signified, and referents.

The paradox of language talking about language comes down to the ability of a language to represent the world. Hayden White summarizes four general possibilities of relating words, worldviews, and the world: "(1) a manifestation of causal relationships governing the world of things in which it arises, in the mode of an index; (2) a representation of that world, in the mode of an icon (or mimesis); (3) a symbol of that world, in the mode of an analogue, natural or culture-specific, as the case might be; (4) simply another among those things that populate the human world, but more specifically a sign system, that is, a code bearing no necessary, or 'motivated' relation to that which it signifies." Might not these different theories of language and referent apply differently to the realms of the physical, social, and conceptual worlds—or at least in different ratios when referring to physical objects, social conventions, and symbols?

Whether the scholar combines these theories to the extent possible or repudiates them for another approach, a theory of language is still relevant to how a text itself is put together in terms of what it purports to represent. Even an attempt to have language and social reality create each other through their mutual othernesses does not resolve the problems proceeding from language talking about language talking about reality in a text, historical or otherwise. If language is not simply a matter of referents, as some theorists maintain, then neither is it merely a matter of internal relations, as their arguments prove by their implied use of the medium if not by their explicit message.

Must a reflexive history become a history of semantics as it tries to represent a past world with words from both the present and the past? For example, the very words we employ for our categories of conceiving and describing our subject matter carry their own burden of conceptual baggage and political implications as a result of present interests combined with their historical development. Are the same words, let alone different words, as employed in different or oppositional political paradigms translatable into the same larger context as (meta)story, or must even the same words mean different things according to which (meta)story they are embedded in as they represent it? Must therefore crucial (critical?) words and all representations demand as many (meta)stories as there are paradigms for understanding them?

It is easier for readers and reviewers to examine what theories of language are used and how in a text than to use language to textualize their own efforts. What choices did an author make about the relation between language and its ability to represent the world? Neither readers nor reviewers (nor this writer) can step outside the universes of discourse that others inhabit. Ought readers and reviewers to reveal their own theories of language in addition to critiquing others' theories?

Theory of theories. Theories pose their own genre problems, including that of translation across genres. If the theories are considered incommensurate, then translation appears impossible. What is considered incommensurate, however, is also a matter of theory. Thus any theory should be reflexive, applying to and explaining itself at least as well as it claims to apply to and explain others.

All the kinds of theories underlying historical discourse are as interconnected in the conceptualization as in the practice of textualization. Even though some scholars today repudiate theory as totalizing or universalist when used explicitly, theories of various kinds implicitly ground even this new (anti)theory. Ought not historical textualizations therefore to make explicit the various problematics employed in explaining and narrating histories? Ought historians not to theorize about theories insofar as their texts exemplify them?

Greg Dening accomplishes a quite explicit reflexive interweaving of description and theory in Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent hand,
Marquesas, 1774–1880. Each chapter contains not only a chronological and topical history but also a “reflection” on a more abstract and general topic or model relevant to that history. Thus the chapter “Priests and Prophets” also contains a reflection “On Religious Change,” while the chapter on “Captains and Kings” includes a reflection “On Dominance.”

Suzanne Gearhart’s reflexive approach to theory in The Open Boundary of History and Fiction: A Critical Approach to the French Enlightenment offers another textual model as she explores the interaction between past and present in creating the forms of history. She complains that historians and other scholars historicize some “concepts,” “events,” “methods,” and “theories” while they accept uncritically and unhistorically others as givens, most notably “history” itself. Accordingly, she historicizes the boundary between history and fiction by comparing eighteenth- and twentieth-century theorizing about what constitutes rationality, genre, narrative, nature, idealism, empiricism, and other categories and concepts. In each chapter she discusses a French Enlightenment thinker and one or more modern “theorists” to compare their approaches to and thus destabilize the current paradigmatic premises underlying current historical practice. Thus she juxtaposes Voltaire with Foucault on reason and the irrational and with Hayden White and Gérard Genette on genre, and Montesquieu with Levi-Strauss on the Other and with Althusser on origins.

Since the nature and value of theory are at issue between modernists and postmodernists, how can historians evaluate the usefulness of theory, whether as model, image, metaphor, or otherwise, apart from this debate? Modernist criteria for a single best and right theory include comprehensiveness of application, descriptive richness, abstraction, conceptual generation, and perhaps quantifiability. Postmodern theorists challenge why theory should be defined as cognitive and therefore as knowledge while moral and aesthetic reasons are denied equal validity and authority; why scientific and universal approaches should be preferred over local stories and narrative histories; or why a single theory should be proclaimed the only right one. If theory cannot be as context-free as natural science pretended and the philosophy of science idealized as the scientific method, does disciplinary custom provide only the context of an interpretive community to gauge what is appropriate theory? To the extent that radical postmodernists treat the search for a metalinguistic theory as part of hegemonic discourses, then radical postmodernist theory ought to allow for multiple theories of what can constitute theory. The existence of multiple good theories seems to subvert good politics, however, in the eyes of those who believe that the only good theory is one critical of, even oppositional to, established (capitalistic) society. Can an antitotalizing theoretical stance depend upon a totalizing political standpoint?

If the status and nature of theory are at issue, ought not even the theory of theory to be reflexively explicit in the text? If theory is not cross-cultural or transhistorical, then is any use of theory therefore a topical or local convenience, a “guerrilla tactic,” as one scholar argues? Must it be either oppositional to or complicit with prevailing social arrangements? Must such guerrilla theorists accept certain kinds of theory to ground even their arguments about theory? If the content of a theory is considered cultural or historical, can this theory about the status of theory transcend its own demystification and historicization? If theory is denied transcultural and transhistorical foundations, can it be rescued as “orienting strategies” or sets of paradigmatic assumptions?

How these issues are resolved in a text constitutes the inquiry of readers and reviewers who would be reflexive in their theorization of others’ theories. How explicit are the texts on the theories that ground them? What kind of theory or theories are used? How systematic, how general, how comprehensive or inclusive, how testable and “objective” are they? Does the text employ theory on an ad hoc orientational basis, as local guerrilla tactics, or as transcultural, transhistorical generalizations? Readers and reviewers should make implicit theories, models, and metaphors explicit, and they should explore silences on social theories and images that are foundational to a historical textualization. What academic and other political purposes do theories serve in the contest over the status of theory, in the role of knowledge as power in modern society? What, in short, is a text’s ideology of theory? How explicit a role should readers and reviewers give their own theories of theory, if they would be reflexive in applying to and explaining their own textualizations about theories in others’ texts?

Toward New Historicizations

To these two series should be added at least one more, one that discusses what forms of representation a textualization might take in any new kind of reflexive historicization. The goal of this series, like that of the previous ones, is to make explicit the theories and practices of representation as they might be employed and exemplified in transformed historical discourses. This series therefore explores the possibilities of how medium and messages might combine to produce new forms of textualization in which the items in the previous two series come together in new ways. To the degree that a crisis of representation exists today, then theories of it as textualization ought to be reflexive also.

New options. If modernism and postmodernism, poetics and politics, textualism and contextualism question, even at times contradict, each other in their implications for historical discourse in the profession, they also reinforce each other in discrediting traditional historical practice. These contradictory implications not only suggest the limits, of normal historical practice as well
as of each other; they also point to some of the options available to those who would take a historic turn. Historians and others who would historicize in new ways face at least three basic options.

First, new historicizers can develop options along the axes of the textualist/poetics problematic. One choice within this option is to collapse history into metahistory and practice it as a form of historical criticism. Would that entail a revision of Carl Becker's old slogan to read "every man his own metahistorian"? Certainly the historian can explore the rhetorical configurations of historical texts and the modes of representation in and for themselves. It is unclear, however, that such an approach encompasses all that might be included under the rubric of what historicization embraces, important as it may be to understand the general implications of metahistorical concerns for general historical practice. The question therefore becomes: how can we go beyond the study of metahistory to the textualization of history itself as a newly self-aware discipline through its newfound reflexive understanding? This would seem to be both the challenge issued and the burden bestowed by Hayden White and others.

Historical practice according to the textualist/poetics paradigm can become a version of intellectual or conceptual history as historiography. White's own 

Metahistory transforms history into conceptual or representational history, as his subtitle, "The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe," suggests. In the same vein are such recent historiographical works as Stephen Bann, The Clothing of Clio: A Study of Representation of History in Nineteenth-Century Britain and France; Linda Orr, Jules Michelet: Nature, History, and Language; and Ann Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: Three Narrative Theories of the French Revolution, whose titles signal their goals.

Conceptual, intellectual, or cultural history can follow this lead by exploring the history of representations or modes of representation in general in a society or culture. As Linda Hutcheon observes, "In a very real sense, postmodernism reveals a desire to understand culture as the product of previous representations. The representation of history becomes the history of representations." Much of the history of the body, for instance, describes its various representations over time. Notwithstanding its title, the journal 

Representations contains articles that belong under the next option as well as this one. Likewise, the New Historicism can be classified both ways. Perhaps Foucault's pronouncements demand and his productions demonstrate the most radical reorientation of history as conceptual history, for they challenge so many of the working fictions of doing intellectual history according to the normal history paradigm.

Just as historians can reorient history practice and production through the textualist/poetics paradigm, so too can they develop the options derived from the contextualist/politics paradigm, which investigates the social and political generation of the subject matter under study. The most obvious strategy explores what we might call the sociology of historical knowledge itself and would result in a history of the political and social bases of modes of historical conceptualization and representation, including the turn to textualism and poetics and maybe even the historic turn itself. Such a subdiscipline of the profession would operate according to the normal history paradigm to connect knowledge and power and the larger society: the why to be answered by normal methods of contextualization. Thus, as mentioned in Chapter 4, Peter De Bolla urges that Hayden White's rhetoric of history be historicized as historical rhetorics. Which tropes dominated which periods, and why? What can be done for the representation of history can also be done according to the same paradigmatic presuppositions for the social and political generation of ideas, concepts, and cultural representations in general in a society. Joan W. Scott, in conclusion to her arguments about experience, similarly urges a conceptual history that "takes all categories of analysis as contextual, contested, and contingent." Both De Bolla and Scott stress the axis of contextualist/politics premises as opposed to that of textualist/poetics. To the extent that historians can establish the relations of power and social structure for ideas and the like, they can also determine them for all of the subject matter that the profession traditionally studies under the rubrics of political, economic, and social history.

Both of these options accept the limitations of their own paradigms of understanding, because the historian accepts the limits of the operative problematic itself. Both basic options also try to operate from within the traditional paradigm of history, although they may transform the nature of the subject matter and how it is approached. The problems of attempting to operate from within the respective paradigms and that of normal history too became clear even in this brief presentation of possibilities. The questions raised in this and previous chapters reveal some of the problems involved in trying to understand what such practices entail in the ways of conceptualization and representation for each other and themselves reflexively. The options, in general, transform history practice either into what the profession calls historiography and intellectual history (modified according to recent trends) or into social and political history (with greater awareness of poetic and textualist consequences), but mainly from within the normal history paradigm with its associated perplexities.

The last and most interesting option asks those who would historicize to rise to the seemingly inuperable challenge of moving beyond problematics of textualism and contextualism, poetics and politics, to reflexive historicization and postmodern textualization, of transcending the limitations of the basic problematics while preserving their insights. How can historians achieve such new histories when the exemplars in the field are few or nonexistent? Should (can?) the historian incorporate a plurality of viewpoints and stories within
the same textualization? Should the historian show how a textualized history is constructed from interpretive contextualization of the sources while showing how the transformation of those interpretations into representations of the past as history are created from processes and systems of meaning at the same time?

Such a vision of what history as a disciplinary practice and form of representation might achieve attempts to break the conceptual barrier posed by the dilemma of representationalism. One cannot explicate how a representation represents something, or produces its effects, at the same time as one tries to comprehend what is represented, its effects and message, for their own sake: examining the means of representation downplays or even conceals the message; examining the message downplays or hides the medium. A new form of reflexive history would resolve the dilemma by doing both together, seeking to operate in the conceptual spaces posed by the contradictions between textualism and contextualism, between social and rhetorical construction of reality, between normal history and metahistory. Thus both practice and production would accept the challenges facing the profession and incorporate them into new ways of doing history in line with late modernist or postmodernist ways of understanding. Such a vision of professional history should change the ways in which historians write articles and review books in the professional journals, conduct sessions and argue cases in professional meetings, and teach and examine in classrooms.

Does this vision of what history might be subvert all history-writing or only traditional ways of representing the past? Does it suggest the limits of the paradigm that constitutes the very possibility of doing history as we define it in the Western world? Do the competing definitions of history embody unresolvable, essentially contested problematics and conflicting, incomensurable paradigms? Should plural paradigms lead to coexisting, even conflicting, plural histories? Should—can—multiculturalism, social constructionism, deconstruction, and textualism issue forth in new kinds of histories based upon new ways of writing history? Can Clio embrace radically different ways of representing the past under the rubric of history? That is, can history be multicultural or only pluralistic, to use today's loaded terminology, about incorporating multiple viewpoints and stories? Can any one exemplar of history combine many viewpoints and (hi)stories? Do plural histories point to plural pasts? Can historians go beyond an ironic stance if they practice a self-conscious or reflexive mode of historicization?

New problematics. Textual experimentation in historical discourse can be aided by a new problematic that incorporates reflexively its own constitutive processes as part of its construction of representation. While old ways of constructing history are being challenged by the recent intellectual and political trends as a way of providing overall context, there is a call in literary criticism and the social sciences for a (re)new(ed) historicism or historiciza-

Reflexive (Con)Textualization

Ball in the court of the historian: Is the historian showing how a textualized history is constructed from interpretive contextualization of the sources while showing how the transformation of those interpretations into representations of the past as history are created from processes and systems of meaning at the same time? Does the historian show how a textualized history is constructed from interpretive contextualization of the sources while showing how the transformation of those interpretations into representations of the past as history are created from processes and systems of meaning at the same time? Should the historian show how a textualized history is constructed from interpretive contextualization of the sources while showing how the transformation of those interpretations into representations of the past as history are created from processes and systems of meaning at the same time?
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New viewpoints. To introduce multiple viewpoints into historical discourse would seem to require both a revision of the normal history paradigm and a new vision of what a historical text can be. A multicultural, dialogic ideal transforms not only the subject matter of histories but also the postulates of what a good history does and is. Ultimately, must multiple viewpoints result in plural pasts in a single text(ualization) as well as in new approaches to the narrativization of histories?

At the least, one narratologist suggests, such a multicultural textualization must abandon the third-person viewpoint for a combination of first-person perspective as creator of the representation and an effort to engage the subjects as co-creators. Such a "second-person" dialogue dissolves the subject-object relationship into a subject-to-subject discourse. The new narrative site becomes one of multiple conversations in the overlap among first, third, and second persons. Both what knowledge is and how it is represented proceed from the interplay of voices and viewpoints in such conversations. To what extent such an ideal demands new textual forms remains to be negotiated in the discipline.54

The ideal of multiple viewpoints challenges the very idea of representation as mimesis, for it substitutes a kaleidoscope for a telescope or microscope. Most certainly, it repudiates the omniscience of a Panopticon for the particular perspectives of situated viewpoints.55 Does the model of pastiche or collage provide better forms of multiculturalist exposition than the normal unified text? As always, the question centers upon whether the contested terrain can be textualized as and through the politics of structured interplay if no one can play observer but all are only participants. Univocal and unitary points of view give way to heterogeneity of viewpoints and temporal locations. Texts deny homogeneity of author and reader and presume no transcendentald author/reader, interpretive community, or referent. Textualizations presume that they exist within conflicting and contradictory world(s) and ought to represent themselves accordingly.

Dialogically, neither reader nor reviewer can accept at face value the supposed voices and viewpoints ascribed in a text to past actors or present observers. What choices of structure did a text make to organize the interplay of voices? Where along the multiculturalist spectrum presented in Chapter 7 is a textualized representation? What forms of representation are used to show the voices and viewpoints? Would montage or pastiche or some other form show better what the text represents as unitary, univocal, or transcendent?

New times. For the representation of time to be reflexive in any new historicization, the various kinds of temporal ordering in the text should be made as evident as possible. Time is textualized both explicitly, through overt argument and story in the text, and implicitly, through discursive organization, privileging presuppositions, and subtext. Periodization is the most obvi-

With the change of a few words specific to literary history, this statement could constitute one methodological call, if not program, for all of a new culturalized and reflexive history. That Bercovitch's path seems quite different from that usually traveled, let alone called for, by most historians, even those advocating the so-called new cultural history, indicates all too well the hegemonic boundaries of the normal history problematic.

That other problematics might satisfy equally well the demand for a new reflexive basis for experimental historical discourses is not as important to my argument at this point as what Bercovitch's effort suggests for that goal. To achieve a new form of historicization demands a new, more reflexive problematic for historical textualization and disciplinary practice than is afforded by the normal professional paradigm. Just as reflexivity and multiculturality reveal the limits of the normal history paradigm, they also suggest the potentiality of new approaches to historical discourse, approaches that incorporate both a new reflexive contextualization and a multiviewpointed narrative into the same text(ualization). To accept the dualisms and relativisms inherent in the various problematics, historians should incorporate the conflictual dilemmas explicitly into the very message of the text and not just implicitly through the process of textualization. A reflexive (con)textualization tries to surmount the basic dilemma of representation itself by incorporating texts and countertexts, discourses and counterdiscourses into the same textualization. New historicizations ought to show self-awareness of their own problematics or modes of representation, exhibiting them as basic to the construction of their textualization.

or reessentialize some basic social and cultural categories as it poeticizes the contextualization of other concepts and categories. It cannot move the margins to the center in the guise of the other but still resort to the traditional paradigm for constructing the past as a single Great Story. And it ought not to pretend to offer a middle way if it narrows the road to achieve it.

These many goals seem to ground Sacvan Bercovitch's summary of the new problematic of historicization espoused in Reconstructing American Literary History:

that race, class, and gender are formal principles of art, and therefore integral to textual analysis; that language has the capacity to break free of social restrictions and through its own dynamics to undermine the power structures it seems to reflect; that political norms are inscribed in aesthetic judgment and therefore inherent in the process of interpretation; that aesthetic structures shape the way we understand history, so that tropes and narrative devices may be said to use historians to enforce certain views of the past; that the task of literary historians is not just to show how art transcends culture, but also to identify and explore the ideological limits of their time, and then to bring these to bear upon literary analysis in such a way as to make use of the categories of culture, rather than being used by them.53
ous way of showing time, by segmenting it to measure it and to exhibit its contents. Should not any textualization discuss what ways are used and why, even what are not used and why? Should not the mode(s) of imaging time and methods of temporal ordering in a text be made the subject of the text as much as any other topic textualized in it?

Would other than normal paradigmatic conceptions of time result in new ways of representing it in and through histories? Although the authors of a series of articles on "Narratives and Social Identities" in Social Science History are sensitive to various kinds of self-constructed historical narratives among past individuals, groups, and institutions, they assimilate these histories according to the professional construal of time in their own textualizations. Despite acknowledging various notions of time in narratives of identity, they still contextualize these other histories according to normal conceptions of time in the discipline and thus make that conception of time seem natural and universal to all kinds of histories. How in a reflexive history should the personal and subjective experience of time by past actors or the collective experience of memory and popular history be represented as opposed to the chronology and formal time of professional history? How does oral history, for example, differ from its professional, written cousin, and should that make a difference in constructing a formal history? In some cases oral histories have led to new forms of textualization, as did, for example, Ronald Fraser's reconstruction of his childhood days at Amnersfield Manor House, mentioned in Chapter 7. In the textual representation of history should present and past notions and constructions of time co-create as they implicate each other? Foucault made the past serve the present in his books, but in The Open Boundary of Fiction and History Suzanne Gearhart makes the relationship reciprocal in and through her textualization.

The concept of multiple viewpoints suggests a multiplicity of times and therefore of histories. Fernand Braudel proposed perhaps the most widely known conception of history as multiple, coexisting sequences of time. In his preface to The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, he asserted that all history can be divided into three kinds. In his well-known tripartite formulation, traditional history concentrates on "the history of events" or "a history of short, sharp, nervous vibrations" often framed and told in terms of the "contemporaries who felt it, described it, lived it." This history focuses on individuals and relates to "the rhythm of their brief lives," often centering on politics. The second kind, "a history of gentle rhythms, of groups and groupings," involves a longer span of time, and receives its form from the "conjunctures" of trends and social structures in the form of collective institutions depicted as economies, societies, states, and civilizations. The third kind, the famed longue durée, encompasses "a history that is almost changeless, the history of man in relationship to his surroundings ... a history that unfolds slowly and is slow to alter, often repeating itself and working itself out in cycles which are endlessly renewed." Covering very long-term demographic and ecological trends, it exists "almost out of time." According to Braudel, historians all too often take one of these kinds of time as the sole framework for history rather than using all three.

How the three times relate to one another, or even whether they can relate to one another, receives different answers depending upon the lesson to be learned about the nature of time in historical representation. In the volumes of The Mediterranean Braudel argued that they are separate levels or series that interact with each other only now and then, and he devoted separate sections to each kind. Elsewhere, however, he asserted that they form a unity through interdependence and conjuncture, and both his goal of total history and his practice suggest as much. It is the former possibility that excites postmodernists and supposedly inspired Foucault in his approach to events.

Whether as archaeology or as genealogy, Foucault enunciated the past in terms of discontinuities, ruptures, displacements, transformations, and chance occurrences. He accused traditional intellectual historians of forcing preconceived unities, continuities, and teleologies on the past through their normal discursive approach to time. Differences in the approaches to time are not a matter of calendars and dating or even of treating time as social activity and cultural construction but rather of the construal and construction of those very notions in (a) historical textualization. Should several modes of time be brought together into one multitemporal text?

What is at issue in exploring new ways of representing time can be seen in the gendering of historic time. Much of the reorientation of women's history has rested upon the different ways in which men and women spend and use time, and therefore in how their history should be represented and narrated. Since the patriarchal division between public and private time relegated (Western? bourgeois?) women to the private side, their lives were omitted from histories and history as being outside of what counted in history. As a result, male time emerged as the basis of histories of production, power, the professions, and even of reason and aesthetics as history recounted only what happened in the public, that is the male-defined and -dominated, sphere. To historicize past women's experiences and activities therefore demanded a transformation, or at least a transvaluation, and supplementation of what counted as worthy of being the subject of history, so that it could include both women's and men's time as creating history.

But did such transvaluation and supplementation transform how women's pasts were contextualized as history? Were new subjects argued and narrativized according to old chronologic modes and temporality, or did new histories develop new ways of representing time as their bases? Julia Kristeva, in her article "Women's Time," maintains that a female subjectivity emphasizes time as cyclic and recurrent, as eternal and monumental, governed essentially by rhythm. According to her scheme, then, men emphasize the
linearity of time as direction and teleology, departure and arrival, genetic growth and progression. Regardless of its seemingly essentialist nature, her scheme highlights the issue of whose and what conception of time is authorized as professional history. What alternative histories might arise from other social constructions of time? Susan Deeds Ermarth in raising this same issue denies all representational history in favor of a rhythmic figural approach to time as a solution. Since she uses modern novels as examples of the new approach, it is unclear just how she envisions history as a genre.

The theories and practices of Braudel and Foucault, like feminist histories and postmodernist metafiction, challenge assumptions about time and its representation in and as normal historicization. Such reflexive consideration of time in historical practice is reinforced by postmodernist critiques of temporality in general. The greater the emphasis on contingency and chance as central to how the world works, the smaller the role of causation—and the more in some ways historicization comes to resemble the one-fact-after-another school of historiography. To the extent that causation is vital to traditional historical narrativization, then the existence of simultaneous or discontinuous time series undermines the normal paradigm of historical discourse. Although Braudel and Foucault or those who follow their examples might be able to construct a series or even a series of series of events, like modern novelists they lose the big picture of connections as they renounce the larger framework of causation in their texts. In the end, the idea of multiple times involves surrendering the idea(l) of a single past for many histories, even giving up the metaphorical growth of time as genetic connections that transform events into episodes, chronologies into histories. Such an orientation challenges the notion of origins as some form of continuous growth from some originary point. Whether represented as subject/author, as originator of ideas and actions, or as the present and future arising from the past as if the connections were intrinsic to the real world, hence to history itself, such devices ought to be shown for what they are: the historicizer's construction of the story.

Readers and reviewers should observe the many ways in which a text uses and represents time. How does a text divide time explicitly in its argument or story? What conventions of profession or culture does the author follow in approaching time in history as the past and as textualized? What periodization does the author assume or explicate, and how does the author know it or argue it? Is time represented through synchronic or diachronic organization of events, as process or stasis, as rupture or continuity, as dialectic or conjunction? To what extent does the author presume progress, decline, cycles, or other basic modes of comprehending time? Is the chronologic framework of the text one of complete rupture, small shifts, continuity as growth, or transformation? Is time represented as stochastic and arbitrary or as ordered and structured, even as dialectical? If a text represents events and ideas as developing from some point in the past, does the text subscribe to some simple originary source or idea of origins? How are beginnings and endings handled? How is time shown through use of tense, imagery, periodization, and general discursive organization?

New representeds. That reflexive contextualization of history demands additional or new ways of representing time also implies that new ways of representing are needed for what occurs in it. If past and present create each other in a reflexive text, how should the historian represent their contents when either set of concepts or categories is chronologically specific? If concepts, categories, or other methods of description are not transcultural or transhistorical, what language can the historian use to describe her subjects? The quandary manifests itself even in what to name this category. I considered "actants," "existants," "representemes," and other semantic concoctions before settling on "representeds" to designate the "what" of what is referred to or represented in a textualization. All these neologisms are meant to embrace the various elements or entities that constitute the subject matter and topics making up the textual content of the narrative and arguments of historical discourses. The problem is what and how, on what level, and by what explicit or implicit methods to specify or individuate the subjects, objects, events, structures, trends, and other elements/entities of a history, if they themselves are subject to historicization for their understanding. How, that is, should historians code and represent the events, elements, entities, topics, and so on that constitute the subject matter of their historicizations if their designations possess no stable and persisting meaning over time but are locally specific and temporally contingent? The historicization of what is represented must incorporate present meaning as product of past process, just as the past processes are defined and constituted by present semantics. If the past and present co-create each other, the task of translation becomes doubly difficult. Although new fields of interest and so-called new histories treat new topics and subjects, they need not employ new ways of representing the representeds in stories and arguments. That all models of society, polity, and persons, like theories of explanation, language, and ontology, are time-bound and in contention complicates their use as referents/representeds in historical discourse.

The multiform nature of this problem can be demonstrated by several questions. How should the subject/object be represented in histories in these postmodern times? How did a series of events/structures/trends get constituted, and according to and from whose conception and viewpoint, in the past, and how should the historian translate these as subjects in a discourse? Should historians follow Foucault's lead in dissolving the subject/object into signifying and discursive practices? The historian must not only investigate how individual subjects, the polity and structures of power, and the social axes of race, gender, and class come into being and who constituted and
named them but also decide how to represent them now in a text. Who specifies their temporal and spatial location, how, and when? From the perspective of this rubric, then, how the various topics or subject matters came into being and through whose eyes, through whose actions, with what effects according to whom must be combined with the same questions asked of the historian’s present-day textualization of them. Reflexive contextualization cannot just accept ethnocontextual or present-day answers to these questions; it must supplement or transform the traditional subject/object, entity/event, structure/trend in historical discourses.

The reflexive constitution of subject matter must deconstruct the seeming naturalness of social subject/object, entity/event, structure/trend in their very construction as and through historicization. To argue that social and cultural construction or even historicization of these topics resolves the problem misses the point, for such an answer does not say how that answer itself will be constructed and according to what and whose categories. Moreover, such an answer accepts either the ethnocontextual or current contextual construction of categories, classifications, interpretations, and metanarratives too much at face value. In each case, the problem concerns how the historian should code or textualize the categories for describing the subject matter or represent the relationships and the story when both past and present are relative to their times. How might the relationship between past and present be characterized and in what kinds of words? In sum, must new historicizations explore a new semantics of what is represented in them in order to convey their new reflexive ideals?

The questions that readers and reviewers must pose about representeds center upon how the various subjects/objects, persons/groups, events/structures, trends/periods, and other categorizations come to be distinguished as such in a text. What is accepted as seemingly natural or normal as an entity? Does a specific historical discourse designate matters according to the names and categories it says the actors employed, or does it construct new categorizations to give new meaning to the past through its representation? Does a text assume that its classifications are natural and transhistorical categories derived from some universal scheme, or are the representeds invented to render problematic even modern categories in the present discourse? To be themselves reflexive, must readers and reviewers construct historicized countercategories of their own to explicit those of historical texts?69

New textualizations. The primary goal of reflexive contextualism is to create new forms of discourse in the writing and teaching, the reading and reviewing of histories, not only by professional historians but also by those scholars who espouse the new historicisms in other disciplines. Thus all the prescriptive items in this and the preceding series are meant to come together under this rubric. No one best or right way exists to combine all the items in the three series; no one problematic, approach to subject matter, or exper-

mental textualization is necessarily preferred. Although some approaches are probably more fruitful than others, we will not know what can be achieved without more experimentation.

These series constitute a catalogue, itself a form of representation. I am not advocating such a form for textualizing historical representations. My catalogue artificially divides what must be united in any historical representation. Any new historicization should embody these elements in new forms. Whether the combination in a single textualization of multiple criteria, deconstructive reconstruction, and theoretical reflexivity can take only such postmodern forms as a kaleidoscope, pastiche, or collage remains to be seen. Certainly a book of multi-authored essays does not solve the problems of form. Late modernism and postmodernism alike demand new approaches to narration, argument, explanation, and description as textualized.

Such a textualization should establish and sustain a conversation between subject and subject then and now and between author and reader, teacher and student. If all representation is self-representation, then surely full disclosure of the role of author as intervener must expand from a few sentences into a fully self-revelatory text. How overt, then, must the author’s role be? Can a self-revelatory textualization ever be more than a self-advertisement of virtuosity? Surely the goal is some sort of cooperative conversation among voices and viewpoints of the past and present. But in the end, any postmodern historicization “calls attention, overtly or covertly, to the fact that it is a text first and foremost, that it is a human construct made up of and by words.”70

To meet reflexive and dialogic goals, a new textualization must combine multiple contexts with novel ways of contextualizing them through their representations. It must combine metahistory and history, Great Stories and historiography while historicizing itself as it historicizes its subject matter; the postulated evidential past and the multifarious present should create each other as they problematize each other. It must combine discourses and counterdiscourses about poetics and politics, texts and textualization, and the other dilemmas historicization tries to resolve as it embodies them. It must theorize about what it theorizes as it theorizes and exemplify its models as explicitly as possible. Such textualization deconstructs itself as it (re)constructs history through its representation. It ought to broaden the genre even as it challenges it by breaching conventions and crossing or combining genres. How many rooms the house of history holds remains to be explored. Ultimately, such new textualizations challenge the dilemmas of representation and language as they try to talk about themselves as they talk about things. Since paradigms and their premises are not compatible, conflicting discourses will result in different approaches for different purposes—but all, it is to be hoped, in reflexive dialogue.

In the end, must incommensurable paradigms be given separate metanarratives, or can they be incorporated into the same Great Story as dissimilar
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modes of understanding power and social relations? Should oppositional viewpoints be incorporated into a single mode of representation? How can historians incorporate multiple voices and viewpoints from and about social and political conflicts into a narrative text in a fundamental and central way of structuring the expression in addition to the explicit content of the story and argument? Would the explicit inclusion of competing problematics and perspectives in formal historical narratives demand new literary forms?

Must all experimental efforts to transform historical discourse resort to postmodern fragmentation of a unified story line in order to avoid the subjection of the other through the imposition of a totalized point of view? Must they necessarily embody the eclecticism of montage or pastiche as they blur genres by crossing the customary boundaries of the discipline between philosophy of history and historical sociology, between oral and documentary history, between folk and professional history? They point to a new way of narrativizing the past as partial and Great Stories. They forgo customary closure through holism, continuity, and consistency of authorship. Normal historicization constrains diversity of viewpoint and authority; so-called postmodern historicization surrenders an Archimedean overview for being just another participant in the dialogue(s) among the voices and viewpoints, just another text in time among other textualizations, another discourse among other discursive practices. By abandoning a totalized overview, postmodern historicization surrenders its claim to a superior Great Story as the foundation of disciplinary and historical authority. Thus any attempt to practice such postmodern history would appear to demand not only recanting and renouncing traditional approaches to historicization but also reconceiving representation in and of history and the nature of historicization itself.7

One historian's quite self-conscious attempt to meet many of these criteria is Greg Dening's Mr. Bligh's Bad Language: Passion, Power and Theatre on the Bounty.7 This book exemplifies one postmodernist approach to reflexive (con)textualization in its self-conscious attempt to make explicit the interaction among the process of converting evidence into sources, the interpretation of events as historical, the organization of history as narratives, the application of various kinds of theories, and the choice and nature of representation. The book takes the reader along on the author's voyage to collect historical evidence and infer historiographical meaning, just as the book reconstructs and re-presents the voyage of the Bounty before and after the famed mutiny that made these episodes part of anglophone, and perhaps global, historical memory and culture. Dening reflexively considers in his own representations the interaction among various kinds of representations then and since of Captain Bligh, Fletcher Christian and the other mutineers, Tahitians and other Pacific islanders, and other actors and events. He plays with the power of words and words of power throughout the book. As his subtitle suggests, he depicts the spectacle of these events as theater for both English and islanders according to their various ways of demonstrating power and understanding each other through warfare, religion, systems of rank, or placing each other as others into their own histories as they made and remade them. He occasionally uses previous fictional representation to make factual points, and at the same time he makes clear the overall construction of his representation as a representation.

To convey the fictive invention of factuality as well as the theatricality of history then and now, Dening very explicitly organizes his main text into a prologue, three acts, two entr'actes, and an epilogue. The prologue contains three versions of a prologue written upon various bicentennial anniversaries of the events of the mutiny and outlining those events for the reader. Each of the three acts is divided into sections called "narrative" and "reflection." The narrative of the first act, "The Ship," tells of the ship's culture of power and rank in relation to British society and the world capitalist system and what therefore was wanted of the Pacific islanders and how the British interacted with them. The reflection muses on the amount of flogging on naval ships, the implications of violent discipline for the world of the ship's society, and the relation in general between law and force, among other matters. Subsequent acts narrate and reflect on the relations between sailors and Tahitians in terms of how they understood each other through religion, violence, sexuality, and other modes of connection; how the sailors went "native" before and after the mutiny; the trial and its aftermath; and finally, how these dramatic events have been represented in a series of twentieth-century motion pictures. The first entr'acte conveys the appropriateness of the Tahitian designation of Englishmen as "sharks that walk the land," given the islanders' cosmology of what happens on the beach and comes from the ocean; the second depicts (in the sense of double representation) the first actor portraying Captain Bligh on the English stage. In the epilogue Dening describes his own thirty-year quest for what happened on the Bounty and how that quest was and is memorialized and historicized as coinciding with the end of the Enlightenment project. Even the notes extend the reflexive arguments of the main text. Thus the endings, like the beginnings, are several. The reader leaves the book convinced of the factuality of what Dening represents and aware of the many textual layers involved in representing the dialogues of past and present, self and other, first and third person experience, the constructedness of memory and history. In this case a postmodernist exercise has eventuated in multiple viewpoints of the actors and those who interpreted them then and now, while the fragmented and juxtaposed textual pieces still sum up to Dening's organized theater of power as his historical representation.

Readers and reviewers, then, must ask a basic question about any history: how does its textualization put it all together? How reflexive are the self-references to the process of constructing the text? In this they seek not how facts are derived but how they are synthesized in and through what forms. How
are they constituted as story and argument and Great Story(ies)? How are the layers of a text put together as a discursive representation? How many of the criteria for reflexive contextualization are met, and in what ways? What form does the text take to embody these criteria? Does the textualization employ new forms or only use one standard in the genre? Ought not readers and reviewers who favor new forms of historical discourse to praise experiments in form or point out new possibilities as they review old ones? Can historians with their help devise new forms that expand the genre?

New experiments. Whether and what new forms of historical textualization have appeared in recent years is a matter of how one conceives of the width of that metaphorical road some historians travel in search of a middle way. The more narrowly the road is conceived, the more innovative recent historical works seem, and the more they are seen as expanding historical practice and changing its direction. The more broadly the road is envisioned, the less the supposedly new historical forms seem to accomplish in any effort to move beyond normal historical discourse and practice. The question is not whether experimentation is occurring—it is—but rather, how far does it go? How many of the current new historicizations attempt to meet many or all the reflexive criteria discussed in this chapter? Measured by this standard, the experimentation seems small or nonexistent—if the point of a new historical practice is to meet all the many criteria or goals in one text, be it a partial history or a Great Story. To what extent do so-called new histories meet even the general goals of reflexivity and dialogy? Have the many new histories of recent times led to new forms of textualization in both representation of content and modes of expression? Although some Annalistes eschewed histories of events for those of the long durations, their textualizations of such structural histories adopted the old conventions of viewpoint and voice if not of story-telling. Even those Annalistes who moved to exposition of mentalities did not abandon old ways of contextualization for new ways. A comparison of the works of Fernand Braudel and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and even Todorov's Conquest of America with the many postmodernist opportunities still to be explored by historians reveals that the former supply a limited range of options.

Let us turn to some of the new histories to see if they provide the examples we need. In one of the more promising surveys, New Perspectives on Historical Writing, the essays cover such relatively new areas and topics as the history of reading, images, the body, and microhistory or review new trends in the histories of women, political thought, oral history, and "from below." Valuable and even exciting as such new histories are in terms of methods or subject matter, they frequently textualize in old ways. Some essays discuss new subject/object categories as appropriate to new fields or to transform old ones, but most show that advocating a broadened approach to what history should include as areas of interest need not lead to any fundamentally new forms of historical representation of their entities as subjects or in their textualization as context. Even those new narrative histories mentioned by the editor, Peter Burke, as harbingers of the future often fail to push very far beyond the bounds of normal history.

Robert Rosenstone, in a short article in Perspectives, the newsletter of the American Historical Association, bemoans the lack of experimentation in historical forms among anglophone professional historians. Among the few examples he can find, several have already been mentioned in these chapters as challenging and extending normal historical practice: Richard Price on multiple voices and viewpoints in Alabi's World; Elinor Langer on use of the personal voice in her biography of Josephine Herbst; David Farber on reinterpreting various sources of evidence from analytical ones about the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago; and Simon Schama on pastiche and the division between history and fiction, discussed below. Rosenstone's own Mirror in the Shrine: American Encounters with Meiji Japan combines direct address both to his historical actors and to the reader, different voices represented as such through typeface and exposition, mimicking fast cuts from one topic to another, and montage and self-confession—all in a reflexive effort to contradict and expand methods of historical representation as narration. His methods make the reader aware of this history as constructed artifact and of this historian as the grand organizer. He repudiates the usual discursive continuity, which patches over thin or nonexistent evidence, in favor of direct address to the reader about the problems of evidence and connectedness. Throughout the book, Rosenstone seeks to collapse the usual rigid distinctions between the past and present of historical realism in a text and among author, actors, and reader in the textualization.

Outside the discipline, New Historicism in literary studies offers less than its promise to textualize history as it historicizes textuality. Whether or how the New Historicism can resolve or mediate the dilemmas intrinsic in its dual goal is as uncertain as whether it is either new or historical. Likewise, the models offered by anthropologists as they culturalize history in the process of historicizing culture are interesting so far as they go, but few examples of their work fulfill many of the criteria for a thoroughly reflexive and dialogic textualization of (a) history. Nevertheless, examples from ethnohistory broadly conceived suggest the most important models for possible future historical textualizations.

Such efforts will constitute their own genre(s) as they increasingly explore and try to exceed the limits of contemporary approaches to historical representation. The chief task of writer and teacher pursuing reflexive contextualization and multivocality is to expand the forms of historical representation across or beyond what is endorsed by the various interested epistemic and interpretive communities, across boundaries of genre regardless of politics in and out of the profession. As part of the new textualizations, experiments
must also push the envelope of realism, for they must try to exist in the conceptual and expressive space between the magic realism of Latin American novelists and the objectivist realism of traditional histories.

How far the boundaries of historical realism and representation can be extended and still be called history is the issue Simon Schama has forced upon the profession in his recent books. Although Schama says he is inspired by the great nineteenth-century narrative historians, his recent books betray postmodernist traits. *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* lives up to its billing as a chronicle in a peculiarly (post)modern way, for his discourse eschews overall survey for a supposedly simple chronologically arranged series of vignettes. By making pastiche his organizational device, he says he hopes to restore human agency to history. Through that means, structure both as interpretive framework and as explanation is deemphasized or hidden in the text. Schama's *Dead Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations)* is presented as an experiment in historical narration. He not only proliferates voices and viewpoints in telling stories about the death of General James Wolfe at the battle of Quebec in 1759 and the disappearance in 1849 of George Parker, a Boston gentleman; he also crosses the line between fiction and fact by inventing a diary and entering into the inner consciousness of some of his characters like a novelist. He fragments the narrative unity in this book even more than in *Citizens*; indeed, one reviewer complained of the "cacophony" of his polyvocality. Schama's "unwarranted speculations" nudge the boundaries of normal historical practice in a postmodernist direction, but his quest for "dead certainties" shows that he measures history by the presupposition of a knowable past according to an objectivist model of historical realism.

The issue in any reflexive (con)textualization resides less in empirical fact versus fictional invention than in what can be "legitimately" juxtaposed to constitute a context in what purports to be a historical representation. From the viewpoint of many historians, the problems of the New Historicism concern not their frequent use of unusual anecdotes nor even their juxtaposition of diverse kinds of documentary or other evidence but rather their crossing what historians postulate as different, even isolated, epistemic and interpretive communities for those materials without proving that such connections actually existed in the past. To read old texts with present-day theory may be inevitable in historical practice, but to textualize all past interpretations of those texts across classes, societies, and cultures without meticulous proof of those crossings unsettles professional historians. If magical realism and metafiction exceed the limits of historical representation on the fictional side, much of the new Historicism pushes the limits of historical representation on the factual side according to the normal paradigm of historical practice. Regardless of how broad a spectrum historical realism will and can eventually accommodate, contention will focus on the problems of juxtaposition in constructing the context in a history. The broader—some would say wilder—and more unlikely the connections across times, societies, and cultures, the greater the challenge to normal reading and interpretation of the past. The greater the challenge, the more the new textualizations will have to "prove" their cases by reference to the evidence. In the end, however, the history of historical practice suggests that what is accepted as proper juxtaposition is connected in its own way to the social and cultural contexts of the times and what a profession can police as part of those social arrangements and cultural premises. Experimentation must be seen as "legitimate" and encouraged if the bounds of the profession are to expand.

**Transforming Historical Practice**

*Reflexive Reading and Reviewing*

Achieving new forms of historicization depends upon new ways of reading and reviewing historical texts as discursive practices. Under normal paradigmatic rules, readers and reviewers are supposed to deal only with the explicit arguments and narratives of histories. Active reading and criticism supplement these normal rules by also investigating the "inner workings," how a text goes about constructing itself as a history.

According to this goal, the fundamental tasks of historians as reflexive readers and reviewers are to demystify and deconstruct what historians as authors or teachers have combined or fused in a text as history: to explore and reveal the structure of interpretation and the means of representation for what they are; to show how a history is a multilayered text of evidential interpretation, argument, narrative, and Great Story; to apply the rhetoric and poetics of history in explicating the stylistic figuration, tropological prefiguration, and structures of expression in general; to expose how discursive practices have both enabled the textualization and suppressed other representations; to evaluate how well a discourse achieves reflexive and dialogic goals; and to uncover implicit politicization as well as explicit politics. The active reader and critical reviewer make a historical text a collaborative effort through their reading and reviewing, even to the extent of creating a countertext. Thus reviewers ought to devote as much effort and space to explicating historians today as intellectual historians devote to explicating historians of yesterday. In fact, these books can be considered models for extended reviews as their authors move toward the historical equivalent of literary criticism.

Another important task of reviewers is to help build a poetics and rhetoric of historical discourse. By pointing out how a text exemplifies a poetics and a rhetoric as it constructs a representation, readers and reviewers help establish a general poetics of various subjects and modes of expression in the
profession. As part of this goal, reader and reviewer explore the relationships among emplotments, structures of expression, and Great Stories to categorize them and probe their limits. A third goal is to prepare fellow readers and reviewers for new kinds of stories by appreciating them as experiments. When new historicizations breach paradigms and problematics; cross epistemic, interpretive, and political communities; and invent new forms of expression, critical reading and reviewing can foster reflexive contextualization and multicultural ideals as they (re)construct and (re)construe what a textualization achieved and how. Ultimately, the task of the active reader and the critical reviewer is to exhibit the same reflexivity that any new historicization ought to manifest. How did they themselves put it all together? Like critiques of historical textualizations, readings and reviews reflexive to their own construction help to indicate how a new historicization might proceed in these postmodern times. Thus becoming active readers and critical reviewers is as challenging in its way as producing a new kind of history is for writers and teachers.

*Reflexive Writing and Teaching*

Given the tasks before the profession as outlined in this chapter, this book ends at a new beginning. Building upon the criteria offered here or upon other, more comprehensive surveys from a greater range of perspectives than this one person can provide, others must continue to explore and exemplify the potential direction and scope of a new reflexive historicization. Most important and most difficult, more experimental textualizations exemplifying new problematics and forms of exposition are needed. The challenge is clear; the appropriate responses, less so. Both writers and teachers should work toward new forms of history as reflexive and multicultural (con)textualizations, but how to achieve this goal poses problems. How can they incorporate the irony of metahistory, mutual deconstructions of problematics, and radical historicization without letting reflexivity paralyze their ability to produce textualizations at all, let alone ones comprehensible to their readers and students? Would the goal of a multiplicity of voices, viewpoints, methodologies, (Great) stories, deconstructive criticism, and reflexive construction in the same text dumbfound an audience expecting a history to be constructed according to normal discursive practice? Or will new reviewing practices lead to new reading practices?

Moving beyond normal history is more easily sought than achieved. Accomplishing this goal entails nothing less than overcoming the four crises of historical representation. First, historians must surmount the dilemma of representationalism or the semiotic absolute; any new historical textualization must show how it goes about achieving its representation at the same time as it represents the past as history. Second, historians must solve the problem of multicultural representation; any new historical textualization must include multiple viewpoints in addition as well as according to the author's viewpoint in genuine dialogue in the very textualization itself. Third, historians must find new ways of overcoming the traditional dilemma of anachronism: how can the present scholar represent the past in its own terms and categories when those terms and categories must be retroapplied from present readings of sources and (re)translated into modern texts? Finally, historians must authorize new forms of representation without creating new rules of historical practice about what constitutes proper history itself; but adopting new rules entails breaking current prescriptions for distinguishing history from other genres and disciplines and therefore what authorizes the profession. Each of these dilemmas reveals the limits of normal historicization as representation and as discursive practice.

If the great challenge of a dialogic and reflexive contextualization culminates in the creation of new forms of historical representation, then the great question becomes whether the new rhetoric and poetics of history will actually issue forth in new kinds of experimental textualizations as historical representations. Or does the very conception of what constitutes formal and scholarly history in our society limit the degree of experimentation? Only further textual experimentation will answer this question. Only openness to such experimentation will allow the answers to be interesting. What might be the goals of any historic turn or drive to historicize should therefore not be judged by what has been practiced so far in the profession or produced up to this point as discourse. Rather the goals themselves should be part of the experiment.
Notes

i. The Postmodernist Challenge


4. Terrence McDonald, of the Department of History at the University of Michigan, invented the expression "the historic turn" for a conference called "The Historic Turn in the Social Sciences," held at the University of Michigan on October 5-7, 1990, and sponsored by the Program for the Comparative Study of Social Transformations. The papers are being published by University of Michigan Press under the title of the conference. Jonathan Ree uses the term "historic turns" in his article "The Vanity of Historicism," New Literary History, 22 (Autumn 1991), 962-963, 976-978. Whether the turn should be called "historical" rather than "historic" depends upon stylistic choice and perhaps on how its participants saw their efforts to transform their disciplines in the light of creating history themselves.

5. The sociologist C. Wright Mills invented the term "grand theory" to condemn the goal of systematic theory in the social sciences at the time he wrote The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). See also Quentin Skinner's introduction to The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).


8. The relationship in current scholarship between poststructuralist theory and postmodernism is a vexed one. Although postmodernism and poststructuralism have different genealogies because they started out in different disciplines, they now overlap greatly, especially when feminist and cultural studies are added to the mix. See, for example, Linda Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1989); Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham, and Mo Malek, eds., Postmodernism and the Social Sciences (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Vincent B. Leitch, Cultural Criticism, Literary Theory, Poststructuralism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

9. The words "reflexive" and "reflexivity" occur frequently in this book. To be reflexive is to be more than self-aware: it is also to be self-conscious and self-critical in theoretical outlook and practice. In the end, such reflexivity results in texts that refer to their own construction as they go about it; in other words, they are self-referring as well as self-reflecting.

10. Have "paradigm" and "problematic" come to possess similar meanings in current scholarly discourse, even though they derive from different political and conceptual contexts? Although "paradigm" was adumbrated by Thomas Kuhn and "problematic" comes from Louis Althusser, both seem to refer today to the set of presumptions that frame the questions and circumscribe the answers. See, for example, the definition of problematic offered by Ellen Rooney, Seductive Reasoning: Pluralism as the Problematic of Contemporary Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 50: the "historically determinate structure of presuppositions that constitute a discourse, its enabling conditions . . . a conceptual matrix that defines objects within a field, fixes lines of inquiry, sets problems, and thereby determines the 'solutions' that can be generated within its limits."


12. Compare the usage of "plastic" and "autonomous" in Martin Hollis, Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). This argument is allied to but not identical with the one over human agency versus structural explanation in interpreting social behavior; see, for example, Anthony Appiah, "Tolerable Falsifications: Agency and the Interests of Theory," in Consequences of Theory, ed. Jonathan Arac and Barbara Johnson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 63-90.

13. Or so argues Harlan, Super structuralism, pp. 67-68. Of these trends to de-naturalization, those of feminist theory are most advanced in conceptualization, but even in this field not all problems are resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Compare in literature, for example, Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (New York and London: Methuen, 1985); and Janet Todd, Feminist Literary History (New York and London: Routledge, 1988). In history see, for example, Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press,


21. Bourdieu, *Distinction*, is the new classic study on these matters.


23. Essentialism claims that a word or concept contains an essential core of meaning irrespective of a specific social or temporal context. Accordingly, words carry the same basic meaning from one text to another. The word "foundational" possesses an allied meaning when it refers to an assumption or proposition so fundamental to a conceptual system that the system could not exist without that premise.


synthetic work the historian produces in the present, my use of this term throughout my own text usually refers to the latter.

37. See Berman, From the New Criticism to Deconstruction; and Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).


40. White, Metahistory, p. 2.


42. Ibid., p. 353.


45. For a good statement of this dilemma and its implications for radical politics, see Ellen Somekawa and Elizabeth Smith, "Theorizing the Writing of History, or 'I Can't Think Why It Should Be So Dull, for a Great Deal of It Must Be Invention,'" Journal of Social History, 22 (Fall 1988), 145-161.


47. As is suggested in the title of her article, "Telling It as You Like It: Post-Modernist History and the Flight from Fact," Times Literary Supplement, no. 4672 (Oct. 16, 1992), 12-15. See also the complaints of Perez Zagorin, "Historiography and Postmodernism: Reconsiderations," History and Theory, 29, no. 3 (1990), 263-274; and a reply by F. R. Ankersmit, ibid., pp. 275-296.


52. The debate in the profession about whether or not Foucault wrote history indicates both the possibilities and limits of contemporary historical assumptions in professional discourse. See, for example, Allan Megill, "The Reception of Foucault by Historians," Journal of the History of Ideas, 48 (Jan.-March 1987), 117-140. Hayden White has always been cited more by scholars outside his discipline than by those inside it, according to Wulf Kansteiner, "Hayden White's Critique of the Writing of History," History and Theory, 32, no. 3 (1993), 272-295. Dominick LaCapra has been accused of subverting intellectual history by arguing the importance of Derrida and Bakhtin for the field. For example, Russell Jacoby, "A New Intellectual History," American Historical Review, 97 (April 1992), 405-424; and reply by LaCapra, "Intellectual History and Its Ways," ibid., pp. 425-439. LaCapra, Soundings in Critical Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 5-7, explains his relationship to Derrida and Bakhtin, but see all of his chap. 1.


54. Toews, "Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn," pp. 881-882. The good multiculturalist will immediately ask: whose experience is preferred as the determiner of the meaning of experience? Joan W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," Critical Inquiry, 17 (Summer 1991), 787-790, criticizes Toews for never defining experience and argues that it is shaped and conveyed through socially determined discursive practices. Most important, she accuses him of being unhistorical about the changing experiences of persons and how the history of a society shapes experience and gives it meaning in that society.
56. Ibid., p. 907.
60. Himmelfarb, "Telling It as You Like It," pp. 15, 12.
63. Whether or not poststructuralism renders historiography impossible is the topic of the essays in Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington, and Robert Young, eds., *Poststructuralism and the Question of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
65. "Interpretive community" comes from Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); "reading formation" is from Tony Bennett, "Texts in History: The Determinations of Readings and Their Texts" in Attridge, Bennington, and Young, *Post-Structuralism and the Question of History*, p. 70.
68. Much of Spiegel, "History, Historicism, and Social Logic," esp. pp. 68-78, wrestles with the problems of distinguishing text and context from both the linguistic and historic turns before she takes a position congenial to anglophone historians.
69. The term "intertextuality" comes originally from Julia Kristeva. My usage of the word broadens its original technical definition, but I believe this accords with scholarly practice today. See, for example, the definition given in Chris Baldick, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 112.
71. Berman, *From the New Criticism to Deconstruction*, p. 169.
73. Myra Jehlen, "Patrolling the Borders," Radical History Review, 43 (Winter 1989), 34-35, discusses the "linguizing of history" as "vulgar linguicism." Palmer, Descent into Discourse, p. 165, picks up this phrase as well as the complaint.


75. Few historians discuss what would constitute a new kind of history and what it would look like. Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 121-129, makes a similar point; but see for some suggestions idem, New Perspectives on Historical Writing (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), chap. n; Robert A. Rosenstone, "Experiments in Writing the Past—Is Anybody Interested?" Perspectives (newsletter of the American Historical Association), 30, no. 9 (Dec. 1992), 10, 12, 20; and Stephan Yeo, "Whose Story? An Argument from within Current Historical Practice in Britain," Journal of Contemporary History, 21 (April 1986), 295-320. For more on this topic see Chapter 9.


2. Narratives and Historicism


bana: University of Illinois Press, 1977), p. 20. Although Haskell argued this specifically in relation to Thomas Kuhn's conception of a paradigm, I trust the interpretation I give his sentence does not distort his larger meaning.


14. This term, borrowed from Gilbert Ryle and popularized in the human sciences by Clifford Geertz, has its own context and therefore meaning in Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), chap. 1, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture." Geertz put forth this term as a way of describing culture "as interworked systems of construable signs . . . culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed, it is context, something within which they can be intelligibly—that is thickly—described"; p. 14.

15. Although Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 18-20, argues that contextualism is only one of four modes of formal argument available to historians, he also admits that it "can be regarded as a combination of the dispersive impulses behind Formism on the one hand and the integrative impulses behind Organicism on the other hand." Since it tries to avoid the abstraction of organicism and mechanism, he asserts, it is preferred in normal historical practice, along with formism.

16. Dominick LaCapra offers a stimulating list of six kinds of contexts in "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts," in Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives, ed. Dominick LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 57-78; reprinted in Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 35-59. Dale H. Porter's hierarchy of levels of abstraction in historical analysis, from the whole event and individuals through social groups, institutions, and ideational elements, to major forces or factors and the universal significance of the event(s), in The Emergence of the Past: A Theory of Historical Explanation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 86-97, "can be read as kinds of context. He uses the Reform Bill of 1832 in England as his example in applying these levels, but one can just as well read the example as ways of contextualizing an event in normal history.

17. As E. P. Thompson argued, for example, in "Anthropology and the Discipline of Historical Context," Midland History, 1 (Spring 1972), 41-55. As Michael Kammen observes, "a scrupulous attention to context" is one of the "most distinctive attributes" of the historical craft; Selvages & Biases: The Fabric of History in American Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 36.


the ideal of historicity demands the very notion of anachronism, however, is the argument of Jonathan Réé, "The Vanity of Historicism," New Literary History, 22 (Autumn 1991), 978-981, for the present could not describe or explicate the past without committing anachronism.


24. Only social scientific historians seem to have tried to apply what is called the covering law model of historical explanation to their analysis of evidence and the building of models. Many of the important articles are reprinted in Patrick Gardiner, ed., Theories of History (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 344-475. See Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, pp. 110-155, ed. exposition and analysis of the covering law model exponents and their narrativist opponents. Contextualism poses conceptual problems for the social scientific historian because it seems to be a case of all—that is, only—dependent variables without any independent ones to explain the phenomena under investigation.


27. I maintain this despite the arguments by McCullagh, "Colligation and Classification in History," and Walsh, "Colligatory Concepts in History," on the use of general classificatory terms for colligation, such as "revolution" and "renaissance."


31. Ibid., p. 459.


34. Compare Walsh, "Colligatory Concepts in History"; McCullagh, "Colligation and Classification in History"; and Cebik, "Colligation and the Writing of History."


36. Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History, p. 457, argues that Zeitgeist and "climate of opinion" are closely associated with colligation. "Paradigm" is the well-known term of Michel Kuhn and "episteme" (my anglicization of epistéme) the equally well-known term of Michel Foucault from The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon, 1970).

37. To emphasize that the presumption of rupture between present and past is foundational to historical discourse, Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), speaks of the dead and absent of history as the Other, for example, on pp. 2, 14, 38, 46-47, 99.

38. The words "narrative" and "narration" pose terminological problems for those who would be precise about the differences among a narrative as a product, narration as the process for its production, the principles governing both that product and its production, and the study of those principles. No one set of terms has gained total acceptance to clarify the distinctions, but I have tried in this book to use "narrative" only for the product. "Narration" is the telling of the narrative, or the recounting of a story, but seems inadequate to refer both to the overall process involved in producing narratives in general and to the principles involved in the practice. Those who discuss narratives employ "narrativity" to refer to the principles underlying narratives, or what accounts for their form and structure. To differentiate between narration as narrating, the telling of a story, and its principles, I have followed those scholars who employ "narrativization" as the term for the general processes of producing narratives and the principles underlying them. The explicit, formal study of the principles underlying narratives and narration is called "narratology"; narratologists seek, in short, a general theory of narrativity and narrativization. Gerald Prince, A Dictionary of Narratology (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), provides one introduction to these terms.


40. William Cronon, "A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative," Journal of American History, 78 (March 1992), 1349, n. 3, claims that he will use story and narrative interchangeably as a result of the difficulty of differentiating the two, but he defines narrative on p. 1367. Thomas M. Leitch, What Stories Are: Narrative Theory and Interpretation (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), explores the difficulty in trying to specify his main title. The problem is especially exemplified in the effort to follow the same supposed narrative across media, for example, a novel or history made into a film.

41. I follow Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, pp. 178-179, in taking this position on the nature of narrative and plot. Compare the notion of emplotment in Chapter 3. This approach to sequence in narrative was taken by E. M. Forster in Aspects of the Novel (London: Methuen, 1927).

42. Seymour Chatman, Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 9, specifies not only causality but also a special kind of contingency as crucial to the narrative.

43. This is the issue dividing those debating, first, the covering law model versus the narrative model in Anglo-American philosophy, for which see Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, pp. 113-155; Porter, The Emergence of the Past, pp. 24-62; and F. R. Ankersmit, "The Dilemma of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History," History and Theory, 25, no. 4 (1986), an issue titled "Knowing and Telling History: The Anglo-Saxon Debate," pp. 1-27; and second, the nature of plot and narrative, for which see Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, and the works cited below in note 46.

44. See Hayden White on the difference customarily presumed between annal and chronicle on one hand and history on the other in "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," in idem, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), pp. 1-25; but see his additional comments on the matter in ibid., p. 42.

45. Even in so-called postmodern narratives? See the conclusion of Chapter 7. Historians have long had problems with the idea of causation, as Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History, pp. 31-39, acknowledges. This concern about causation has been exacerbated in the debates over historical structure versus historical agency in post-Marxian theory and by the fusion of text and context in so much of poststructuralist and New Historicist theorizing.

46. In addition to Leitch, What Stories Are, Wallace Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (London: Methuen, 1983); and Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of the Narrative (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), survey modern theories of narratology. Prince, A Dictionary of Narratology, offers a guide to the vocabulary of the field as well as bibliography. For some indication of the different approaches to narrative in history these days, see the special issue on "The Representation of Historical Events," History and Theory, 26, no. 4

50. The idea of "whole" and "total" present problems that are discussed under employment and patterning in Chapter 5 and under totalization in politics in Chapter 8.


53. Does this mean that historians have what might be termed a "big picture" of history as plenitude, one that postulates a surplus of "facts" that are not completely narrativized by any story at all? Does this notion of surplus unnarrativized facts lie at the base of the historical profession's preference for specialization in a "field" and "period" in order to get the "in-depth" knowledge needed for a big picture of an era? 54. W. H. Walsh distinguished between modern critical philosophy of history and the older speculative philosophy of history in his Philosophy of History, pp. 13-28. See the distinction at work in the entry "Philosophy of History" in Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History, pp. 319-324. Because of the particular meaning given "metanarrative" first by the speculative philosophers of history and, more recently, by Jean-Francois Lyotard as the grand stories of emancipation, progress, etc., I do not equate metanarrative with Great Story. In essence the metanarratives of Lyotard and the histories postulated by the speculative philosophers of history serve the same intellectual and ethical ends. Karl Popper condemned such speculative metanarratives as historicism and devoted The Poverty of Historicism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) and The Open Society and Its Enemies, 4th ed. rev., 2 vols. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), to their refutation. See also Burleigh T. Wilkins, Has History Any Meaning? A Critique of Popper's Philosophy of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and D'Amico, Historicism and Knowledge, esp. chaps. 1-2.


60. Ibid., p. 131.
61. Ibid., p. 132.
62. Ibid., p. 131.
66. Could not the essays in Theda Skocpol, ed., Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), be read with this point in mind?
3. Historical Representations and Truthfulness


2. "Interpretation" is a much-used but poorly defined word in historical practice. It possesses multiple meanings depending upon the philosophical affiliations and political purposes of the user, and it has gained new meaning and importance as a result of the so-called interpretive turn in the human sciences. See, for example, the brief history of the professor's usage given in Harry Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 243-250. Compare, for literary theory, Steven Mailloux, "Interpretation," in Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 121-134. Two attempts from different perspectives to clarify the term in relation to history are Hayden White, "Interpretation in History," in idem, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 51-80; and Marvin Levich, "Interpretation in History: Or What Historians Do and Philosophers Say," History and Theory, 24, no. 1 (1985), 44-61.

3. Although the overall purpose of the distinctions may be the same, the actual implications for the three fields of study are quite different. Story and discourse are discussed in Chapter 4. Other important aspects of interpretation, bias and the problems of partiality, are discussed in Chapter 6.

4. In my scheme, a Great Story may include one or more interpretations, just as an interpretation may depend on two or more Great Stories.


Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of Trance, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4; and (I could not resist including) Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944).


69. Tilly, Big Structures, pp. 80-84; Skocpol, Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, pp. 362-386.

70. Tilly, Big Structures, pp. 7-10.

71. Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, p. 4.

19. Michael Krausz, "Ideality and Ontology in the Practice of History," in van der Dussen and Rubinoff, *Objectivity, Method, and Point of View*, pp. 97-99, clarifies the relationship between the notion of pluralism of historical interpretations and what he terms singularism and multiplicity. The singularist ideal postulates one best or right interpretation, while the multiplist ideal recognizes the incommensurability of two or more right interpretations. A pluralist ideal can mean the latter, or it might postulate that the variety of interpretations ought to and can be reconciled to produce one best or right interpretation. The elephant analogy is the latter, of course; I would like to argue for the former usage. Compare the terms "uni-perspectivism" and "trans-perspectivism" (borrowed from William Dray and "inter-perspectival" in Lionel Rubinoff, "Historicity and Objectivity," ibid., pp. 139-141, which describe respectively the transcendent authority of one particular viewpoint, various viewpoints approaching (one) reality asymptotically, and mutually constituted and interacting viewpoints that may converge.


21. Cronon, "A Place for Stories," pp. 1350-51. Most of this chronicle is cast in sentences that are minimal narratives in themselves. See the definition of minimal narrative in Chapter 5.

22. Ibid., pp. 1370-71.

23. Ibid., p. 1371.

24. Ibid., pp. 1371, 1372.

25. I take considerable liberty with his second criterion by offering what I consider the general implications of his specifically environmentalist approach to nature as material, hence ultimate, reality.


33. Compare "Event," ibid., pp. 138-142; and the idea of colligation as a collective noun in note 79 below. See also the concept of the narratio as developed by Ankersmit in *Narrative Logic* and summarized in "The Use of Language in the Writing of History," pp. 64-78. That historical evidence comes already interpreted is also argued by Carlo Ginzburg, "Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian," *Critical Inquiry*, 18 (Autumn 1991), 79-92.


37. Probably few historians in these multicultural times would assert such a generalization as "fact," given the revised view of how little emancipation and Reconstruction accomplished for African Americans, let alone for Native Americans and other minority Americans. But even in this regard this revisionist view must also be constructed and contextualized in accordance with other Great Stories. Both Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1930), chap. 18; and Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1865-1877* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), pp. xxiii-xxiv, speak of the Civil War as the "Second American Revolution," but with quite different emphases. What the Beards saw as the most revolutionary aspect of the war—the "silent shift of social and material power" from a Southern plantation aristocracy to Northern capitalists and free farmers—is subordinated by Foner to the "transformation of slaves into free laborers and equal citizens," particularly the active role of African Americans in achieving that transformation.

38. Ankersmit, *Narrative Logic*, pp. 58-66, argues that analysts of historical narratives miss the point if they reduce a narratio to mere conjunctions or sequences of sentences (p. 59).

39. Ibid., pp. 66-78. His theory of the relationship among a narratio, language, and reality is summarized in "The Use of Language in the Writing of History," pp. 71-78.
42. Paul Christianson, "Patterns of Historical Interpretation," ibid., pp. 47-71, proposes the notion of historical frameworks and levels of factuality.


56. See Muñoz, The Shapes of Time, chap. 7, on sources.


58. On the rhetorical artistry of social science history, see the example explicated by Donald N. McCloskey, "The Problem of Audience in Historical Economics: Rhetorical Thoughts on a Text by Robert Fogel," History and Theory, 24, no. 1 (1985), 1-22.

59. That res gestae equals historia rerum gestarum in normal historical practice is also the point of Muñoz, The Shapes of Time, chap. 8; and Barthes, "Historical Discourse," pp. 145-155, among others.

60. The generalizations in this paragraph hold even if we substitute "a" for "the" before Great Story and Great Past throughout.


62. Notable among the advocates of fusion in the United States, for example, are Hayden White and Hans Kellner. For some indication of the reaction to such an approach to history, see F. R. Ankersmit, "Historiography and Postmodernism," History and Theory, 28, no. 28 (1989), 137-153; and the reply by Perez Zagorin, "Historiography and Postmodernism: Reconsiderations," ibid., 29, no. 3 (1990), 263-274; and Ankersmit's reply to Zagorin, ibid., pp. 275-286.


64. Much of this discussion is premised, of course, on realistic novels. Suzanne Gearhart, The Open Boundary of History and Fiction: A Critical Approach to the French Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), problematizes the distinction between history and fiction by comparing the differing views of eighteenth-century thinkers and twentieth-century theorists on what constitutes the boundary. David Carroll, The Subject in Question: The Languages of Theory and the Strategies of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), argues that the distinction has been further eroded in recent decades by those metafictional novelists who deliberately subvert the boundaries through conscious appropriation of recent literary theory.


71. For a sampling of opinion on the differences between narrative in history and in fiction, see Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin Blarney and David Pellauer, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), chaps. 6, 8;


73. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

74. The essays in Whiteside and Issacharoff, *On Referring in Literature*, argue and illustrate the problems of referring and reference peculiar to fictional as opposed to nonfictional texts. See also Ryan, "Possible Worlds and Accessibility Relations"; and Margolin, "Reference, Coreference, Referring.

75. Clues to this context are often supplied by such paratextual matter as dust-jacket descriptions, advertisements, introductions, and stylistic conventions.

76. Ankersmit, *Narrative Logic*, pp. 19-27, argues that historical fiction is applied historical point of view rather than its creation.


81. For example, note the dichotomy posed in the title as well as in the text itself of Gordon Wood's oft-cited article, "Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 23 (Jan. 1966), 3-32.


83. The ethnocentrism, indeed cultural hubris, of contemporary industrial societies as embodied in normal or professional historical practice was the main target of Claude Lévi-Strauss in the last chapter of *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

84. See the classic article by David M. Potter appropriately titled "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," *American Historical Review*, 97 (July 1962), 924-950.


4. The New Rhetoric, Poetics, and Criticism


5. Emplotment


5. Hence Claude Levi-Strauss' argument about the synchronicity of all forms of history, even diachronical and dialectical ones, in the famous final chapter of *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).


7. Elizabeth Deeds Ernarth, *Sequel to History: Postmodernism and the Crisis of Time* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), esp. pt. 1, is good on the assumptions of time as a social construction. If the time of historical discursive practice is a social construction, then should "the historicization of time" be called more accurately "the historicization of time"?

to the ratification of the Constitution, ranged from a low of 3.6 percent to a high of 113 percent of the pages treating the time from Native American settlements to 1763.


29. Ibid., p. 296.

30. Ibid., p. 303. As Wilkins, *Has History Any Meaning?* pp. 18-19, points out, one could disapprove of the pattern found in all of history as well as approve of it. That history is meaningless is as much a philosophy of history as that it is meaningful. On the whole issue see J. F. M. Hunter, “On Whether History Has a Meaning,” in *Objectivity, Method, and Point of View: Essays in the Philosophy of History*, ed. W. J. van der Dussen and Lionel Rubinoff (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), pp. 87-96; and William Dray’s response, ibid., pp. 178-181.

31. Hayden White offers an interesting interpretation of the distinctions among chronicle, annal, and proper history that most working historians accept in “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” reprinted in *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), esp. pp. 42-44. There is a danger of overdrawing these distinctions in theory as opposed to what practice shows. Even annals can convey great meaning, if one takes the widespread popularity of a song by the pop singer Billy Joel, “We Didn’t Start the Fire,” as evidence. Most of the song’s verses recite the names of persons, places, and events in the news year by year from 1949, the year of the singer’s birth, to 1989 the year the song was written. The names range from those of politicians to sports figures and movie stars to fictional and real places. The events are drawn from the real and media worlds without implying that there is any difference. Overall, the selection seems miscellaneous except for rhyme and year. The choruses, however, are another matter, since they offer in their way a historical interpretation of the chronicle from the viewpoint of the singer’s generation (“The Lessons of Rock and Roll,” *Newsweek*, Jan. 29, 1990, p. 76). Similarly, William Cronon’s effort to write a bare chronicle of Great Plains history contained many sentences that could only be called minimal narratives themselves. Even as he tried to produce only a “chronological listing of events as they occurred in sequence” and “to remove as much sense of connection” as possible, he admitted that he introduced meaning and narrative (and Great Story) into his chronicle through the criterion of importance. William Cronon, “A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative,” *Journal of American History*, 78 (March 1992), 1350-51. How little or how much sense and pattern an annal or chronicle contains would seem to be a matter of how much common meaning through shared Great Stories writers and readers (or singers and listeners) bring to the text as opposed to any universal reading of these stories by “outsiders.” Nevertheless, the distinction is important in the historical profession’s understanding and justification of its practices.

33. No historian surpasses Paul Veyne, "Writing History," in declaring plot basic to historical practice. According to him, even "a theory is only the summary of a plot," p. 118.


37. Ibid., p. xi.


42. Quotations from ibid., p. 66. See pp. 67-68 for more on the paradox of time. Ricoeur acknowledges (pp. 155-161) that he derived the idea of narrativity as configural act from Louis Mink, J. P. Connerty, "History's Many Cunning Passages: Paul Ricoeur's Time and Narrative," *Poetics Today,* 11 (Summer 1990), 383-403, discusses Ricoeur's attempts to overcome dualisms of form and content, prefiguration and figuration, and text and context in fiction and history.

43. Is that what the anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace claims to have discovered in *Rochdale: The Growth of an American Village in the Early Industrial Revolution* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978)? P. xvi: "But what I did not really expect, and found to my considerable surprise, was the presence of 'plot'—that is to say, an organized structure of conflict among the main participants in the story that required a period of time before strategies of the sides combined toward resolution. It is this structure of conflict, among named persons about whom considerable information is known, that has made the work a poignant chronicle of struggles between well-intentioned men and women all striving toward a better age."

44. Examine, for instance, the sentences in Cronon's Great Plains chronicle as minimal narratives, "A Place for Stories," pp. 1350-51. Compare the definitions of "minimal narrative" and "minimal story" in Prince, *A Dictionary of Narratology,* p. 53. Is a synchronic history a narrative strictly speaking if a narrative needs at least two stages and a transition? Since any synchronic history presumes a similarly structured era before and after it as Great Story, it implicitly, if not explicitly, affirms its place in a narrative.


47. Said, *Beginnings,* pp. 5-6, distinguishes between beginnings and origins.


51. Margaret R. Somers, "Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English Working-Class Formation," *Social Science History,* 16 (Winter 1992), 590-630; the quotations are taken chiefly from pp. 590-598.

52. Cronon, "A Place for Stories," pp. 1351-52. These plot lines are fleshed out with variations and political subtexts on pp. 1352-67.


55. For example, Nancy Struweer, "Philosophical Problems and Historical Solutions," in Dauenhauer, *At the Nexus of Philosophy and History,* pp. 75-76, points out the prevalence of whiggism in histories, of philosophy by philosophers.
56. Manifestos for new histories in particular employ such visions of the past and future of historiography as progress. See, for example, Ernst Breisach, "Two New Histories: An Exploratory Comparison," ibid., pp. 138-156.


59. Stanley Aronowitz, in his new edition of False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. xxiii-xxxiv, writes about the (con)fusion between the social relations in the artisanal workshop and the republican vision of equality in studies of the working class in North American history, so important is the theme as moral and conceptual foundation to the Great Story of capitalism and industrialization in the United States.


61. Stow Persons, The Decline of American Gentility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), argued that the alienated intellectuals of recent times in the United States were the successors to the gentry who criticized the emerging social system that rendered them functionally useless and powerless.


65. Somers suggests her own alternative version of English history, ibid., pp. 615-616.


67. White, The Content of the Form, p. 65.


71. Thompson himself goes on to characterize his book as "a group of studies, on related themes, rather than a consecutive narrative" (ibid.).


76. White, The Middle Ground, p. ix, complains that even the so-called new Indian history followed this model. See Fabian, Time and the Other, for the theory behind this process.

77. The so-called New Immigration History repudiated this older emplotment by showing that immigration to the United States was an extension of changing economic and social situations in Europe rather than a reflection of changes in America. Bodnar, The Transplanted, is a synthesis of this scholarship and its new emplotment, esp. chap. 1.


79. Synchronic histories attempt a one-stage periodization, although they may be emplotted by such a standard literary form as irony.


81. What role does metaphor play in the stage theory of periodization? The four seasons and the seven stages of man, like the trinity, all hint at metaphorical founda-


83. For introductory surveys of these efforts see Bal, Narratology, chaps. 11-12; Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative, chaps. 4-6; and Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, chap. 9.


87. Ibid., p. 180-190.


6. Partiality as Voice and Viewpoint

1. Although the basic argument of this chapter was drafted before the publication of Philippe Carrard, Poetics of the New History: French Historical Discourse from Braudel to Chartier (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), which contains important observations on voice and point of view, I was able to use some of his argument and examples for my purposes.
9. Reflexive (Con)Textualization


4. This and the series that follow do not pretend to be either definitive in the number of their elements or comprehensive in what is covered under each element. Each series merely suggests a minimum of what seems necessary for reflexive contextualization.


6. Compare, for example, the editorial introductions by Robert Brent Toplin in Journal of American History, 73 (Dec. 1986), 819-821; and by Robert Rosenstone in American Historical Review, 94 (Oct. 1989), 1031-33, inaugurating the film review sections in those journals, as well as subsequent reviews for differences about what kinds of films to review and how to review them as historical representations. From these two sections one could construct a spectrum of films ranging from documentary histories to historical fiction to fictional history, just like the range mentioned above in Chapter 3. See also Lonnie Bunch and Spencer Crew, "Exhibits and Interpretive Programs: Critical Elements of a Good Review," Perspectives, 29 (Dec. 1991), 12-14, for museum presentations.

7. Such as those efforts already in existence for classrooms that combine traditional text with contrasting interpretations, documents, pictures, artifacts, oral interviews, film excerpts, gaming simulation, and other methods through the aid of computers and CD-ROM media.

8. Both Hayden White and Richard Rorty have been accused of ethical relativism in their approaches to history and philosophy. For White see, for example, Saul Friedlander, ed., Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). Jack W. Meiland and Michael Krausz, eds., Relativism: Cognitive and Moral (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), contains essays on these two kinds of relativism.


15. Compare the complaint of Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 259-261, that liter-
ary theory does not map or chart society and operates in too eclectic a fashion. Is this criticism based on too unqualified an objectivist realism?

16. For these and other questions see, for example, Geoff Eley, "Is All the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Society Twenty Years Later," in The Critical Turn in the Social Sciences, ed. Terrence McDonald (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming); and Bannet, Postcultural Theory, pp. 5-13.

17. Guidebooks to such models in the social sciences can be reread as taxonomies of such models in history, for example, Christopher Lloyd, Explanation in Social History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).


20. In addition to McKerrow, "Critical Rhetoric and the Possibility of the Subjective," the role of the self in postmodernist theory is raised in Flax, Thinking Fragments.

21. A major theme of Freadman and Miller, Re-Thinking Theory.


33. A clear message of Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). Compare the essays
34. An interesting effort to cope with these problems in social and political theory is the glossary in Alford and Friedland, *Powers of Theory*, pp. 444-451, showing that the same concepts are expressed by different words or phrases depending upon whether they are part of pluralist, managerial, or class perspectives on society, capitalism, the state, democracy, and "knowledge." For the purposes of my argument here, the last category is the most pertinent. Their whole book is an attempt at resolving conflicting presuppositional frameworks in what is today a highly contested area of scholarship. Their resolution, however, used theories from the various conflicting problematics as answers to questions they posed according to the common overall framework they had developed.

35. Since social science historians emphasized their models and theories through explicit discussions in the text, they were more reflexive according to that criterion than were the authors of the books cited in note 34. An approach to the French Enlightenment, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31 (Jan. 1989), 180-184. One of the editors, Reinhart Koselleck, explains the connection between "Begriffsgeschichte and Social History" in *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 73-91.


47. Peter De Bolla, "Disfiguring History," *Diacritics*, 16 (Winter 1986), 55-57.


49. Compare the dilemma of representationalism with what Sande Cohen, in *Historical Culture: On the Recoding of an Academic Discipline* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 100, calls the "semiotic absolute": "The conceptual result is that no instance of historical narration can say the way it tells what is shown as it tries to show: this silence of every historical narrative can say the way it tells what is shown is a semiotic absolute."


54. Mieke Bal, "First Person, Second Person, Same Person: Narrative as Epistemology," *New Literary History*, 24 (Spring 1993), 293-320. Offers this scheme for specifying the nature of the narrative site. One of her exemplars of the proper approach is an art history.

55. According to Thomas R. Flynn, "Michel Foucault and the Career of the Historical Event," in Dauenhauer, *At the Nexus of Philosophy and History*, p. 105, n. 22, Paul Veyne employed the image of the kaleidoscope to describe Foucault's mode of textualizing. Foucault, of course, used the notion of Bentham's Panopticon to describe the development of a new incarceral architecture of discipline and, by extension, the surveillant nature of modern society.


60. For example, ibid., pp. 48-49.

61. As he acknowledged in The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 3-4.

62. Linda Nicholson, Gender and History: The Limits of Social Theory in the Age of the Family (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), presents a self-acknowledged feminist (but normal) history of changing political and economic theory about the public/private spheres in Western society since 1500. Denise Riley, "Am I That Name?" feminism and the Category of "Women" in History (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), also uses a traditional approach to the past in explicating her topic.


64. Ermarth, Sequel to History, esp. pt. 3.

65. Flynn, "Foucault and the Career of the Historical Event," discusses several kinds of events employed by Foucault, including what he terms the "series event."

66. Thomas L. Slaughter, "The Historian's Quest for Early American Culture(s), c. 1750-1825," American Studies International, 24 (April 1986), 29-59, analyzes nineteen books according to whether they assume static or dynamic, homogeneous or heterogeneous models of American society for the first half of the 18th century.


68. In addition to Foucault's own writings on this matter, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), cover Foucault's treatment of subject and object practices throughout their book, but particularly in chaps. 7-8; but see again Flynn, "Foucault and the Career of the Historical Event."

69. Should one read in this light the efforts of Marshall Sahlins in Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981) and Islands of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) to reconstruct event and structure in terms of each other?


71. For examples of combining oral and documentary history, folk and professional, personal and other histories in different ways, see Timothy H. Breen, Imagining the Past: East Hampton Histories (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1989); Ronald Fraser, In Search of a Past: The Manor House, Ammersfield, 1933-1945 (London: Verso, 1984); Martin Duberman, Black Mountain: An Exploration in Community (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972).

72. Particularly pertinent to this complex subject is Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernity, esp. chap. 6, "The Postmodern Problematizing of History," which first appeared in English Studies in Canada, 14 (Dec. 1988), 365-399. Cohen, Historical Culture, maintains that traditional forms of narrativization necessarily limit or contain political diversity and conflict.

73. Greg Dening, Mr. Bligh's Bad Language: Passion, Power and Theatre on the Bounty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Given the complexity of Dening's organization and representation, I can do no more than suggest what in my opinion he attempts.

74. Compare, however, Philippe Carrard's judgment on what the Annalists have achieved in hybrid style, genres, and polyphony of voices; Poetics of the New History: French Historical Discourse from Braudel to Chartier (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 221-225.

75. Burke discusses some new ways of writing history in the introduction and chap. 11 of New Perspectives on Historical Writing. How far does the new cultural history expand the nature of historical representation as form, interesting as the results may be? See, for example, Lynn Hunt, ed., The New Cultural History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), esp. the introduction; and Roger Chartier, Cultural History: Between Practices and Representation, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).


79. If we use the authors represented in Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, ed., Culture through Time: Anthropological Approaches (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), interesting as some of their efforts may be to reconcile synchronic symbolic anthropology with a diachronic historical analysis or combine the varying macro and micro structures of different societies in interaction.

80. Numerous examples include Richard Price, Alabi's World; Dening, Mr. Bligh's Bad Language; Stephen A. Tyler, The Unspeakable: Discourse, Dialogue, and Rhetoric in the Postmodern World (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987);

81. Will new reflexive and dialogic textualizations of history also eventuate in such typographic and other innovations as Tyler, *The Unsayable*; the complicated textual organization of Malcolm Ashmore, *The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology of Scientific Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); and Boon, *Affinities and Extremes*, as they attempt to reflect on their own reflexivity?


84. Cushing Strout, "Border Crossings: History, Fiction, and Dead Certainties," *History and Theory*, 31, no. 2 (1992), 156. This review is interesting not only for what it says about Schama's book but also for what it says about normal historical practice.

85. Perhaps few books offer a greater challenge to historical juxtaposition and the construction of context than music and popular culture critic Greil Marcus' *Lipstick Traces: A Secret History of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), which connects surrealism, the Paris Commune, and even radical Anabaptists of the 1530s to punk rock and post-Second World War countercultural tradition. His fragmented text, with its many juxtaposed quotations, descriptions of persons and events, and personal reminiscences, enhances the message through the use of the medium.

86. Dominick LaCapra, *History and Criticism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), offers one example of a newer approach to criticism within the profession, as does Carrard, *Poetics of the New History*, from without. Compare the provocative readings of Cohen, *Historical Culture*, as a model for criticism in as well as of the profession.

87. The word "new" is always difficult for historians to use, and never more so than when it is applied to historical discourses themselves. Too many previous calls for such a new history have been issued, each claiming to transform discourse and professional practice. The lesson of such a history is that new histories quickly become old, assimilated, superseded, or more manifesto than contribution. On new history as trope in historical discourse see, for example, Ernst Breisach, "Two New Histories: An Exploratory Comparison," in Dauenhauer, *At the Nexus of Philosophy and History*, pp. 138-156, which compares the New History of James Harvey Robinson and the *Annales* school.

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As the abundance of notes makes clear, I owe a great deal to many scholars. Indeed, I perhaps owe the most to those who shaped my ideas so early that they are not even cited here.

In some ways the starting point for this book was the conclusion of *A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis* (New York: Free Press, 1969), which ended with a query about how best to present history in light of modernist fictional techniques. While I pondered the implications of new forms of historical (re)presentation, the English translations of Michel Foucault's *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* appeared and, not long afterward, Hayden White's *Metahistory*. Both authors stimulated structuralist and formalist thinking about both the writing and the reading of history. My own initial thinking about those issues culminated in a long paper, "The Irony of Metahistory," which was presented in the 1970s to sessions at the Organization of American Historians, conferences at the Hobart and William Smith Colleges and the University of Wyoming, and a colloquium of the Harvard American Civilization program. The comments of Thomas Haskell and Mary Young were particularly helpful at this stage.

Other projects intervened, and when I returned to the earlier one, in 1980, poststructuralist theory had reached America. Richard Vann and Dominick LaCapra kindly commented on a revised outline of the book. David Hollinger, then my colleague in the Department of History at the University of Michigan, encouraged me to summarize my thinking in another long article, versions of which were read at a conference on comparative history at Northwestern University, the new humanities centers at the Universities of Maryland and Utah, and a department of history colloquium at the University of California at Los Angeles, where Eric Monkmonkon and Joyce Appleby acted as gracious hosts and discerning critics. Allan Megill was especially
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Several individuals tried to overcome my particular political and philosophical prejudices. Joan Scott and Martin Burke read the whole manuscript from quite different political and philosophical perspectives to my enormous benefit, although I continue to steer a different course than either would wish. Jonathan Beecher, Genevieve Berkhofer, Aida Donald, Michael Geyer, Gail Hershatter, and Hayden White made the book more complete and better argued by their own queries and arguments. The differences among their reactions to the manuscript provided me with firsthand applications of reader-response theory. Members of a graduate seminar on historical methodology at the University of California at Santa Cruz gave an early draft of the manuscript a "test run" to my enormous benefit. My editor, Ann Hawthorne, helped all subsequent readers by compelling me to say just what I meant as precisely as possible. Because of the differences among my friendly critics, I alone am ultimately responsible for what is argued in these pages.

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generous in his detailed analysis of the paper, which became the basis of "The Challenge of Poetics to (Normal) Historical Practice," published in Poetics Today, 9, no. 2 (1988), 435-452, and subsequently reprinted in Paul Hernadi, ed., The Rhetoric of Interpretation and the Interpretation of Rhetoric (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 183-200. I am grateful to Paul Hernadi for the invitation to participate in the lecture series sponsored by the Humanities Center at the University of California at Santa Barbara, which led to the special issue of Poetics Today and to the book, and for his many helpful comments on the article at each stage. I thank the Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics of Tel Aviv University and Duke University Press for permission to include various parts of that article in sections of Chapters 2 and 3 of this book.

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Subsequent revision as a result of further reading in feminist and postmodernist theory enlarged both the text and the vision of the book to its present form. That undertaking was made possible by salaried leaves from the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and the University of California at Santa Cruz, particularly with the help of Deans Peter Steiner and Gary Lease. As I completed the first revision, cultural studies, New Historicism, and feminist and postmodernist theory all challenged one another, more often as soliloquy than as dialogue. Part of my response to this challenge was an essay titled "A Point of View on Viewpoint in Historical Practice," first presented to the Cultural Studies colloquium at the University of California at Santa Cruz and soon to be published in A New Philosophy of History, edited by Frank R. Ankersmit and Hans Kellner. I thank both the editors for their comments and Reaktion Books for permission to republish these words as some sections of Chapter 7. Finally, I am grateful for permission from W. W. Norton to quote at length from The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West, copyright © 1987 by Patricia Nelson Limerick.